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Abstract 
This research seeks to address long-standing empirical questions about human morality 
arising from the critical sociological tradition.  It examines, in social-psychological terms, the 
theoretical contention that systems of ownership predicated on exclusionary conceptions of 
what is “mine” and/or “ours” causes people to overlook or decidedly ignore the needs of 
others and of society at large.  More specifically, it draws upon the theoretical works of Karl 
Marx, Erich Fromm, Erik Erikson, and C. B. Macpherson to examine the relationships 
between individuals’ attitudes toward private property relations and the kinds of “active” or 
“passive” cognitive processes individuals use when reasoning about moral problems.  
A sample of 139 graduate and undergraduate students completed an online survey that 
contained both established and exploratory attitude scales pertaining to property ownership 
norms, humanism, and possessive individualism.  Following the psychological research of 
Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, participants were also asked to express moral judgments 
on two hypothetical moral dilemmas, and their responses were coded according to 
characteristics of morally “heteronomous” or “autonomous” reasoning.  OLS regressions 
were conducted to investigate the relationships between these forms of moral reasoning and 
the aforementioned attitude scales.   
The study’s results suggest a positive relationship between cognitive moral autonomy and 
humanism, as well as for the inverse relationship between cognitive moral autonomy and 
both private property attitudes and possessive individualism.  These findings provide general 
(albeit tentative) support for certain theoretical critiques of private property within the 
Marxist-humanist tradition, namely the premise that private property norms are at odds with 
the exercise of autonomous moral cognition. Theoretical implications of these findings, both 
for the Marxian theoretical tradition and for the development of a critically oriented social-
psychology of morality are also addressed. 
Keywords 
Morality, Property, Ownership Psychology, Marx, Critical Sociology, Humanism, Fromm, 
Kohlberg, Autonomy, Possessive Individualism    
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Chapter 1  
1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about the way people think about things that are “theirs.”  It explores, 
in social-psychological terms, the individual’s capacity for moral autonomy in a society 
dominated by private property.  
Classical social theorists from Karl Marx (1990, 1992) and Friedrich Engels (1942, 
1976), to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1994) have made the institution of private property a 
central issue in their moral criticism of modern society, pointing to its psychologically 
oppressive tendency to pit the perceived interests of owners against non-owners 
specifically, and persons against persons more generally, and to legitimize self-interest 
over considerations of the greater human community.  Max Weber’s climactic image of 
the “iron cage” (stalhartes Gehäuse) in his foreboding conclusion to The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism is likewise posited in direct reference to the “increasing and 
finally inexorable power” that “the care for external goods” might wield under the 
rationalizing forces of modern capitalism (1930: 123–124).   
During the twentieth century, theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition such as Max 
Horkheimer (1947, 1989, 1993), Theodor Adorno (1989), Herbert Marcuse (1964, 1972), 
and Erich Fromm (1976) specified this analysis to the proliferation of instrumental 
rationalization within bourgeois society, drawing links between “mass” consumer culture, 
ideological manipulation, and the truncation of individuals’ critical reasoning faculties 
(see also, Horkheimer and Adorno 1972).  Non-Marxists, too, such as Hannah Arendt 
(1958; Suchting 1962), Bertrand Russell (1961) and C.B. Macpherson (1962, 1966, 
1978a, 1978b, 1979) have postulated connections between the institution of private 
property ownership and a burgeoning sense of people’s individuation and 
disembeddedness from their material and social environment.  Subsequent research in 
critical sociology (e.g. Badiou 2014; Bauman 2008; Billig 1999) has similarly directed its 
attention to the processes and effects of consumer capitalist proliferation and the 
concomitant atomization of the individual. 
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And, while such critiques attended to the various cultural and political-economic 
implications of bourgeois hegemony, it is the Marxist-humanist tradition, carried forward 
most notably by Erich Fromm, that most directly connects the problem of property 
ownership to the problems of morality.  Fromm’s corpus consistently tackles not only 
cognitive concerns with moral autonomy (1947, 1950, 1968, 1970, 1973, 2010) but also 
the moral concern for cognitive autonomy (1955, 1956, 1969, 1994). That is to say, 
Marx’s and Fromm’s social analyses entail both a social-psychological diagnosis of the 
immature “social character” with which moral problems are addressed in society, and a 
moral critique of how that immaturity is rendered through societal conditions that 
promote possessiveness, greed, and crude materialism.  
Despite the extensive theoretical criticism about private ownership norms, however, 
empirical psychological evidence to support these claims has rested largely on discursive 
psychoanalytic methods (e.g. Fromm 1976), and quantitative investigation remains 
scarce.  The broader thesis expressed in Marx’s and Fromm’s works, as well as the work 
of the above mentioned theorists—that differences between individualistic versus 
collectivistic orientations to resource allocation are related to deeper cognitive differences 
between what may be termed moral autonomy and heteronomy (cf. Piaget 1965)—will be 
explored throughout this dissertation in various ways.  Thus, it is the theoretical objective 
of this dissertation to advance the field of critical social-psychological inquiry by 
exploring the moral significance of private property relations for the modern individual.  
It is the empirical task of this dissertation to trace the connection between the subjective 
valuation of property ownership norms and the objective phenomenon of human moral 
cognition. 
This dissertation is, therefore, also about the way people confront moral problems.  
However, it does not address people’s “moral” or “social” character as such, nor does it 
place much stock analytically in particular pre-constructed ethical philosophies (e.g., 
utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics) or people’s behavioural or attitudinal conformity 
to them.  Rather, it builds upon the cognitive developmental social psychologies of Jean 
Piaget (1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1984) in order to examine how individuals 
themselves apperceive their view of the relevant moral dimensions of a given dilemma, 
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and how they construct “moral solutions” for dilemmas.  Its purpose is to scratch the 
surface of understanding how actors come to engage moral issues and troubles regarding 
property ownership in their personal and public lives.  It takes as its analytical point of 
departure the observation that when faced with a dilemma of “right” action and tasked 
with making a moral judgment (“what ought to be done?”), people utilize cognitive 
operations in order to evaluate the relative significance of various practical and ethical 
factors for making a decision (Habermas 1979; Kohlberg 1984; Piaget 1965).  As will be 
discussed below, this process may be undergone in a more or less passive or active 
fashion, depending on whether one’s deliberations are guided more significantly by the 
heteronomous authority of societal conventions (e.g. norms, traditions, ideologies, 
pressures), or by the autonomous reasons constructed by one’s own critical thinking 
(Kohlberg 1984; Piaget 1965).  This dissertation will compare these two types of moral 
cognition, analyze the relationship they have to attitudinal predictors concerning 
ownership, and discuss the sociological significance of this relationship. 
Thus, this dissertation addresses the connection between two variables: moral reasoning 
and attitudes about property ownership.  And while a study relating these two variables 
may perhaps appear arbitrary—what, after all, does something as “subjective” as moral 
cognition have to do with something so “objective” as ownership?—my aim in this 
dissertation is to demonstrate that there exist empirical grounds for supporting the attacks 
advanced by Karl Marx and other radical humanists (e.g., Erich Fromm) concerning the 
deleterious effects bourgeois property exerts on the modern individual’s moral 
sensibilities about the world around them.  In the following chapters, I argue not only that 
there exists a statistical relationship between attitudes to private property and moral 
reasoning, but also that this relationship reveals a truncation of morally autonomous 
thought in cases where bourgeois morality is most strongly held. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
At least three distinct bodies of literature inform the current study’s social psychological 
investigation of attitudes toward property and their relationship with moral cognition: 
critical social theory, ownership psychology, and the sociology of morality.  While each 
of these domains of research provide important insight into the moral significance of 
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property relations in modern society, they have yet to be fully integrated into a 
theoretically coherent research project.  As such, critically oriented empirical research on 
the social-psychology of property regimes is often constrained by disciplinary 
boundaries, leaving gaps within each of them that the others might fill.  
For instance, among the prevailing moral critiques of private property ownership, 
structuralist, materialist, and culturalist theories (especially their postmodern iterations) 
remain empirically inadequate for a full explanation of the processes by which ideologies 
and social norms are apperceived by individuals, and the factors which predict whether 
these processes are engaged passively or actively by individuals.  As a result, social 
criticism and theoretical proposals for equitable (re)distributions of resources such as 
those suggested by Marx or Proudhon have historically underestimated the durability of 
possessiveness as a social-psychological phenomenon, and capitalism as a socio-
historical phenomenon. 
On the other hand, the methodological individualism of cognitive psychological studies 
of ownership restricts inquiry to atomistic conceptualizations of property ownership in 
ways that may not adequately account for sociocultural, historical, and ethical factors that 
frame the intersubjective construction of ownership “rights” in the first place.  
Commonly, “ownership” is a notion conceptually limited to the relations and control over 
things by individuals (Bottomore 1994: 518; Hollawell 1982a, 1982b).   Cognitive 
psychological research thus finds itself conceptually under-equipped for dealing 
substantively with the broader socio-historical forces (e.g., global capitalist infrastructure, 
post-industrial consumerism, competition and contradiction between various normative-
ethical paradigms, etc.) that frame people’s day-to-day thinking about property 
ownership.   
Lastly, within the sociology of morality, there is burgeoning interest in exploring 
prevailing normative conceptions of fairness, freedom, and responsibility in ways that 
account for both individual and social-structural forces.  This research promises to 
expand upon the “old” sociologies of morality constructed by Durkheim and Weber by 
exploring the various overlapping and “cross-cutting” social factors which shape moral 
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codes, behaviours, and identities (Abend 2010; Hitlin and Vaisey 2013; Stets 2010).  
However, it currently remains underdeveloped in its incorporation of critical sociological 
theories of morality, particularly those which examine moral cognition as well as the 
contradictory relationship between society’s moral conventions and its capitalist 
economic structure.   
In exploring the relationship between moral reasoning and property ownership attitudes, 
the present study seeks not only to address some long-standing questions in the area of 
critical social theory, but also to establish a possible framework for a more integrated 
critical social psychology of morality. 
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Chapter 2  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the foundational literature on moral reasoning and the 
critical sociology of property ownership.  Given the tenuously explored connection 
between these two phenomena, its aim is not only to address the relevant literature in 
each domain of research but also to lay a groundwork for a critical social-psychological 
study of their relationship.   
Section I of the chapter presents a review of the social-psychological literature on 
morality, including a synopsis of the current state of social scientific and neuroscientific 
research on morality.  Specific focus is addressed to the importance (albeit 
underutilization) of the seminal work of Jean Piaget (1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg 
(1981, 1984) in these research areas.  This discussion is followed in Section II by a social 
ontology of property ownership, detailing its functioning as both a social relation and a 
social institution.  The section then turns to an overview and discussion of two 
analytically distinct forms of ownership in modern society: private and social ownership.  
Lastly, Section III of this chapter reviews other literature relevant to the current study. 
Here, Eriksonian research on the “humanistic value orientation” and C. B. Macpherson’s 
theory of “possessive individualism” will be presented as possible exploratory 
frameworks for understanding the sociocultural milieu in which the current study takes 
place. 
I. MORAL RESEARCH 
A. Social Science and the Meaning of “Moral” 
In recent years, academics from both the social and natural sciences have shown a 
renewed interest in morality as a topic of empirical investigation.  Eschewing traditional 
disciplinary boundaries that had formerly restricted the study of morality to the domains 
of philosophy and religious studies, researchers from the social and biological sciences 
are now attempting to examine questions of human morality in new and creative ways 
7 
 
that use scientific methodologies, techniques, and theories to directly confront normative-
ethical problems. 
The recent “explosion” in attention paid to the study of morality from legal scholars and 
neuroscientists (e.g. Churchland 1991, 2011), philosophers (Harris 2010), and 
psychologists (Green 2013; Haidt 2008, 2012) stands in contrast, however, to the 
reticence of many sociologists to take up morality as a full-fledged topic of inquiry 
(Hitlin and Vaisey 2010, 2013).  Not only do technological advances in psychology and 
neurobiology appear to threaten the relevance of “softer” forms of moral inquiry in the 
public mind (and the minds of funding agencies), but they proceed with such technical 
complexity that social scientists find themselves most often occupying the role of 
audience critic rather than participating in the production of knowledge.  Citing the 
proliferation of neurological research (e.g., of Haidt 2008, Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 
Turiel 2002, and others), Hitlin and Vaisey (2013) observe that, 
the further into the mind (sic1) that science delves, the further that sociological 
issues recede.  Viewed together, sociology’s decreased emphasis on morality 
coupled with psychology’s increased focus on biology and neuroscience paint a 
bleak picture for a robust understanding of the social dimensions of human morality 
(p. 53). 
But surely whatever “morality” is, it gains at least some of its meaningfulness from the 
domain of the social—through culture, language, kinship, tradition, political economy, 
law, and so forth—and therefore constitutes territory well suited to sociological 
exploration.   
And indeed, a cursory review of the classical sociological canon reveals the centrality of 
questions about human morality for the theoretical and empirical projects of Comte 
(1974), Durkheim (1957, 1974), Martineau (1838), Marx (1992), and Weber (1930; Stone 
2010).  Likewise, interest in morality appears in the twentieth century sociologies of 
Parsons (1951), Sorokin (1966), Gouldner (1970), Foucault (1999), Habermas (1979), 
                                               
1 One assumes that Hitlin and Vaisey (2013) here are in fact referring not to the mind but to the 
brain. 
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Bourdieu (1984), and Bauman (2008), as well as in the political and philosophical 
writings of C. Wright Mills (1959, 2008) and the Frankfurt School.  More recently, 
sociological discourse on morality has been stimulated both indirectly by Michael 
Burawoy’s (2005a, 2005b, 2009) call for a “public sociology,” and directly by the 
politicization of past moral and epistemological doctrines by intersectional theorists and 
activists (Munoz 1993). 
Theorists like Gabriel Abend (2010, 2011, 2013), Steven Hitlin (2008), Andrew Sayer 
(2010, 2011), and Jonathan Haidt (2008, 2012) have taken up the substantial task of 
explicating a research programme for a “new” sociology of morality and asserting its 
important role within a broader scientific division of labour in the field of moral inquiry 
(Hitlin and Vaisey 2013).  For Abend (2010), sociology faces the unique challenge and 
opportunity of ascertaining knowledge about the social nature of morality—that is, the 
structures, processes and forces which shape and sanction people’s conception of “moral” 
conduct.  Because Abend’s work both describes and reflects the prevailing epistemic and 
normative trends in social scientific research on morality it provides a useful point of 
departure for situating the current state of the “sociology of morality” literature.   
The “sociology of morality,” Abend (2010) explains, 
intends to develop a social-scientific understanding of morality, in the same sense 
that the sociologies of religion, literature, and science intend to develop social-
scientific understandings of religion, literature, and science.  Sociologies of 
morality should be able to obtain a special kind of knowledge, different from 
common sense knowledge, inaccessible to the the layperson, obtained using 
methods that the layperson doesn’t master, and so on (p. 563). 
Abend argues that the attainment of this “special kind of knowledge contains the same 
methodological and epistemological assumptions as the objectives pursued by early 
sociologists like Martineau (1938) and Durkheim (1938).  Indeed, the search for “what 
social independent variables account for the variance of moral dependent variables” is 
consistent across the history of sociology’s moral inquiry (Abend 2010: 571).  Both “old” 
and “new” sociologists of morality are concerned with the various social “factors” 
responsible for shaping moral rules, ideas, beliefs, institutions, norms, and so on (Abend 
2010).  How such variables are operationalized and measured may have changed, and the 
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language used to describe their relationship has softened (in light of criticism toward hard 
positivism), but what remains consistent is the deterministic logic of the mode of inquiry 
itself (Abend 2010).  Among the differences between “new” sociological inquiry into 
morality and its “older” counterpart is the shift toward a more descriptive, Weberian 
orientation to its subject matter. Hitlin and Vaisey (2013) describe this distinction thusly: 
A new approach to morality is emerging in sociology, one that is no longer wedded 
to the assumptions about universal internalization and unproblematic consensus that 
doomed functionalist theory.  If the old sociology of morality was Durkheimian—
seeing morality as a property of entire societies and binding its members together—
then the new sociology of morality is more Weberian.  Morality belongs to cross-
cutting groups and less to society as a whole (p. 53). 
This is an apt characterization of the current literature.  Presently, the theoretical 
standpoint among the field’s most prominent researchers is geared toward such Weberian 
interests as the variations in moral concerns across social groupings, the overlapping 
influences of different types of social action in moral behaviour, and an effort to maintain 
a value-neutral stance in the analysis and understanding of morality within society.   
Despite what optimism might be inspired by sociology’s potential niche in the scientific 
study of morality, there is currently an important conceptual deficiency within much of 
this literature: “morality” itself remains conceptually underdeveloped as both an 
empirical variable and a sociological phenomenon.  A review of the current literature 
finds very little theoretical effort to conceptualize what specifically sociologists mean by 
the term “morality”/“the moral”. This problem goes to the heart of sociology’s relevance 
to the study of moral inquiry, and it is no exaggeration to say that the resolution of this 
problem is crucial to the legitimacy of a claim to be studying a “special kind” of moral 
inquiry.   
It appears that, for many social scientists, the moral pertains, somewhat tautologically, to 
norms that are imbued with ethical weight.  That is, morality is analyzed by sociologists 
(e.g., Abend 2010, 2013; Gouldner 1970; Hitlin and Vaisey 2013) in terms of social 
conventions that compel behavioural adherence to a culturally established notion of 
goodness, rightness, propriety, and so on.  Jan Stets’ (2010) definition of morality 
provides an example of the meaning that many contemporary moral sociologists have for 
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morality: “broadly speaking, morality is the evaluative cultural codes that specify what is 
right or wrong, good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable in a society” (p. 544).  To 
conceptualize morality in terms of cultural codes and social acceptability, however, 
requires one to confront two critical problems: the problem of abstracting ‘the moral’ 
from concrete experience (and thus ignoring the moral standpoints—and moral agency—
of social actors), and the problem of conflating social conventions with morality proper.   
The “Thomas Theorem” reminds us that in the course of everyday lived experience, 
individuals participate (actively or passively) in apperceiving and defining situations, 
both practical and normative.2  If we consider that “cultural codes” are, by definition, 
forms of pre- and proscriptive rules for action—it becomes apparent that they only make 
sense in reference to social actions within a concrete (real or hypothetical) situation.  
Since a concern with morality implies a question of “ought,” it must be defined (at least 
indirectly) in reference to situations where more than one action is possible, where things 
could imaginably be otherwise; that is, where a moral dilemma is present.  Norms, 
principles, laws, commandments, and “evaluative cultural codes” only make sense when 
contextualized within a real or imagined sphere of dilemmas of human action, where they 
may be practiced or ignored.3  The fact that people may derive various moral meanings 
and draw divergent conclusions about the same issue suggests that the moral ‘substance’ 
of morality lies not in the “established cultural codes” themselves, but rather in the 
apperceptive process by which a person, upon encountering and interpreting a dilemma 
subjectively assesses (implicitly or explicitly) the relative ethical merits of various 
possible resolutions.   
                                               
2 The Thomas Theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” 
(Merton 1995: 380). 
3 A consideration of well-established “cultural codes” concerning actions like theft or generosity 
illustrate the contingency of moral justifiability on the particulars of a given situation.  Is stealing 
always wrong? Are we morally obligated to share?  To the extent that a person does not respond 
in absolutes, but instead qualifies their judgment with certain conditions and reasons, it is 
apparent that morality rests at least as much upon one’s “definition of the moral situation” as the 
cultural values one references in justifying their judgment. 
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B. Kohlberg and Morality 
Whereas morality in contemporary society (and sociology) is widely conceptualized in 
terms of an adherence to normative codes of behaviour, the theoretical and empirical 
approach to morality taken by Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984) raises the 
possibility of exploring active, self-reflexive qualities of moral cognition as well.  Indeed, 
the difference between “heteronomous” and “autonomous” orientations to morality is one 
of the major empirical distinctions at stake in the present study.  For Piaget, 
heteronomous reasoning refers to the application of norms to resolve dilemmas, whereas 
autonomous reasoning is capable of modifying rules and making exceptions to rules in 
the course of responding to the needs and claims of persons involved in a dilemma 
situation.  That is, while cognitive moral heteronomy relies upon the authority of 
established normative conventions, cognitive moral autonomy relies upon the active use 
of one’s own reason in order to apply norms deemed appropriate to the moral situation. 
For example, if one imagines a dilemma of a person stealing some food for a person who 
is very hungry, heteronomous logic would tend to find this “wrong” because stealing is a 
violation of a rule; conversely, autonomous reasoning might try to qualify this judgment 
by taking account of (or arguing) that the norm against stealing is insufficiently sensitive 
to guide one’s decision making in a dilemma such as this.   
In the developmental psychological and philosophical model developed by Kohlberg 
(1981, 1984), moral reasoning is invoked when addressing an hypothetical dilemma—a 
situation pitting competing claims or needs of persons against one another—and 
constitutes the reasoners’s attempt to prescribe a rational resolution in accordance with 
some conception of what constitutes the “good” or the “right” (see Harper 2009 for a 
detailed comparative analysis of these concepts and their relevance to conceptualizing 
“the ethical” and “the moral”).  Hence, the measure and evaluation of a respondent’s 
reasoning in Kohlberg’s (1968) early childhood moral development research invoked the 
notion of “the child as a moral philosopher” (p. 24). 
Kohlberg (1984) notes that philosophical conceptions of morality have four different 
orientations: normative order, which is oriented toward the adherence to rules; utility 
consequences, which is oriented toward the goodness or badness of the “welfare 
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consequences” of an action; justice/fairness, which emphasizes the relations of liberty, 
equality, reciprocity, and contract between persons”; and ideal self, in which the 
imagined image of the “good self” is brought to bear on moral decision-making (p. 183). 
Of these orientations, Kohlberg (1984) places greatest emphasis on the justice 
orientation, asserting that justice is the most fundamental characteristic of morality.  He 
reasons that since “moral situations are ones of conflict of perspective or interest,” and 
since “justice principles are concepts for resolving these conflicts,” the need for justice is 
inherently embedded in concerns for morality (ibid: 184).  Indeed, while one may act 
morally with varying regard for rules or the ‘greater good’, “one cannot act morally and 
question the need for justice” (ibid: 184; emphasis added).  In this sense, a normative 
order orientation uncritically takes for granted the validity of property rights, a 
utilitarian/consequentialist view fails to adequately quantify the moral weight of social 
contracts, and an ideal-self orientation neglects the political-economic roots of social 
inequality.  A justice orientation, however, must invoke a consideration of all of these 
issues in its resolutions because its conception of morality is seen to exist prior to social 
convention or particular circumstance.   
More recently, and in reference to Kohlberg’s (1984) six-stage moral development theory 
(to be described below), Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine (1990) have demonstrated that an 
adequate conceptualization of morality must also incorporate a principle of benevolence, 
or “active sympathy,” which “views the other and human interaction through the lens of 
intending to promote good and prevent harm to the other” (p. 157). Such an orientation 
stands in a kind of constructive tension with justice as the reasoner struggles to reconcile 
the intent to give each party “his/her due” against the preservation of each’s well-being 
(and vice versa).  It is only at the final stage of moral development (stage six) that the 
reasoner conceptualizes a resolution in which these imperatives “are at the same time 
mutually supportive and coordinated” under a principle of respect for persons (ibid: 157).  
According to Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine (1990),  
this coordination can be summarized thus: benevolence constrains the momentary 
concern for justice to remain consistent with the promotion of good for all, while 
justice constrains benevolence not to be inconsistent with promoting respect for the 
rights of individuals conceived as autonomous agents (pp. 157–158). 
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It follows that the principle of respect for persons concerns itself fundamentally with the 
dignity of human life, rather than life itself.  Consequently, the preservation of dignity 
necessitates that all potentially differing viewpoints be considered, and that morally 
adequate resolutions can only be approximated through a democratic process of dialogue 
(Kohlberg et. al 1990; Habermas 1979, 1990).   
This conception is particularly well suited to the purposes of the present study.  As I 
discuss below, property rights are widely and variously (mis)understood both culturally 
and legally, and it should go without saying that liberal, conservative, socialist, anarchist, 
and libertarian ideologies, to name a few, tend to have grossly disparate things to say 
about property and the “greater good.”  Common among these various political 
philosophies, however, is the fact that each one’s ethical conception of property is 
essentially based on claims to justice, fairness, and some appeal to social or individual 
well-being (i.e.: benevolence).  Kohlberg’s conception of the moral is therefore especially 
appropriate to the present study of how moral cognition relates to issues of property 
ownership.  It should also be noted that the integral principle of respect for persons also 
extends the moral imperative to a matter of dialogical principle, rather than ideology 
(although some political philosophies/ideologies may be better oriented toward dialogical 
and/or morally valid resolutions than others).  In this way, the study’s meta-ethical 
framework is distinguished from bias toward any particular political party or economic 
interest. 
1. Moral Development 
Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) theory of moral development implies a teleological progression 
of individuals’ cognitive structures of moral reasoning in which an individual may 
potentially develop through six different stages of moral cognition.  These stages 
constitute “structured wholes, total ways of thinking, not attitudes toward particular 
situations,” and, as such, encapsulate the structure of how an individual reasons about a 
dilemma, instead of the content of the reasoning process itself (Kohlberg 1981: 120).  
This is to say that each stage features a distinctly different arrangement and interaction of 
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cognitive operations.4  With each higher stage, the interaction among these cognitive 
operations becomes increasingly integrated and the reasoning more adequate in balancing 
relevant claims and points of view.  Stages occur in an invariant sequence in which each 
progressive stage constitutes (a) an ability to actively reconstruct the structures of 
reasoning in lower stages and (b) increasingly approximate a conception of justice and 
benevolence based on the highest stage, stage six (Kohlberg 1981).  Thus the superiority 
of one stage over another is evidenced by a reasoner’s ability to independently and 
accurately interpret lower stage reasoning while bringing to bear a more logically 
coherent, universalizable resolution with the use of a more advanced stage.   
The six stages can be more generally characterized according to their orientation to the 
conventional ethical norms of society, which Kohlberg groups into three “levels”: the 
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral levels.  The preconventional 
level, stages one and two, characterizes an acceptance of external rules and authority 
without necessarily having a clear understanding of the moral status of the claims and 
needs of others; the conventional level, stages three and four, characterize an 
internalization and purposeful orientation to rules, authority, and social expectations 
because they are the rules, authority, and expectations of self and other (stage three), or 
of society (stage four); and the postconventional level, stages five and six, characterizes 
an adherence to the principles that guide the norming of norms that underlie, and thus 
supersede, the conventional morality of society or any of its norms or institutions 
(Kohlberg 1984: 172–173).5   
Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine (1990) argue that the last stage in Kohlberg’s theory (stage 
six) is a cognitive structure that enables the articulation of a principled moral point of 
                                               
4 These operations include: equality, equity, reciprocity, universality, universalizability, 
prescriptive role taking, empathy, sympathy (Kohlberg 1984).  A synopsis of these operations is 
presented in Table 4.2, Chapter 4.  
5 In Kohlberg’s (1984) theory, Stage 5 is largely concerned with a prior to society focus on public 
welfare, maximizing utility and happiness, largely through institutionalizing notions of fair 
contracts.  It sees human beings as free to enter into contractual relationships with others, and that 
they ought to be free to do so.  
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view that always attempts to balance and weigh the moral relevance of competing claims 
when attempting to produce morally adequate judgments.  It therefore does not ignore 
norms, but it goes beyond simply appyling them “heteronomously.”  The assertion of a 
categorically imperative, universalizable principle implies the assumption that all 
reasonable people would hypothetically agree with the resolution to a dilemma if given 
sufficient time, resources, and communicative competency to discuss it democratically.  
The validation of such a claim therefore necessitates the elevation of justice and 
benevolence operations to the level of formal principle.  This is to say that all justice and 
benevolence operations, which had at earlier stages been restricted by egoism (at 
preoperational stages), normative conditioning (at conventional stages), and pragmatic 
constraints (at stage five), are no longer treated as optional considerations, but instead 
necessary components to be considered in order to construct a judgment’s moral 
adequacy (Kohlberg 1984).  “Given this self consciousness of moral agency and decision 
making,” writes Kohlberg (1984: 638), “the operations of prescriptive role-taking (i.e. 
balancing perspectives) and universalizability become operative principles as well as 
being validity checks on the reasons given for upholding moral laws or norms.”  As such, 
“stage six is not so much ‘based’ on a new social perspective beyond stage five’s notion 
of prior-to-society perspective” as it is on a deliberate, self-conscious use of the justice 
operations to ensure an adequate response to moral dilemmas. (Kohlberg 1984: 638).6  
Hopefully it is now clear that Kohlberg’s model therefore assumes that moral 
development is a progression toward a principled cognitive moral orientation, one that 
closely approximates a (hypothetical) universally accepted morality based on respect for 
persons.  For Kohlberg (1984), stage six exists as a “theoretical postulate but not an 
                                               
6 In comparison with stage 6, however, stage 5 remains monological and therefore egocentric.  
Stage 6, in contrast to the utilitarian bent of stage 5, is deontological.  It concerns itself with the 
needs, rights, and views/perspectives, of persons conceived as persons (rather than as social 
roles). It is concerned with responsibilities and duties toward self and other.  In general, then, it is 
concerned with a moral point of view that emphasizes the importance of attending to the moral 
points of view of self and other.  Accordingly, it recognizes the ideal of transcending monological 
deliberation and entering into a dialogical procedure that it recognizes as a more valid way to 
obtain moral consensus (see Habermas 1979; Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine 1990). 
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operational empirical entity” (p. 425).  The stage six thinker reasons autonomously on the 
basis of self-chosen, universalized principles (such as an orientation of humanistic 
solidarity and respect for persons).  Kohlberg (1984) explains that these principles are 
denoted by “positive prescriptions rather than negative proscriptions” (and are thereby 
differentiated from rules or rights), as well as by an applicability to “all persons and 
situations” (p. 637).  For Kohlberg (1984: 637), principles may be formalized in a 
number of different ways, such as choosing outcomes under a Rawlsian “veil of 
ignorance,” adopting a role-taking exercise of “moral musical chairs,” or applying a 
Habermasian emphasis on dialogue to balance the competing interests of persons (i.e., 
“ideal communication situation”), but as we see in Kohlberg, Boyd and Levine (1990), it 
is only the latter formalization that guarantees that dialogical cooperation itself—and 
thus, arguably, mutual respect (Piaget 1965)—is applied as a principle.7 
2. A-Type and B-Type Reasoning, and Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral 
Substage 
Kohlberg (1984) theorized the existence of two “substages” within stages two through 
five of his six-stage model.  These substages were used “to conceive of moral reasoning 
in a hybrid fashion, in terms of its structural and content properties simultaneously” (Côté 
and Levine 2002: 197).8  While these substages do not feature the structured wholeness 
or invariant sequencing that moral stages do, they do serve to incorporate the Piagetian 
distinction between heteronomous (A-type) and autonomous (B-type) reasoning, and, 
accordingly, they can be distinguished from one another by their fundamentally different 
use of certain cognitive operations (Colby and Kohlberb 1987).  This is to say that while 
stages indicate only the structure of a moral judgment, substages denote both the 
                                               
7 One may note here evidence of two conflicting operationalizations of stage six: one in which 
advocating for a dialogical principle is essential to a sufficient formalization of mutually 
respectful prescriptivity (suggested in Kohlberg et. al 1990 and Habermas 1990), and the other in 
which the realistic limitations of “ideal communication” force us to afford a pragmatic concession 
to prescriptions that advocate a principled orientation of respect for persons, but that are 
formalized monologically (Kohlberg 1984). 
8 Substages in this thesis are variously referred to as “types,” substages,” or described in terms of 
their “heteronomous” or “autonomous” content and structure. 
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structure and content of a moral judgment—that is, how a person thinks through the 
dilemma itself, and what they think about the specific competing interests and norms that 
comprise the dilemma (Kohlberg 1984).   
For Piaget (1965), the distinction between “heteronomous” and “autonomous” morality 
lies in the way individuals relate to the formulation of rules.  In his studies of childhood 
cognitive development, Piaget observes a qualitative difference in the ways individuals 
formulated moral judgments and conceived of moral rules.  Young children especially 
tended to attribute a unilateral respect for moral rules, in which the authority of rules (and 
higher status figures such as adults) command “compulsory conformity” (1965: 363).  In 
contrast, other, most often older, children conceived of rules as emerging from the 
rational cooperation of autonomous actors (Piaget 1965).  “Autonomy” in this regard 
denotes both an individual’s cognitive self-sufficiency to construct reasoned justifications 
for a proposed moral rule and also a social environment which enables competing 
judgments to be resolved through mutually respectful deliberation rather than status 
hierarchy.  It should be noted that “autonomy” in Piaget’s usage does not imply an 
egoistic “individuation” from all others; on the contrary, it consists in a individual’s 
freedom to participate conscientiously in the cooperative development of rules with 
others.  Thus for Piaget (and Kohlberg) mutual respect is prerequisite for cognitive moral 
autonomy.  
In the current dissertation, stage six provides the ideal typical reference standard for 
distinguishing the content and structural qualities of B-type from A-type reasoning.  Just 
as stage six reasoning, with ‘better’ reasons than lower-stage reasoning, is able to actively 
reconstruct the reasoning of the latter, so too does the autonomous orientation of B-type 
reasoning make it capable of actively reconstructing A-type reasoning from the same 
stage (Kohlberg 1984).  According to Kohlberg et al.’s (1984) adaptation of these 
concepts, A-type (i.e., heteronomous) judgments can be insensitive to the needs of 
persons when it applies a strict logic of equality (e.g. “everyone is equal under the law”) 
to resolve dilemmas.  Such an approach may also be insensitive to (or intolerant of) 
claims that could be seen as justifying making exceptions to rules.  In contrast, a B-type 
(i.e. autonomous) judgment, with its use of cognitive operations such as perspective 
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taking, sympathy, and empathy, is disposed to make exceptions to the application of 
norms when deemed reasonable.  Furthermore, the autonomous nature of stage six 
suggests that, as far as preparation for postconventional reasoning is concerned, B-type 
reasoning at any stage constitutes a developmentally superior substage  (i.e., more 
adequately moral) than its A-type same-stage counterpart (Côté and Levine 2002).9 
And while Kohlberg and his colleagues eventually abandoned their attempts to formulate 
and test a comprehensive theory of moral substage development, there remain several 
reasons that a distinction between “heteronomy” and “autonomy” may provide a valuable 
theoretical framework for the critical social-psychological study of morality.   The rest of 
this section will discuss the qualities of these “substages” with the intent of elucidating 
their empirical utility to this project. 
i. Moral Heteronomy 
A-type reasoning takes a “pre-constructed” approach to moral dilemmas and simply 
invokes existing norms to solve dilemmas, whereas B-type reasoning involves the “active 
reconstruction” of relevant norms, rules, and values in its consideration of normative 
claims (Côté and Levine 2002: 197).  The “heteronomous” reasoner’s judgments invoke 
reasons that apply existing norms and values without a reflexive regard for the socially 
constructed nature of these norms.  Rather, rules are regarded as being “endowed with an 
intrinsic and eternal value” (Piaget 1965: 26).  Since this type of reasoning entails an 
uncritical acquiescence toward figures and institutions of authority, it does not depend on 
consideration of the views of other persons implicated in dilemmas.  The reasoner 
engages very little (if at all) within the cognitive operations of sympathy, empathy, 
prescriptive role-taking or equity (Levine 2004). Instead, justice is conceptualized 
                                               
9 While there is not sufficient space in this dissertation to discuss the philosophical and pragmatic 
basis for my position at length, it is quite clear that neither the motivation for the present research 
nor the assumptions made regarding the superior moral adequacy of “stage six” reasoning are 
independent of certain value judgments.  As the present literature review would suggest, I do in 
fact agree with Kohlberg (1981, 1984), Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine (1990), and Habermas 
(1990) that a monological or dialogical “stage six” is morally adequate and ought to be a form of 
cognition obtained by human beings. 
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(especially at Kohlberg’s preconventional and conventional stages of moral reasoning) as 
an exercise in the selection of, and conformity to, appropriate external rules, norms, laws, 
and rights to resolve the dilemmas addressed (Levine 2004).   
ii. Moral Autonomy 
In contrast, B-type reasoning requires the capacity to make moral judgments in ways that 
reflexively recognize norms as the products of social construction, and to autonomously 
select, modify, or reject norms based on their appropriateness in resolving the dilemma at 
hand (Levine 2004; see also, Piaget 1965).  This process of “norming norms” invokes the 
reasoner’s ability to form his or her judgments based on an active reconstruction of the 
relevant interests, values, and circumstances of all parties implicated in the dilemma 
(Côté and Levine 2002; Levine 2004). At each subsequent stage of moral development, 
this ability becomes increasingly adroit (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Levine 
2004).  Most relevant to the issue of stage acquisition is the fact that since B-type 
reasoning involves the kind of reciprocal role-taking operations requisite for post-
conventional reasoning, it suggests a greater preparedness for higher-stage reasoning than 
A-type reasoning (Côté and Levine 2002: 197).  Thus, although heteronomous and 
autonomous reasoners may utilize the same stage as one another, the latter are in a better 
position to expand and develop their moral reasoning to higher stages while the former 
are held back by a combination of unilateral obedience and ethical self-absorption.  In 
fact, Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983) argue that 
subjects who are principled or B-substage are (a) more likely to make judgments of 
responsibility and to perform actions that are consistent with their deontic 
judgments of rightness and (b) more likely to perform the “right” action, right 
action being defined by that agreement reached between philosophical principles 
and postconventional judgments (p. 261). 
It becomes clear, then, that the use of B-type cognitive operations provides even non-
principled respondents the ability to intuit morally adequate resolutions, even if the 
structure of their reasoning does not elicit the most compelling arguments for the 
standpoint of a “highest” stage of moral reasoning. 
Since substage measurements evince both the structure and content of reasoning, it is the 
case that different dilemmas will invoke varying degrees of structuring and “contenting” 
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in reasoning.  This is to say that, depending on the social perspectives and views of 
persons that a respondent holds prior to the dilemma, certain norms and values perceived 
as relevant in the dilemma may prove influential in how cognitive operations are used.  
For example, Levine (1976: 41) finds that differences in both “the identity of the 
protagonist implicated in the moral dilemma and the nature of the issue raised by the 
moral dilemma” can produce variation in moral judgments from respondents at the 
conventional stages.  Levine’s (1976) findings suggest that when moral dilemmas involve 
the loved ones of the respondents, the “strong norms of reciprocity that are activated by 
these relationships” are likely to invoke cognitive operations oriented to the preservation 
of “general positive relationships among people” that is characteristic of stage three 
reasoning (Levine 1976: 42; Rest 1973: 94 quoted in ibid).  Since conventional reasoners 
are capable of taking into account different role-taking standpoints but do not yet choose 
these standpoints as a matter of principle, the perspective they take is somewhat 
dependent on whose perspective it is that they focus on.  Thus, their sense of obligation, 
empathy, and sympathy tends to vary in intensity depending on the meaningfulness of the 
issues, interests, and parties for the individual respondent (Levine 1976).  Conversely, the 
social distance between a respondent and a generalized or “fictitious other” removes the 
emotive and relationship-preserving imperative from the direct attention of the 
respondent, thereby opening up the possibility for the kind of perspective balancing 
orientation characteristic of stage four (Levine 1976).   
3. Discussion 
It is important that sociologies of morality not overlook the process by which a given 
moral problem has come to be defined and legitimated.  That the moral domain 
references not simply established norms and “cultural codes,” but must also reference 
cognition about situations of potential normative conflict (i.e., moral dilemmas), 
highlights the importance of critically examining the social conditions under which a 
given moral rule or moral dilemma arises.  If morality is taken up strictly from the 
standpoint of existing norms and normative codes, then the basis for critical inquiry into 
the social construction and philosophical legitimation of the codes themselves is severely 
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diminished.  Inquiry into “morality” is essentially reduced to a study of descriptive ethics, 
social behaviourism, and existing social conventions, values, and norms. 
In response to Durkheim’s L’Education Morale, Piaget (1965) rejects the notion that 
moral autonomy is tantamount to knowingly and willfully following the “rules of 
morality” (pp. 456–357).  Piaget argues that such psychological and behavioural 
conformity ignores both the philosophical and procedural importance of cognition about 
mutual respect for resolving moral matters.  Using “the existence of spontaneously 
formed children’s societies” as evidence of the child’s developmental capacity for 
cooperative rule-making (1965: 356), Piaget shows that moral autonomy lies not in 
unilateral respect for rules or authority figures but in the exercise of reason to judge the 
rightness of a moral rule.  This of course is not to beg the question of an asocial 
psychologism; quite the opposite.  For Piaget (1965), 
There are no more such things as societies qua beings than there are isolated 
individuals.  There are only relations; these relations must be studied 
simultaneously from outside and from inside (there being no possible conflict 
between psychology and sociology), and the combinations formed by them, always 
incomplete, cannot be taken as permanent substances (p. 360).  
Hence, it is precisely the nature of these social relations within a given situation—either 
geared toward authority or mutual respect—which orient the child’s day-to-day 
apperception of moral problems, and thus the stimulation of his/her cognitive moral 
development.  It stands to reason, for instance, that a social milieu oriented toward 
political or economic oligarchy will produce not only social hierarchies but also total 
“personalities” characterized by anti-democratic tendencies and the increasing inability to 
even perceive dilemmas (Adorno et al. 1969).10  The relevant point here is that without 
                                               
10 As Fromm (1984) demonstrates, such anti-democratic sentiments need not be specific to any 
particular social class or ideological leaning.  For both Fromm (1984) and Adorno et al. (1969), it 
appears that “the answer must be sought not in any single personality nor in personality factors 
found in the mass of people, but in processes at work in society itself” (1967: 7).  As far as the 
present research is concerned, it would appear that one societal “process” worth examining is the 
way in which resource allocation and access guides the “privatization” versus “collectivization” 
of social relations.  The current study aims to test the hypotheses logically emerging from 
theoretical criticisms of the “privatizing” processes at work in society. 
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the necessary conditions for mutual respect among persons who participate in the 
construction of society’s rules, moral autonomy lies outside of both the individual and 
society. 
It is here that critical sociology stands to contribute fruitfully to the development of moral 
inquiry in the social sciences.  Without a critical examination of the social and 
psychological conditions under which and through which particular circumstances 
become “matters of great” or “minor moral moments” (cf. Churchland 2011: 9–10), 
moral research constrains itself to the normative confines of the dominant culture, and in 
this respect is predisposed to normalize its values rather than expose their inherent moral 
adequacy or inadequacy.  This problem is not simply one of theoretical “reflexivity,” nor 
is it one of methodological rigour—although it is both; it also has broader societal 
implications.  As Horkheimer (1993) observes,  
The prevalent tendency in bourgeois morality to lay exclusive value upon 
conviction proves to be a position that inhibits progress, especially in the present.  
It is not consciousness of duty, enthusiasm, and sacrifice as such, but consciousness 
of duty, enthusiasm, and sacrifice for what which will decide the fate of humanity 
in the face of the prevailing peril (p. 24; emphasis added).  
Horkheimer’s comments stand not only as a critique of bourgeois conceptions of the 
moral but also of the “new” sociology of morality that purports to study it.  To the extent 
that sociologists do not reflexively clarify and criticize the economic and socio-political 
relations that structure and are structured by the moral consciousness of interacting 
persons, their moral research cannot help but reinforce the normative conventions of the 
present bourgeois morality.   
The present study of morality and property shares the view expressed by Freirich and 
Münch (2010), that we not only “have to know what morality is as a social phenomenon 
and a scientific object; we also need to learn more about how morality is constructed, first 
of all” (p. 530).  In order to adequately grasp the nature of morality in present-day 
society, sociology must account for the way that social norms frame and influence the 
formulation and deliberation of moral judgments, not merely describe the judgments or 
the norms themselves. To again quote Piaget (1965), “when Durkheim reminds us that 
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the individual is unable of himself to create morality, this by no means implies that the 
person (i.e., the individual, insofar as he submits to the norms of reciprocity) is not free to 
judge everything by his reason alone” (p. 370).  Thus, rather than conceptualize morality 
as a set of conventions to which individuals either adhere or deviate, and rather than 
emphasizing only its cohesive function in society, the critical sociological approach to 
morality taken in the present study takes up the moral domain as a site of crisis, as a 
dilemma of conflicting interests, and seeks to investigate factors that affect the relative 
“autonomy” people exercise in “working through” these dilemmas.  How individuals 
apperceive the dilemma, and the qualities of the justifications they provide for their 
judgments, therefore become just as relevant to the analysis as the judgment itself. 
As concerns the specific relationship between property and morality, the critical concern 
for “autonomy” will be examined in Chapter 3 with specific reference to the Marxian and 
neo-Marxist traditions.  Piaget’s (1965) and Kohlberg’s (1981) moral theories suggest 
that sociocentricity has a stimulating effect on the development and exercise of morally 
autonomous reasoning and hence on the development toward moral maturity.  This 
proposition has also been expressed by both Western Marxists (e.g., Horkheimer 1993; 
Fromm 1959, 1999; Habermas 1990) and by Marx himself, as part of a broader 
materialist critique of moral conventionalism and as a radical critique of private property 
(see also Engels 1976; Marx and Engels 1964).  The theoretical congruity of these two 
domains of research forms the conceptual foundation of the present study, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Their empirical congruity is the subject of the study itself.   
II. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
In his influential treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, the English jurist Sir 
William Blackstone wrote that “there is nothing which so generally strikes the 
imagination, and engages the affectations of mankind, as the right of property” ([1766] 
cited in Shacher 2009: 8).    
But what is property?  And what are the social bases of property “rights”?  Answers to 
such questions are deceptively complicated.  Peter Hollawell (1982a) notes that on one 
hand, “everyday use of the term ‘property’ indicates no apparent difficulty about its 
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meaning.  Familiar experience leads to an easy and unconscious acceptance”; and yet, on 
the other hand “a cursory examination of even general definitions of property confirms 
that it is a very complex phenomenon indeed” (p. 1).  It should therefore be noted from 
the outset that the topic of property ownership spans an extraordinary breadth of diverse 
and fiercely contested scholarship across law, history, politics, cultural anthropology, 
sociology, and philosophy.  Any attempt to assert a “neutral,” much less a definitive 
conception of property is bound to fail as either too general to be practically meaningful 
or too specific to be culturally or historically generalizable (Hollawell 1982a: 3; Radin 
1993: 102).  Likewise, any analysis of property that orients itself to a given political 
perspective or philosophical tradition—however transparently—is bound to meet 
criticism form conflicting traditions. 
The purpose of this section is to establish, through an overview of some elementary 
social-theoretical conceptions of property ownership, a more-or-less feasible and 
supportable analytic framework for a critical sociological analysis of ownership norms.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to review some broadly accepted ideas about 
property ownership and thus to accomplish the following conceptual tasks: (A) 
disentangle property ownership norms and social relations from the common-sense 
conceptions of property as things; (B) elucidate from this relational conception of 
property an ideal-typical distinction between private and social ownership norms that 
arise within modern property regimes; and (C) establish a theoretical framework for the 
critical social-psychological analysis of “private” and “social” property relations in 
contemporary society. 
A. Conceptualizing Property 
Property ownership affects all aspects of modern life, from the intimate relationships 
individuals have with personal possessions to the institutional formations that govern the 
legal and economic system of global politics, but the idea of property ownership is not 
prior to the society in which it arises.  Rather, it is a social construct, with meanings and 
consequences varying considerably across the history of human society.  As Randall 
Collins (1982) explains, 
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property is a relationship among people regarding things; it is some kind of 
enforcement agreement as to who can or cannot do what with certain things, and 
who will back others up in enforcing these actions…  It is the society that makes 
something property and not some inviolable relation between one individual and 
the soil (p. 122). 
Collins’ observations foreground the social basis of property ownership.  Property in its 
broadest sense denotes a normative, institutionalized framework for accessing and 
allocating resources within a given society (Waldron 1985).11  However, it is a common 
mistake for people to unreflexively think of “property” as a thing—i.e., to equate 
“property” with the owned possession itself (Van Der Walt 2010: 81).  The basis for this 
mistake lies in the fact that our prevailing system of “property ownership” places high 
emphasis on individuals’ exclusive (i.e., private) entitlement to objects that are “their 
property.”  Commonly, the object itself is treated as if it has a metaphysical “property” of 
belonging to a person, when in fact the basis for its being owned lies in a set of normative 
relations concerning exclusivity and privation. 
There are two major implications worth noting about this idea: (1) the significance of 
property lies not in the “thing” (i.e., the object of ownership) but in a particular kind of 
social relationship, and (2) as an institution, property orients people’s access to 
resources.  These two premises, elaborated below, have much support within the 
theoretical literature and are central to the current study.   
1. Relations, not Things 
The current study proceeds from the legal and social-theoretical premise that “property” 
should not be understood as “things” but as relations (Hohfeld 1913; Hollawell 1982a; 
Rudmin 1991; Vogt 1999; Waldron 1985).  In modern ownership regimes, when actors 
make direct reference to things they own as “their” property (e.g. a swath of land, a 
computer, a house, or an authored manuscript), they are in fact conflating the bundle of 
property rights attributed to the thing with the thing itself.  For instance, a landowner’s 
                                               
11 This is not limited to individualistic modes of allocation.  As will be discussed below, it may 
also (or alternately) include communal, public, common, collective, state, corporate, or any 
number of historically extant arrangements.   
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demand that a trespasser “get off my property!” illustrates a common misunderstanding: 
it is the landowner’s relationship vis-à-vis the trespasser—the right to refuse the 
encroacher’s access to the territory12—that constitutes the ownership of “property” (i.e. 
the ownership “right”), not the territory itself.  Quoting Jeremiah Smith, the legal scholar 
Wesley Hohfeld (1913) explains that “land is not property, but the subject of property… 
‘Property’ in its legal signification means only the rights of the owner in relation to it…  
The right of user necessarily includes the right and power of excluding others from using 
the land” (p. 22).  The key point is that property is not the resource itself, nor is the 
resource itself property; rather, property pertains to the social relationship designating 
each party’s rights to a certain resource vis-à-vis the other parties. Property is about who 
is entitled to grant or refuse access to a resource, and who lacks such entitlements.  
It should be noted immediately that some disagreement exists concerning the nature of 
the rights that such a relationship entails.  Do property rights pertain to the relationship 
between owner–object, owner–non-owner, or both?  Although much legal attention has 
been paid to the kinds of rights an owner has in relation to the object of ownership (e.g. 
“use rights,” “income rights,” “disposal rights” cf. Vogt 1999), Waldron (1985) 
demonstrates that property relations fundamentally lie between persons (owners and non-
owners).  He reasons that “legal relations cannot exist between people and [things], 
because [things] cannot have rights or duties or be bound by or recognize rules” (1985: 
314).  In other words, it is not things which are held responsible for obeying ownership 
laws, but people!   
Following Hallowell, then, we might speak of the following “triadic” quality of 
ownership relations: “A owns B against C, where C represents all other individuals,” and 
B represents a specific resource (1943: 120, cited in Dittmar 1992: 36).  Hence, in the 
“trespassing” scenario described above, the salience of property rights lies not in the 
landowner (A)’s relation to the land (B), but above all in relation to the “trespasser” (C), 
just as the trespasser’s violation lies not in setting foot on the land, but in doing so against 
                                               
12 And thus the legal, and “symbolic” power to define the encroacher as a trespasser. 
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the landowner’s expressed wishes.  Accordingly, since the legitimation of any property 
right rests upon its recognition by other people (Hollawell 1982a: 1), ownership is best 
understood not as an “objective” relationship, but as an intersubjective—i.e., social—
relationship (Hollawell 1982a, 1982b; Munzer 2001; Pejovic 1997; Waldron 1985).13 
However, widespread acknowledgement of the institutional legitimation of modern 
property relations does not imply widespread agreement on the normative-ethical 
goodness of these relations. As the work of some critical social theorists suggest, taken-
for-granted assumptions about what property “is” and “ought” to be must be interrogated 
as a possible site of ideological domination (cf. Fromm 1976; Marcuse 1964; Marx 
1992). Following W. I. Thomas, it may be said that while property ownership does not 
constitute an “objective” reality independent of social actors, it nevertheless has very real 
consequences for how legal, political economic, and ethical situations are defined—and 
therefore, very real consequences for the socio-political interests of those actors (cf. 
Hollawell 1982a).14  One such consequence, the regulation of individuals’ relative control 
over resources, will now be discussed.   
2. Access to Resources 
Sociologically speaking, “property ownership” may be thought of as a system of rules 
governing people’s relations to one another on issues of access to, and control of, scarce 
                                               
13 It may be observed that in certain regards, “legal relations” (Hohfeld 1913; Honoré 1961) may 
be fruitfully distinguished from “social relations” (Hollawell 1982; Munzer 2001).  Although a 
great deal of scholarship has been dedicated to the “legal relations” of property ownership, these 
may nevertheless be considered a more specific type of “social relation” given the fact that law is, 
ultimately, a social institution.  In full recognition of the complexity of legal property relations, 
the present study seeks to investigate questions relating to this more general “social relation” of 
property ownership. 
14 cf. Hollawell: “In the language of the symbolic interactionists, if people define something 
(rather than rights in it) as property, more frequently or more intensely than other things, then this 
definition has real consequences.  An insistence on the importance of the subjective aspect of 
property reveals that the objective definition (property as rights) is limiting.  The real breadth of 
the institution is pared down since the notion “right of enjoyment” conveys no sense of the true 
delights or miseries of property” (1982a: 8–9). 
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resources (Pejovic 1997: 65; Waldron 1985:318, 1988).15  Here, the following 
explanation from Waldron (1988) is instructive: 
The concept of property is the concept of a system of rules governing access to and 
control of material resources.  Something is to be regarded as a material resource if 
it is a material object capable of satisfying some human need or want.  In all times 
and places with which we are familiar, material resources are scarce relative to the 
human demands that are made on them.  (Some, of course, are scarcer than others.)  
Scarcity, as philosophers from Hume to Rawls have pointed out, is a presupposition 
of all sensible talk about property.  If this assumption were ever to fail (as Marx 
believed it some day would) then the traditional problem of the nature and 
justification of rival types of property systems would probably disappear.  But so 
long as it obtains, individuals (either on their own or in groups) are going to 
disagree about who is to make which use of what.  These disagreements are often 
serious because, in many cases, being able to make use of a resource that one wants 
is connected directly or indirectly with one’s survival.  A problem, then, which I 
shall call the problem of allocation, arises in any society which regards the 
avoidance of serious conflict as a matter of any importance.  This is the problem of 
determining peacefully and reasonably predictably who is to have access to which 
resources for what purposes and when.  The system of social rules which I call 
property rules are ways of solving that problem (pp. 31–32). 
Waldron’s conceptualization of the connection between property rights and problems of 
resource allocation is of critical relevance to the present social-psychological study.  
Waldron demonstrates that it is not the qualities of objects themselves, but rather the 
kinds of meanings and legal-moral arrangements people establish in relation to one 
another regarding the use of (and access to) resources which constitute the practice of 
property ownership.16  This conception also expands our analysis beyond the 
methodological individualism of particular rights-holders and -regarders to a broader 
consideration of a structured “regime” of ownership which determines and enforces these 
particular “rights.”  Waldron’s conceptualization implies that at the core of property 
                                               
15 In broader, more general terms, it may therefore be spoken of as a social institution, or a 
property regime (Hollawell 1982; Noyes 1936; Rose 1994; Waldron 1993). 
16 Waldron (1985) uses the term “resource” to refer to “a material object capable of satisfying 
some human need or want” (p. 318).  These resources may be corporeal (e.g. land) or incorporeal 
(e.g. copyright), but, as Waldron notes, “It is important to see that there is a reason for 
concentrating first and foremost on property rules about material resources, for it is only on that 
basis that talk about property in incorporeals becomes possible” (p. 322). 
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ownership lie normative questions concerning how best to meet the relative material 
interests of society’s members.  It explicates a critical link between psychological and 
philosophical concerns with fairness on the one hand, and sociological concerns with 
resource allocation on the other: that is, that property’s most basic function lies in 
rationally coordinating a society’s legal–moral doctrines with its prevailing economic 
relations (cf. Gouldner 1970). 
Thus, to take a sociological view of property is to examine the connection between 
property relations, property norms, and property regimes (Hollawell 1982b).  To take a 
critical sociological view of property is to examine the processes by which those factors 
come to shape human relations, and on this basis to evaluate from a moral point of view 
the effects of the property system on human well-being, autonomy, solidarity (cf. Marx 
1990, 1992; Fromm 1967; Marcuse 1989). The present study seeks to explore some of 
these critical concerns. 
B. Property Relations in the Sociological and Psychological Literature 
1. Property Ownership 
It has thus far been established that property ownership entails a set of normed relations 
among individuals pertaining to their respective access to a resource.  It has also been 
suggested that the durability of these relations lies in their institutionalization in legal, 
political, and economic spheres, which in turn ascribes an implied morally-sound 
justification for those relations.  Returning to the previously cited conception of 
ownership, in which “A owns B against C, where C represents all other individuals,” it is 
worth considering more concretely the relationship of A “against” C, the basis for its 
legitimation, and the effects that this relationship may have upon people’s social relations 
more generally (Hallowell 1943: 120, cited in Dittmar 1992: 36).  
The predominant ownership regime in modern capitalist societies is individualistic, 
private ownership.  This form of ownership entails an owner’s right to exclude (i.e., 
deprive) non-owners from accessing an owned resource (Durkheim 1957; Fromm 1976; 
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Macpherson 1962; Radin 1992; Ryan 1982; Vogt 1999).17  Such rights are “final” in the 
sense that decisions concerning the use, alienation, tradeability of the owned object are, 
in the last analysis (and with very few limitations), at the sole discretion of the private 
owner (Waldron 1985: 327; see also Shachar 2009). 18  This is the form most frequently 
addressed in academic literature, legal theory, and in public discourse.  
In his examination of the origin of property ownership in society, Durkheim (1957) notes 
the “sacred” quality that this right obtains in society, drawing connections between the 
origins of property and “the nature of certain religious beliefs,” and suggesting that these 
“can in all likelihood be attributable to similar causes” (pp. 143–144).  As such, property 
is deeply entwined with the moral codes of society; it constitutes a basis for regulating 
social relations among individuals and shapes the collective conscience, often in ways 
that go unquestioned in people’s day-to-day lives (Van der Walt 2010).  As Gerth and 
Mills (1953) grimly note, “in the United States many master symbols of the social 
structure are derived from and primarily legitimate the economic order.  ‘Free enterprise’ 
and ‘private property’ are practically unquestionable symbols, even when they are not 
very skillfully used” (p. 281). 
There are, however, non-exclusionary forms of property ownership within society which 
may be distinguished from the “private” form, and which entail significantly different 
relations among social actors.  The theoretical possibility and historical prevalence of 
such non-exclusionary ownership relations serve to destabilize the fallacious conflation 
                                               
17 This is the form of ownership which corresponds most closely to Durkheim’s conception of 
property in general: “the right of property is the right of a given individual to exclude other 
individuals and collective entities from the usage of a given thing” (Durkheim 1957, cited in 
Hollawell 1982b: 30–31). 
18 “Alienation” here is used in the legal sense of a power “to alienate his legal interest to another, 
i.e., to extinguish his complex aggregate of jural relations and create a new and similar aggregate 
in the other person” (Hohfeld 1917: 746; see also, Hohfeld 1913).  The Marxist geographer David 
Harvey (2014) provides a more specified discussion of the various meanings of alienation in 
social scientific, political, philosophical and legal discourses, and offers the somewhat more 
simplified legal definition of alienation: a power “to transfer a property right to the ownership of 
another” (p. 267). 
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of property with private property, or the naturalization of private property as its inevitable 
form. As Marx (1973) explains,  
that there can be no production and hence no society where some form of property 
does not exist is a tautology… But it is altogether ridiculous to plea from that to a 
specific form of property, e.g. private property.  (Which further and equally 
presupposes an antithetical form, non-property.)  History rather shows common 
property (e.g. in India, among the Slavs, the early Celts, etc.) to be the more 
original form, a form which long continues to play a significant role in the shape of 
communal property (pp. 87–88). 
More recent literature supports these claims, suggesting that while there may exist a more 
or less universal cultural and psychological tendency to recognize some form of 
entitlement to personal possessions, the nature of this perceived entitlement varies widely 
across cultures and history.  Intercultural and historical variability in ownership regimes 
and relations dispels any facile notion that private property arises as a consequence of 
human beings’ innate territoriality, acquisitiveness, or egoism, much less that private 
property should constitute anything but an historically contingent system of resource 
allocation (Becker 1980; Vogt 1999; Waldron 1985).19  To cite just one example, 
                                               
19 It is along these lines that Marx (1970) also distinguishes between “possessions” and 
“property” (p. 207).  As the foregoing analysis would suggest, it is only with the institution of 
legal relations that one’s possession of a resource comes to be formalized as property, proper.  
But a “concrete substratum underlying the relation of ownership is always however presupposed” 
(p. 207).  That is to say, it is only when certain “concrete social relations” have evolved (such as 
the family or the master and servant) that abstract property relations become a possibility.  
Accordingly,  
private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can only be achieved 
within the conditions established by society and through the means that society affords, and 
that it is thus linked to the reproduction of these conditions and means.  It is certainly the 
interest of private individuals that is at stake; but its content, as well as the form and the 
means of its realisation, is only given by the social conditions independent of all these 
individuals (1971: 65–66).   
Possession is therefore distinguishable from ownership not only in the theoretical sense of an 
owner–object relationship (in the case of possession) versus an owner–non-owner relationship (in 
the case of property), but also in the historical sense of how/whether these modes of ownership 
emerge from the concrete economic relations within a particular social formation (Marx 1970: 
206–207). 
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Becker’s (1980) review of various justifications of private property demonstrates how 
much of the existing historical, anthropological, psychological, and socio-biological 
evidence about the implications of ownership may just as reasonably be used to argue 
against private property as for it. 
2. Private and Social Property Relations 
Cognitive research on the psychology of property ownership uses the term psychological 
ownership to denote a person’s sense of ownership —that is, a mental orientation in 
which an individual perceives an object to be “theirs” (Chi and Han 2008; Furby 1978, 
1991; Pierce and Jussila 2011; Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003).  Just as distinctions 
between “private” property and numerous sub-categories of non-exclusionary property 
rights have been posited, a generalized distinction can be made between ownership 
relations that are “individualistic” (or private) in nature, and those that are “collectivistic” 
(or social) in nature.20  Two bodies of research within the literature can help illustrate the 
distinction between the individualistic and collectivistic psychological orientations.   
Belk (1985) examines issues of “individualistic” ownership by way of an examination of 
materialistic consumption habits.  Belk (1984, 1985) identifies three traits of this 
materialistic orientation, which he operationalizes as scale measures: “possessiveness,” 
“non-generosity,” and “envy.”  These traits pertain to a conception of ownership that 
foregrounds the exclusive control of objects by an individual.  For instance, 
possessiveness and non-generosity denote an individual’s inclination to retain control of 
an object they possess, while envy denotes an individual’s desire for the possessions of 
others (Belk 1985).  In each of these traits it is apparent that objects of ownership are 
conceived of in “individualistic” terms, along the lines of a sole individual owner and the 
things that belong to him or her.  For the sake of the present study, Belk’s sub-scales may 
                                               
20 E.g., Waldron (1985) distinguishes between “collective” and “common” property on the 
grounds that the latter provides no special privilege to either the collective or an individual—i.e., 
every resource is available to every individual—whereas this may not be the case for collective 
property proper.  (See also Fromm 1976; Gerth and Mills 1953; Hollawell 1982a, 1982b; Munzer 
2001;  Pejovic 1995). 
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therefore be understood as measuring dimensions of a particularly “individualistic” 
conception of ownership—one which not only takes the exclusionary rights of ownership 
for granted, but which also places exclusive emphasis on the individual-object 
relationship.  They therefore provide a useful means of differentiating an individual’s 
psychological inclinations toward acquiring and retaining possessions from their social 
attitudes toward various cultural and political norms about property.   
In contrast to the individualistic ownership attitudes studied by Belk (1994, 1995), Pierce 
and Jussila (2011) examine “collective psychological ownership,” a group-level 
phenomenon that emerges through collectively “shared feelings, knowledge, and beliefs 
about a target of ownership,” and is experienced in a different way than “individual 
psychological ownership” (pp. 3–4).  Whereas individual psychological ownership entails 
a sense that a target of ownership “is mine!”, collective psychological ownership entails 
the sense that it “is ours!” (Pierce and Jussila 2011: 16).  Notably, although collective 
psychological ownership “transcends the limits of individual cognition/affect,” this does 
not appear to obviate a person’s sense of individual rights and responsibilities relating to 
an owned object (Pierce and Jussila 2011: 3). Insofar as this sense of ownership is 
commonly held, it is possible that one’s personal commitments to it may be enhanced.  
As Pierce and Jussila explain,  
‘Ours’ is a small word, arising out of a shared event, when collectively experienced 
and recognized by a group of people who experience themselves as ‘us,’ it is 
‘deceptive in its power and importance,’ capable of binding people together and 
controlling their behaviour in pursuit of a common cause (2010: 827, cited in Pierce 
and Jussila 2011:237).   
Pierce and Jussila’s research suggests that the social bonds formed around a shared sense 
of ownership may produce not less but a greater sense of personal commitment to a 
target of “ownership” such as a company, community, or political cause; it does so, 
however, in a form that generates cohesion among the individual’s and others’ respective 
interests, instead of conflict.  Rather than a dispersion of responsibility, a genuine sense 
of collective ownership may strengthen one’s identification with both the group and the 
thing they collectively own.  
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The distinction between individual and collective lenses of psychological ownership may 
be compared to certain ownership relations at the institutional level. In particular, Marx 
draws a dichotomy between “private” versus “social” ownership relations based on how 
social relations (particularly relations of production) are formed within a given economic 
mode of production.  For Marx, “property relations… express both the manner in which 
people relate to nature and the manner in which they relate to each other” (Hunt 1979: 
285).  Under the capitalist mode of production, where the productive relationship to 
nature is one in which nature is appropriated and privatized, and where human relations 
are fractured along class lines, Marx observes a corresponding prevalence of private 
property relations.  These relations can be radically contrasted with the kinds of social 
property relations necessary for natural resources to be productively cultivated toward 
social ends, and for human relations to proceed according to collective, rather than 
private interests (Marx 1992). Under these latter conditions, Marx contends, the reified 
conception of “property” discussed above would necessarily be exposed as illusion, and 
individual interest in property rights would be correctly understood as inextricable from 
collective interests (Marx 1992; Marx and Engels 1964; Fromm 1965, 1976). 
C. Discussion 
The above literature review has addressed the social ontology of property ownership.  It 
has also sought to establish some foundational conceptual points regarding the social 
institution and cognitive apperception of property ownership in contemporary society in 
order to lay the theoretical groundwork for the present study.  The core premises of this 
groundwork may be summarized as follows: 
1. “Property” does not denote objects themselves, nor the possession of an object per 
se, but rather specific rights-relations among social actors.  It is a mistake, therefore, 
to equate property with the things one “has.” Rather, property is understood as a 
specific set of institutionalized privileges which regulate one’s access to things vis-à-
vis other persons.  In other words, property is a social relation. 
2. Although private ownership remains the dominant property regime in late-modern 
society, it is not the case that ownership is inevitably exclusionary.  Indeed, private 
property is an historically-specific form of ownership that is relatively rare among 
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human societies (Fromm 1976).  Ownership may take numerous forms depending 
upon the cultural norms and social structure of a given society.  One may, however, 
draw a philosophically (Arendt 1958), sociologically (Gerth and Mills 1953; Marx 
1992), and psychologically (Pierce and Jussila 2011) relevant distinction between 
private (i.e., exclusionary) versus social (i.e., inclusionary) ownership norms within 
contemporary society.  Such a distinction stems from the way these norms orient 
people’s social and legal relations to others and to resources.   
3. Property regimes constitute durable, ubiquitous institutions which legitimate existing 
modes of resource allocation within a society.  Private property in modern society is 
treated with a “sacred” reverence (Durkheim 1957), and obtains ideological purchase 
through its integration with other cultural values like “freedom,” “individuality,” and 
“choice” (Gerth and Mills 1953).  Collective forms of ownership, by contrast, tend to 
be regarded as cultural exceptions to the norm, and their attendant ethical precepts 
(e.g. to engage in sharing, charity, co-operative ownership, wealth redistribution) are 
treated not as legally or socially binding “duties” but as voluntary, supererogatory 
“choices.”  In short, the ownership interests among members of modern Western 
society are predominantly practiced and thought about in antagonistic terms (Fromm 
1976; Marx 1990). 
The purpose for this somewhat lenghty review of the property ownership literature has 
been to provide a context for the analysis of Marx’s moral critique of property, ideology, 
and power relations that appears in Chapter 3.  Nowadays, there exists a pervasive 
misrecognition not only of the socially constructed nature of property ownership 
(Rudmin 1991), but also of the inherent antagonism of interests that exists between 
private property owners and non-owners (Gouldner 1970). The reification of property, as 
well as the hegemony of private property (i.e., the widespread failure to recognize the 
social relations that produce it), bears moral relevance both for questions of “fair” 
allocations of resources within society and for questions of how “respect,” both for pre-
constructed rules about property and/or for persons, is accorded in moral decision 
making.  A few additional theoretical comments on the social construction and the 
ideology of property are therefore in order.   
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1. The Reproduction of Property Ownership Regimes in Modern Society 
Among the numerous dimensions of modern property ownership, one of the most 
compelling surely lies in its near-total entrenchment within the cognitive/emotional 
sensibilities of individuals, despite how little thought is actually given to what it means to 
own something.  As Rose (1994) notes, 
property regimes and even individual property holdings are by no means self-
evident constructs; there are many property arrangements that people have quite 
consciously talked themselves into.  Then, too, are property arrangements, like 
‘first possession,’ that seem as much a part of nature as the summer sun—even if, 
as I suspect, people have talked themselves into those understandings as well (p 6; 
emphasis added). 
How is this possible?  How is it that a social construct as abstract as property can be so 
widely practiced but so rarely interrogated?  What is quite apparent is the need to account 
for how social practices—particularly those concerning the allocation of resources—also 
occur within a context of power relations. Whether people have indeed “consciously 
talked themselves into those understandings” (Rose 1994: 6), or are in fact manipulated 
into them is a problem that remains empirically underexplored by critical sociology 
(Gouldner 1962).  By dint of the unequal control over economic, political, and cultural 
institutions, some individuals have greater influence over what we “talk ourselves into” 
than others (Mills 1956).  While it is the case that the social construction of ownership 
regimes requires the ongoing participation of social actors, there are compelling social-
theoretical reasons to consider the role of power, coercion, and force in the creation and 
perpetuation of these “arrangements.”  Individuals socialized in an environment that 
rewards competitiveness, exploitation, and egoism do not simply “talk” themselves into 
accepting systems of privatization; they are socialized within those systems and 
participate in their reproduction often as a matter of course.  Because ownership rules 
govern social relations around access to, and allocation of, basic resources, they likewise 
affect the fundamental modes of social, cultural, and economic reproduction within that 
society.  Manners of social interaction, moral cognition, and symbolic discourse all 
proceed within particular milieux of property relations, and are more or less predisposed 
to reproduce those relations (Bourdieu 1977).  If the total “social character” of an 
individual’s society—from “its language and its laws” (Marx 1992: 322; see also, Fromm 
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1976), to its family structures (Engels 1942), to its mode of production (Marx 1990, 
1992)—reinforces the reification of private ownership, we should then not be surprised to 
find complementary dispositions in individuals’ own normative-ethical and 
epistemological perspectives toward objects and others. It is reasonable, therefore, to 
speak of private property as a “total ideology” in Mannheim’s (1936) sense of the term.   
Thus, to say that property is a “social construct” is not to say that it isn’t real.  Rather, it 
is to suggest that its existence is neither prior to nor independent of the practice of social 
actors and the processes of social systems.  It is the consequence of shared social 
definitions of what it means to “own” something.  (As Berkeley notes, “to own is to be 
perceived to own” [Rudmin 1991: 86; emphasis added]). Following the constructionist 
logic of Berger and Luckmann (1966) or the structuration theory of Giddens (1979, 
1987), property may be viewed as a socially contingent social norm, a “virtual reality.”  
As a social “construct,” it may enable or constrain action, but it is nevertheless also 
constituted by action in everyday practice—based upon the power relations of particular 
actors (cf. Giddens 1981; Gouldner 1970).  With regard to Rose’s (1994: 6) comments, 
then, people do indeed “talk themselves into” particular understandings about ownership, 
but their ability to do so is always already situated within social arrangements, norms, 
structures, and power relations that make such “talk” more or less comprehensible and 
realizable.  Hence, the ideological purchase that property institutions have in modern 
society confers inordinate power to owners over non-owners (Gouldner 1970).   
Because the everyday relations of individuals are predicated on cultural and legal norms 
about who may be excluded from accessing this or that object of property, such 
individuals are unlikely to reflect upon the implications of those norms, and may mistake 
the rules, the relations, or the consequences of such exclusionary relations, as “natural.”  
A condition of this disposition to ignore the claims of “the other” is that, in confronting a 
moral dilemma regarding property a person is not likely to utilize cognitive operations to 
apprehend the claims and needs of the other.  Especially under the hegemonic logic of 
privatization in modern capitalism, the needs of the propertyless “other” are effectively 
eliminated from practical and moral consciousness.  
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All of this suggests that attitudes toward property contain a moral dimension.   To my 
knowledge, there has never been an attempt to document the relations between 
insufficient moral cognition and property relations.21  The present study is an attempt to 
“scratch the surface” of this otherwise unexplored relationship. 
2. Sociological Implications for Moral Research in the Present Study 
Suffice it to say that property ownership tends to be conceived of in varied, contentious, 
and often fallacious ways within contemporary society (Rudmin 1991).  As the preceding 
literature review discusses, the relational aspect of ownership is rarely considered in 
conventional discourse about property (Hollawell 1982a, 1982b; Hohfeld 1913; Waldron 
1985). With respect to the exclusionary qualities of private property, for instance, ethical 
attention is predominantly directed toward the individualizing notion of “exclusive 
rights” over objects than to the exclusionary social relations that are its practical effects 
(Hollawell 1982; Hohfeld 1913; Waldron 1985).  These common (mis)conceptions of 
property ownership suggest something interesting about the ways people orient to 
objects, others, and the social institutions in which they engage.  The reification of 
property, and the narrowly individualized terms in which it is commonly experienced, 
may reflect a more generalized possessiveness in the moral and “social character” of 
contemporary society (cf. Fromm 1976, 1998).   
Because property institutions are both structured and structuring phenomena, it is 
necessary that research critically addresses not only the legal, historical, economic, and 
psychological facts of property regimes, but also the normative discourses (i.e., the 
prevailing moral philosophies, social conventions, and individual values and attitudes) 
that reproduce them (Gerth and Mills 1953).  As Lametti (2010) writes, 
private property is a social institution that comprises a variety of contextual 
relationships among individuals through objects of social wealth and is meant to 
serve a variety of individual and collective purposes—human survival, human 
development and flourishing etc.—coupled with its scarcity.  In short, private 
                                               
21 As will be discussed in the following chapter, Karl Marx’s social theory clearly implies a 
connection here, but nowhere has the connection been empirically demonstrated.   
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property is social because of its ethical dimensions and implications (p. 3; 
emphasis added.) 
This conception aptly draws out both the normative-ethical and relational qualities of 
private property, but there is one problem worth noting in Lametti’s formulation.  For 
Lametti, it is private property’s normative-ethical and distributive significance that makes 
it social.  The proposition appears to be backwards, though.  Things are not social 
because they are ethical; they are ethical because they are social.  That is, it is only in and 
through some particular social relationship and social structure that notions of “good” 
and “right” emerge as debatable or actionable concepts (cf. Engels 1976; Horkheimer 
1993).  Following Mead (1934) or Weber (1958), we might instead say that private 
property is necessarily social because it holds common meaning for social actors 
(however asymmetrical their relationship may be); it is necessarily sociological because 
it asymmetrically determines the kinds of outcomes—e.g. of survival, development, 
flourishing, on one hand, and status, influence, power, on the other—experienced by 
people within the property regime; and it is necessarily moral for the fact that the 
rightness of both these social and sociological conditions is subject to critical evaluation.  
From this modified point of view, it is apparent that private property relations are the 
dominant and domineering social relations that underly the prevailing notions of values, 
ethics, laws, and scarcity within a society, not the other way around (cf. Engels 1976; 
Marx 1992; Vogt 1999).   
It follows that private property institutionalizes not only a procedural framework for the 
control and disposal of resources (e.g. Waldron 1985), but also a normative-ethical 
framework for how individuals relate morally to the interests of one another as social 
actors (Fromm 1976, 1998).  The implication here, and the theoretical impetus of the 
present study, is that private property is not merely an expression of societal values, for 
both of these are in fact leaves on the same branch.  Both the institution of private 
property and the social values used to justify it extend from the dominant social relations 
of society.  Thus, the private, exclusionary quality of private property must, from this 
view, be understood as the legal expression of a broader moral atomization—and 
concomitant alienation—of individuals (cf. Marx 1992).  This proposition will be 
explored further in Chapter 3. 
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III. VALUE ORIENTATION AND CRITIQUE 
Before attending to the dissertation’s central theoretical problem of ownership attitudes 
and moral reasoning, it is worth considering some additional areas of inquiry that may be 
relevant to the current research topic. It may be noted that the two phenomena addressed 
thus far, property ownership and morality, share a number of sociologically relevant 
connections.   
Firstly, the theoretical conceptualization of of both ownership and morality addressed 
above are understood to be constituted by social relations.  Property is a concept that 
designates the relative rights and duties among individuals concerning the allocation of 
resources, and morality arises from attempts to resolve dilemmas of competing interests 
among social actors.  In both regards, therefore, the way individuals conceive of the 
social interrelatedness of human beings, and the values they ascribe to such relations, is 
likely to correspond to their respective conceptions of property relations and moral 
situations.  Two cultural “value orientations” prevalent within contemporary society, 
humanism and possessive individualism, have been incorporated into the study for 
exploratory purposes.  These two concepts reflect more or less opposing ontological and 
normative-ethical conceptions of social relations, social institutions, and identity, which 
may provide additional explanatory support for the results of the main study of moral 
reasoning and property ownership attitudes.   
A. The Humanistic Ethos 
Erik Erikson proposes that persons develop through a series of stages which provide the 
foundation for their normative-ethical sensibilities (Côté and Levine 1989).  Echoing in 
social-psychological terms the Kohlbergian stage logic of “pre-convenventional,” 
“conventional,” and “post-conventional” moral stages, Erikson (1975) conceptualizes 
three “value orientation” stages: the “moral,” the “ideological,” and the “ethical.”  Like 
the stages in Kohlberg’s theory, this stage sequence can be argued to represent the 
increasing adequacy (and maturation) of an individual’s moral reasoning capabilities 
(Côté and Levine 1989: 392), but these stages also represent “a hierarchy of increasingly 
adaptive reasoning abilities about the source and nature of authority and the role of 
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individual responsibility in complying with that authority” (Côté and Levine 1989 392).  
In this way, Erikson’s theory lays the groundwork for connecting the development of 
moral reasoning to identity formation—and, more generally, to the agency of the “ego” 
(Côté 2009; Côté and Levine 1989, 1992, 2002; Levine et al. 2000).   
Erikson’s (1975) examination of identity development finds that young people in 
contemporary society are afforded a “psychosocial moratorium” period in which they 
explore various ideological affinities and experiment with adult and juvenile behaviours, 
which may ultimately serve to generate the ego strength for a later “ethical” orientation.22  
He explains that, whereas young people’s ideological preferences often have a rather 
“totalistic” quality, their maturation to adulthood is marked by a corresponding 
maturation and “absorption” of the preceding moral and ideological stages into an 
“ethical” orientation, one in which “a universal sense of values (is) assented to with some 
insight and some responsible foresight,” and through which the ego exerts the strength to 
direct the individual’s choices autonomously, in accordance with one’s self-chosen values 
(p. 206).   
Erikson (1975; see also, Côté 1984; Côté and Levine 1987) distinguishes between “two 
principal ideological orientations” adopted by youth during the institutionalized 
moratorium: the “technological” ethos and “humanistic” ethos.  Côté and Levine (1987) 
make the following distinction between the characteristics of youth who gravitate toward 
these two ideological orientations: 
“Technological youth” (Erikson 1974:202) base their sense of ego identity on the 
ideological framework of the technological ethos that is dominant in our society.  
Erikson identifies two ideological principles that are fundamental to the 
technological ethos: (1) you “become what you do” (1968a:31, Erikson’s emphasis) 
and (2) “what works is good” (1975:216).  Technological youth constitute the 
majority of youth in our society. 
                                               
22 Distinct from the Mannheimian conception of “ideology” referenced earlier, Erikson (1975) 
uses the term to mean “a system of commanding ideas held together to a varying degree more by 
totalistic logic and utopian conviction than by cognitive understanding or pragmatic experience” 
(p. 206–207; emphasis in original). 
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“Humanistic youth” (Erikson, 1975:193) are that “minority of youth (that) sense 
that what only ‘works’ may be destructive unless restrained by a new sense of 
responsibility toward makind as one species” (Erikson in Evans 1967: 34–35).  
Humanistic youth reject “a subordination of ideology to technology” (Erikson 
1963:26).  Given the dominance of the technological ethos in our society and its 
tendency to neutralize dissent (e.g., Marcuse 1964), humanistic youth tend to 
undergo a more prolonged search for an ideological framework as part of their 
ideological stage of value development and, therefore, tend to have the most 
prolonged identity crisis (pp. 68–69). 
During the 1960s, Erikson regarded these two orientations as characteristic of two 
prevailing ethea in American society.  As the above description suggests, the 
“technological” ethos embodies the prevailing “moral pragmatism” of modern culture 
(1975: 216).  Identity formation in accordance with its corresponding norms orients the 
individual’s moral, ideological, and ethical sensibilities around the instrumental-rational 
“promise” of a universal consolidation of technical and cultural values in society (1975: 
216).  Conversely, the “humanistic” ethos is oriented not to the values of “method and 
technique” but to humanistic values such as creativity, social responsibility, and peace—
as well as an often “revolutionary” sensibility against established authority, tradition, 
power, state violence, and default rationalization (Erikson 1975: 216; Côté and Levine 
1987, 1988).   
Extending Erikson’s (1975) connection of adolescent ideology to the development of an 
ethical orientation (p. 216), studies such as those conducted by Côté (1984), Côté and 
Levine (1988, 1989, 1992, 2002) and Levine et al. (2000) show that these value 
orientations (i.e., the technological ethos and humanistic ethos) are predictive of a 
number of developmental and socio-biographical outcomes.  Humanistic youth tend to 
experience a more severe identity crisis than technological youth (Côté and Levine 1988).  
Humanistic youth also tend to report lower rates of “identity foreclosure” (Côté and 
Levine 1988), and psychosocial domains such as ego identity and moral cognition tend to 
develop more “consistently” (i.e., with greater coherence) in university students enrolled 
in humanistic faculties than technological faculties (Levine et al. 2000).  Additionally, 
Côté and Levine (1992) find that established academics in humanistic fields report more 
severe psychosocial crises during their youth and young adulthood than those in 
technological fields (p. 405), but that the humanistic orientation is also associated with 
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more advanced phases of identity development.  Such outcomes are likely explained by 
the degree of ideological conflict one experiences between their value orientation and the 
predominantly technocratic nature of social institutions in contemporary Western society.  
Youth who gravitate toward technological values encounter less conflict between the 
values that they hold and the values of the outside world (Côté and Levine 1988, 1992, 
2003).  Meanwhile, humanistic youth face the more “troublesome” challenge of holding 
values that are marginal to the status quo values and practical demands of a technocratic 
society (Côté and Levine 1988, 1992, 2002). 
The challenges faced by humanistic youth do, however, entail long-term potential for 
stimulating greater adaptability to the complexities of modern society in general, and 
greater coordination of one’s apperception of moral situations and their ability to reason 
about them (Levine et al. 2000).  Levine et al. (2000) point out that,  
It is this greater crisis severity that can better prepare the humanist individual for 
life in a society often characterized by fluctuations in degree of social regulation 
and organization.  …With greater frequency they perceive themselves as learning 
to cope with and resolve problems with the aid of relatively fewer and less 
consistently defined and sanctioned institutional directives (pp. 486–487).  
In other words, the incongruity between the humanist’s ideological values and those of 
the dominant culture generate an impetus for him or her to cultivate greater autonomy in 
adjudicating normative-ethical matters.  Since technological and humanistic values orient 
the individual’s navigation of the psycho-social moratorium and their subsequent identity 
development (Levine et al. 2000: 486), it is possible that they may also influence factors 
relevant to the current study, such as an individual’s attitudes toward the allocation of 
resources or the manner in which he or she apperceives and judges moral problems. 
However, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is the humanistic orientation which is of 
greatest theoretical and empirical interest.  More precisely, it is the sociocentric quality of 
the humanistic orientation—its prioritization of human interests over institutional 
exigencies (Levine et al. 2000)—which make it relevant to the current study of 
individualistic versus social ownership norms, and heteronomous versus autonomous 
moral reasoning.  Conversely, it is not as clear that the “technological” orientation has 
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this same relevance.  While the “moral pragmatism” of the technological ethos indicates a 
nascent ethical sensibility (albeit a potentially amoral one) which may be of relevance to 
the current project, it does not offer a sufficient corollary to humanism with regard to 
individuals’ attitudes to property ownership (Erikson 1975: 216). And while retaining 
both the “humanist” and “technological” typologies in the current study might extend its 
relevance to the field of identity studies, it also runs the risk of distorting the intended 
function of these analytic concepts and oversimplifying the theoretical assumptions 
which undergird them (e.g. ego-superego struggle, institutionalized moratoria, and/or 
identity crisis).23 
Given the exploratory, supplementary significance of value orientations and identity to 
the current study, the humanistic orientation will instead be compared with an ideology 
that shares many characteristics with the technological orientation in regards to its “moral 
pragmatism” and acceptance of a technocratic status quo, but that orients its normative-
ethical values and its conception of identity around the language and logic of property 
ownership specifically.  This ideology has been dubbed by C. B. Macpherson as 
“possessive individualism.” 
B. Possessive Individualism 
C. B. Macpherson (1962) used the term “possessive individualism” to describe a 
“unifying assumption” underlying the English liberal tradition that posits the individual 
as the “proprietor of [their own] person and capacities” (Hansen 2015: 16; Macpherson 
1962: 3).  In accordance with his broader interest in the political theory of democratic 
liberalism, the purpose of Macpherson’s critical study of possessive individualism was to 
                                               
23 It should also be noted that while Erikson posited technological and humanistic values as two 
broad “transhistorically valid” cultural forces (Côté and Levine 1987, 1989), the distinction is 
primarily an empirical rather than a dialectical one.  That is, while the values themselves are, in 
practice and in principle, antithetical to one another, they are not antinomies in the sense that one 
cannot exist without the other.  It is therefore theoretically tenable that only one orientation may 
be studied without the other, or juxtaposed with a different set of cultural values, insofar as a 
researcher is willing to depart analytically from Erikson’s particular conception of the 
institutionalized moratorium. 
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explore “how a certain conception of property ownership had shaped liberal thinking 
about individualism” (Carens 1993: 2).  Macpherson (1962) describes this conception as 
one which posits the individual as the owner of his or her self and capabilities, in effect 
equating each individual as both the property and proprietor of their own person and thus 
binding the notion of freedom with that of property ownership.  
Macpherson observes a conception of individualism underlying the political theories of 
Hobbes, the Levellers, Harrington, and Locke that is deeply reflective of (if not shaped 
by) the “nascent capitalist relations around them”—and, more generally, the prevailing 
notions of property ownership during this period (Lindsay 2013: 133; Carter 2005).24  As 
Carter (2005) explains,  
Macpherson’s central thrust was to argue how such a reified world-view was ‘read 
back into the nature of the individual,’ so that the individual human being comes to 
be seen as an isolated thing—and, more to the point, a commodity to be bought and 
sold on the market.  I am my own property, a least common denominator of 
ownership justifying all other property relations (p. 834). 
The significance of this conception lies in its “possessive” quality—that the individual is 
thought to be one who “owns” one’s own productive faculties in the same way that one 
might privately own any other object of property (Macpherson 1962: 3).  Such an 
individual therefore bears no particular obligation to others in society and is regarded as 
“free” only insofar as his or her activities are conducted independently of the will of all 
other people (Macpherson 1962).  Thus, in contrast to the humanistic orientation 
                                               
24 Commentators on Macpherson’s observations (e.g. Carter 2005; Hansen 2015; Lindsay 2013), 
as well as Macpherson himself, have noted that this conception is “not illogical in principle” 
given the historical-political context in which it emerged (Macpherson 1962: 13).   
For instance, under circumstances in which political powers could otherwise appropriate 
ownership of land or resources with relative legal impunity, the claim to private property had 
“become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual 
freedom and actual prospect of realizing their actual potential” (Macpherson 1962: 3).  Indeed, 
this essential problem lies at the foundation of most liberal and libertarian justifications for 
private property (e.g. Becker 1980; Pipes 1999; Pejovic 1997). 
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described above, “the individual is seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger 
social whole, but as an owner of himself” (Macpherson 1962: 3).25 
Macpherson derives his conception of possessive individualism from an immanent 
analysis of the “unquestioned assumptions” about property ownership and the ontology 
of the human being in liberal political theory (Carter 2005: 823).  These assumptions are 
summarized in a set of seven propositions:  
1. What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others. 
2. Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with 
others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view 
to his own interest. 
3. The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for 
which he owes nothing to society. 
4. Although the individual cannot alienate the whole of his property in his own 
person, he may alienate his capacity to labour. 
5. Human society consists of a series of market relations. 
6. Since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human, each 
individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules 
as are necessary to secure the same freedoms for others. 
7. Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's 
property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of orderly 
relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves. 
(Macpherson 1962: 263–4). 
From these propositions it may be concluded that possessive individualism identifies 
individuality with ownership, and ownership with freedom, in the sense that an individual 
“owns” their own person and capacities as private property. Such an individual bears no 
                                               
25 Macpherson (1962) suggests that Hobbes likely regarded possessiveness as so engrained in the 
constitution of the human being that the lack of property, or the act of selling one’s human 
capabilities (i.e., selling one’s labour), diminishes not only one’s “humanity” but one’s very 
worth as an individual (Carter 2005).   
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particular social duty to others except against violating the property of others.  Thus, to 
the possessive individualist, not only is property conceived of in “private,” individualistic 
terms, but so is each and every human being.   
Macpherson regarded this conception of human nature as fundamentally flawed, and 
according to Carens (1993) and Carter (2005) his account of possessive individualism can 
be understood as entailing three main lines of critique.  The first was that by placing 
greater value in acquisition or consumption than “deeper human purposes or capacities,” 
it espoused an “impoverished view of life” (Carens 1993: 3).   
The second was that it “holds out a false promise” for the possibility of freedom and 
equality (Carens 1993: 3).  By conceiving all social relations and individual capacities as 
property relations, possessive individualism imagines that each individual should 
maximize the satisfaction of his or her own desires (Carens 1993: 2).  This promise 
ultimately fails in actually-existing social and political systems, however, whenever 
actually-existing inequalities provide inordinate means for a segment of the population to 
reproduce and expand its interests at the expense of other segments (Carens 1993).  As 
Carens (1993) notes, “a system based on private property and so-called free exchange 
inevitably generates a concentration of ownership of all the means of production except 
labour.  Most people are compelled to sell their labour to gain access to the means of life.  
They are free and equal individuals in name only” (p. 3).   
The third was that possessive individualism’s “denial of the communal basis of the 
individual” essentially fails on pragmatic and moral grounds (Carter 2005: 836).  
Connecting this line of Macpherson’s criticism to the work of Adorno, Carter (2005) 
shows how the theory of possessive individualism highlights the deceptive, ideological 
dimensions that notions of freedom and individualism can obtain in capitalist society.  
Not only does the assumption that the individual “owes nothing to society” ignore the 
facts of human ontogenesis, it also conceals the social-structural conditions which 
circumscribe both the individual’s actions and self-identity as a social “agent.”  In spite 
of the possessive individualist’s illusion of independence from the rest of society, he or 
she is, in this regard too, “free in name only” (Carter 2005: 836).   
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Despite the considerable and lasting interest that possessive individualism has generated 
among political theorists (Carter 2005; Lindsay 2012; Storms 2004), as well as the 
significant contributions Macpherson’s subsequent works made to the social scientific 
analysis of property ownership more generally (e.g. Macpherson 1966, 1978a, 1978b, 
1979), there do not yet appear to be any attempts to operationalize Macpherson’s concept 
for social-psychological exploration.  This may be due in part to the fact that, like the 
humanistic and technological orientation described above, possessive individualism is not 
merely an attitude per se.  Rather, “the possessive individualist ethos is an identity that 
imbues intersubjective norms and values upon individuals, institutions and state” (Storms 
2004: 5).  In other words, it entails a Weltanschauung encompassing an individual’s 
sense of self, agency, freedom, and social relations.   
A “possessive individualist orientation” nevertheless appears to be a fertile subject for 
empirical social psychological research, especially for the current study.  For instance, 
the escalation of individualistic and materialistic values within society, reflected in the 
generational rise in extrinsic values and narcissistic life goals, on one hand, and decline in 
intrinsic values, concern for others, empathy, and civic orientation, on the other hand, 
provide ample indication of the continued salience of the possessive individualist 
orientation in society (Twenge, Campbell, and Freeman 2012). In bolstering his call for 
an expanded empirical investigation into the possessive individualist identity, Storms 
(2004) states,  
At issue is the sheer pervasiveness of possessive individualism within modernity 
and how it has seeped into almost every aspect of life.  Many pressing issues such 
as global poverty, inequality, overconsumption, and environmental degradation are 
problems of social obligation… Thus, what results are “collective action” 
dilemmas that cannot be easily solved due to our entrenched possessive 
individualist identity.  By recognising this fact, it allows for more detailed schema 
in which to study real effects of this core identity and the roles and behaviours it 
perpetuates (pp. 7–8; emphasis added). 
The current study aims to explore the implicit hypothesis in this claim (as well as 
Macpherson’s overall project), that possessive individualism undermines people’s 
abilities to resolve dilemmas of “social obligation” and “collective action.”  Discussion of 
how possessive individualism might covary with—or, in the theoretical sense, 
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confound—the autonomy of individuals’ resolutions to the moral dilemmas in the current 
study will be presented in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 3  
3 THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
Sociological inquiry cannot speak comprehensively about property—especially private 
property—without addressing the processes by which it is legitimated in the modern 
epoch; nor can it speak comprehensively about morality—especially moral autonomy—
without examining the particular social relations under which claims about justice, 
fairness, dignity, and needs are expressed, debated, and resolved.  As the literature 
discussed in the previous chapter demonstrates, such standards have not yet been met in 
the sociological fields of property or of morality research.  The preceding analysis has 
therefore tended to eschew traditional disciplinary boundaries separating legal, 
sociological, psychological, economic, and philosophical scholarship in favour of a more 
pragmatically-oriented conceptualization of the study’s two main variables: property 
ownership and moral reasoning.    
This chapter narrows its analytic focus the relationship between these two variables, with 
the aim of establishing some empirically testable hypotheses regarding their relationship.  
It also narrows its theoretical scope to the radical humanist perspective expressed, for 
instance, in Marx’s early work (namely, the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
and The German Ideology) and to Fromm’s (1947, 1955, 1969, 1976, 1998) psycho-
sociological critiques of modern capitalism.  As will be discussed below, Marxist-
humanist social criticism draws substantially upon the premise that social relations 
underpinning productive resources have profoundly negative effects upon the moral and 
social-psychological well-being of the individual.  Specifically, this theoretical tradition 
regards the institution of private property (such as that practiced in modern capitalism) as 
a phenomenon that perpetuates the alienation of “man” (both the individual human being 
and mankind as a species) from its essential “human” qualities.  Deprived of agency over 
his labour, man becomes subordinated to the very systems of social organization (e.g. 
property, government, religion) which he has in fact created, and ultimately finds himself 
“chained” —both psychically and materially—to illusory conceptions of freedom, 
individuality, sociality, power, progress, and morality (Fromm 1990; Marx 1992; Marx 
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and Engels 1964).  This chapter provides a synopsis of this theory, and attempts to draw 
from its rich philosophical content a few recurring themes for empirical analysis.  
A theoretical overview of Marx’s humanist philosophy and anthropological conception of 
modern society will be followed by a summary overview of some key contributions to 
this critique, particularly by Erich Fromm.  Fromm’s theorization of the “having” and 
“being” modes of existence will be presented as perhaps the clearest statement regarding 
the relationship between property and moral autonomy in the Marxist humanist tradition. 
In contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition from which Fromm draws his analyses, 
however, the aim will not be to operationalize these modes into quantifiable form, but 
rather to deduce from them a series of hypotheses that may be tested using statistical 
methods. 
I. THE MORAL CRITIQUE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A. Alienation and Private Property 
With respect to Karl Marx’s historical, philosophical, economic, anthropological, and 
sociological body of work, this dissertation is most concerned with the ideas emerging 
from Marx’s early theoretical ideas about human autonomy, property ownership, 
alienation, and ideology. Recognizing the breadth of interpretations and depth of 
controversy among scholars regarding Marx’s theories, it is this researcher’s view that 
Marx’s early works lay both an ontological and a moral foundation for his later economic 
theory (see, e.g., McLellan 1971 and Fromm 1965 for two otherwise conflicting 
perspectives that nevertheless converge on this conclusion). Accordingly, the scholastic 
and activist struggles in which Marx engaged throughout his life may be regarded as a 
logical moral extension of his conception of humanity’s social and productive essence 
and its destruction under industrial capitalism (Fromm 1990).  The focus in the present 
analysis is therefore upon Marx’s views on the relationship between property and human 
agency.   
It is perhaps most appropriate, then, to establish plainly Marx’s opposition to the 
institution of private property.  Marx (1978b) writes: 
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private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours 
when we have it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, 
eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.—in short, when it is used by us.  Although 
private property itself again conceives all these direct realizations of possession as 
means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private 
property—labour and conversion into capital.In place of all these physical and 
mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses—
the sense of having.  The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in 
order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. (p. 87). 
 
Here it is apparent that Marx’s moral criticism of private property does not simply 
implicate problems of the unequal distribution and control of resources.  Also at issue are 
the effects that private property regimes have on the humanity of its subjects. Human 
beings are made “stupid” by private property—both our physical and mental faculties 
focused on labour and thinking become dominated by capital, and are thus impoverished 
and estranged from our being.  The “sense of having” replaces all other “senses,” both 
physical and mental, as the determinants of our practical conduct.  In short, according to 
Marx, private property destroys the most basic human “senses” needed for an individual 
to relate productively to the natural and social world.26 
This criticism is founded in Marx’s anthropological conception of human productivity 
and sociality, in which property results from the “objectification” of human intellect 
through labour in the material world.  Where labour is conducted “humanely,” as an 
expression of humankind’s social being, production and distribution is likewise expressed 
as a cooperative social process.  Conversely, where labour is conducted “inhumanely,” it 
stands as an alienating process—estranging the individual from his life activity, the 
products of that activity, from other persons, and from the agentic qualities that 
distinguish human beings from other animals. 
                                               
26 In Marx’s usage, then, “private property” entails both the class relations that emerge when 
resources are privately controlled by the bourgeois ruling class against the propertyless 
proletarian class, and the political-economic system that reproduces these relations.  “Social 
property,” by contrast, entails the ownership relations emerging from a collectively controlled 
mode of production, in which resources are shared amongst the community.  
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It is worth noting the way that Marx thinks of the relationship between alienation and 
private property because it serves to illustrate his more general theoretical view of human 
productivity. While it may appear that private property engenders conditions that alienate 
owners from non-owners and workers from their products, one another, etc., Marx in fact 
regards alienation as the necessary condition for the emergence of private property.  This 
is because “rights” to private property are, for Marx, illusory abstractions that emerge not 
from human beings’ natural relation to man and nature but out of particular material 
conditions and under particular historical circumstances.  As Marx explains in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, it is only from a profoundly alienated social 
condition that such illusions could take hold: 
Private property is… the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of 
alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself… 
[It] thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour—i.e., of alienated 
man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged man.True, it is as a result 
of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated 
labour (of alienated life) from political economy.  But on analysis of this concept it 
becomes clear that though private property appears to be the source, the cause of 
alienated labour, it is really its consequence, just as the gods in the beginning are 
not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion.  Later this relationship 
becomes reciprocal. (1978b: 79).  
There is much to be said about the claim Marx is making about the causal relation 
between alienation and private property here; most relevant to the present study, 
however, is the implication that private property is for Marx an outcome of humankind’s 
more general estrangement.  As the above analogy to religious phantasy makes clear, 
Marx views private property not as a real, material fact, but as a fetish, a human creation 
which has obtained an illusory status as natural and real—and which has thus mastered 
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human beings rather than being mastered by them (1990).27  His analysis of “the 
fetishization of commodities” in Capital Vol. 1 (1990) depicts the full manifestation of 
the reciprocal relationship between humankind’s social creations and its intellectual 
confusion under capitalist production.  Here Marx depicts the processes by which the 
exchange value of commodities obtains hegemonic power over individuals’ social 
relations and psychological perceptions.  Labour, the material expression of individuals’ 
human autonomy and the practical basis for the reproduction of both individual and 
society, comes to be seen only through the lens of exchange value (Marx 1990).  Hence 
social relations obtain a purely instrumental significance, and “autonomy” is distorted 
into the narcissistic image of the private individual.   
The connection between the alienated distortion of individuality and the institution of 
property receives further analysis in Marx’s (1978a) writing on “The Jewish Question.”  
Here Marx attacks the very social system upon which political-economic discourse about 
“individual rights” is conceived, and sets out to demonstrate the connection between 
capitalist society and the moral precepts of modern political economy.  Marx interrogates 
the premises that distinguish the “rights” of citizens from those of humankind and 
demonstrates how the former reduces individuality and society to an egoistic abstraction.   
At the bottom of all these distortions lies a key institution: the right to private property. It 
is this “inviolable and sacred” right to private property28 which, Marx argues, grants the 
right to “enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion (à son gré), without 
regard to other men, independently of society,” and thereby codifies “the right of self-
                                               
27 This view is likewise implied in the opening paragraphs of “Alienated Labour,” where Marx 
contrasts the apriorism of political economy with his own materialist analyses: “Political 
economy proceeds from the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us.  It expresses 
in general, abstract formulae the material process through which private property actually passes, 
and these formulae it then takes for laws” (1978b: 70).  And later, “theology in the same way 
explains the origin of evil by the fall of man: that is, it assumes as a fact, in historical form, what 
has to be explained.  We proceed from an actual economic fact” (1978b: 71).   
28 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article XVII: “Property being an inviolable 
and sacred right, no one can be deprived of private usage, if it is not when the public necessity, 
legally noted, evidently requires it, and under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.” 
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interest” (1978a: 42).  In political economy, citizens’ rights to liberty, security, equality, 
and property are all formulated on the assumption that individuals’ interests are separable 
from the rest of social reality.  However, “none of the so-called rights of man… go 
beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society–that is, an individual 
withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and 
separated from the community” (1978a: 43).  Rather than conceive of the human being as 
an individual member of society, modern rights relations conceive of the human being in 
abstraction, as an “isolated monad” whose bonds to society extend only to satisfying 
one’s private economic self-interests (1978a: 42).  
In a turn-of-phrase that uses the German word Judentum to convey both a reference to the 
political issue of Jewish religiosity and citizenship as well as to his broader critique of 
commerce (the secondary meaning of the term),29 Marx excoriates the ‘religious’ power 
of money to abstract and privatize social relations and thereby rule over human beings: 
“Money is the alienated essence of man’s work and existence; this essence dominates 
him and he worships it” (1978a: 50).  So far as morality is concerned, the law of the 
‘Jew’ (qua commerce) comes to engender only a “caricature” of morality, freedom, right, 
or reason.  Instead, such principles are abstracted into legal terms which obtain a power 
over the very people who reproduce them.  Both in themselves and among one another, 
individuals’ social relations are compartmentalized into legal statuses of “rights holders” 
and “rights regarders,” and the moral conduct enacted therefrom is based not on reason 
but on rules, not on rightness but on rights.  The individual’s legal status and legal 
relations become the “supreme condition of man,” to be obeyed “not because (they are) 
the laws of his own will and nature, but because they are dominant and any infraction of 
them will be avenged” (1978a: 51). 
The contradiction of a societal morality that enshrines the “isolated monad” as something 
separable from others and from the community is the cornerstone of Marx’s response to 
                                               
29 Editor’s footnote in Marx (1978a: 50). Marx (1978a) also specifies this distinction more 
concretely when he writes “Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer 
considers, but the everyday Jew” (p. 48). 
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“The Jewish Question” (1978a: 43). The notion of distinguishing one’s “private” moral 
or spiritual beliefs, on one hand, from one’s social membership, on the other, is rejected 
by Marx on the grounds that they reify the political identity of the citizen at the expense 
of the personhood of the full human being.  After all, the very point of emancipation 
according to Marx is to bring humankind’s activities (as both species and individual) 
more comprehensively in line with the total productive and social powers of humanity 
(cf. 1978a: 46).30  
But by replacing one abstraction, God, with another, money, the modern political 
revolutions have only perpetuated humankind’s alienation in secular form.  “Thus,” 
argues Marx, “man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty.  He was 
not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property.  He was not liberated 
from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business” (1978: 45).  In 
effect, the prevailing political economic system abstracts the “individual” from the 
“material and cultural elements” which constitute the individual’s social life 
circumstances, and modern man is left alienated from the personal and social autonomy 
to shape these latter “elements.”  However much liberty humankind has been granted 
over their own private affairs, the production and reproduction of “public” affairs is 
mediated by the “fantastical,” alien power of money—and thus the private interests of 
whoever controls it (1978a: 52).  It is readily apparent that such power has become 
hegemonic in our own time (cf. Badiou 2014). 
B. Bourgeois Property and Bourgeois Morality 
Marx’s theory extends an important premise established in the previous chapter: to 
understand property as a social relation requires us to expand that understanding beyond 
just legal relations; for Marx, property (and particularly private property) finds its 
“relational” basis in the relations of man to nature, of man to man, and in the relations of 
production within a given society.  The legal relation (i.e., of rights-holder to rights-
                                               
30 Marx writes in the Economic and Philosophic manuscripts, for instance, that for the fully 
developed person “every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression 
corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life” (1978b: 105). 
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regarder), then, is merely the institutional system which maintains the underlying social 
relation.  Furthermore, Marx raises the problem that prevailing property ownership norms 
are not merely conceptually inadequate, but that this conceptual inadequacy arises from 
deeper social-structural relations that are themselves morally inadequate.  Because 
private property and other social-legal relations operate as powers that “cleave” the 
individual’s interests and identity from that of the community, and because they operate 
as a power over individual and society rather than being an expression of their own “will 
and nature,” these systems stand opposed to the full exercise of human autonomy (1978a: 
51). 
And while the personal liberties enjoyed by individuals in bourgeois society might be 
regarded as the fulfilment of humanity’s drive for autonomy, it should be recalled that 
autonomy entails not freedom from the will of others, but freedom to formulate one’s 
own rules in a manner that respects the rights and autonomy of self and others.  Engels’ 
(1976) analysis of bourgeois morality illustrates the inadequacy of the existing economic 
relations to provide such freedom.  Following the historical materialist logic of Marx’s 
(1978c) social ontology, Engels (1978) argues that “all moral theories have been hitherto 
the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the 
time” (p. 726).  In each era, the prevailing ethical ideas ultimately emerge from the 
prevailing economic relations.  Where relations of production and exchange are shaped 
by class antagonism, individuals (consciously or unconsciously) formulate their moral 
perspectives and justifications according to the external influences of the prevailing class 
interests.31  It is only when the distorting force of class antagonism has been abolished 
that moral autonomy may be fully realized in concrete reality, since “a really human 
morality, which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them, 
                                               
31 Engels here does not necessarily preclude the oppressed class from shaping moral influence; 
his point is rather that ethical ideas, like all other ideas, are shaped by the power relations 
obtaining in a given milieu.  In an observation intimated in Marx and Engels (1965) and later 
taken up by Gramsci, he suggests that the oppressed class, should it become powerful enough, 
will form its own “class morality” which “represents its indignation against this domination and 
reflects “the future interests of the oppressed” (Engels 1978: 726). 
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becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class 
antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life” (Engels 1978: 726–727).   
It is with the above logic that Engels makes the explicit connection between property 
ownership and the truncation of moral autonomy.  For Marx and Engels, the enduring 
dominance of private ownership regimes has served to entrench the hegemonic moral 
injunction, “thou shalt not steal.”  The philosophical and social scientific project 
undertaken by Marx and Engels entails an excoriation of the institution of private 
ownership and its deleterious effects on human autonomy, including human moral 
autonomy.  Under capitalism, Marx (1978a) argues, commerce, competition, and private 
property become supreme values not only as abstract economic relations but by-and-by as 
sacred moral dogma:   
money is the universal and self-sufficient value of all things.  It has, therefore, 
deprived the whole world, both the human world and nature, of their own proper 
value. Money is the alienated essence of man’s work and existence; this essence 
dominates him and he worships it (p. 50). 
Modern capital thus encroaches not only on the social relations of individuals but upon 
their psychological orientations as well.  This phenomenon never received direct 
systematic analysis from Marx, but later became one of the major foci of the Western 
Marxists of the Frankfurt School who combined Marx’s insights with the psychoanalytic 
theories of Freud.  The work of psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, in particular, takes direct 
aim at the relationship between modern ownership regimes and moral autonomy.  Like 
Marx’s, Fromm’s theoretical framework posits not only a moral rejection of private 
property but an affirmation of social property.  It is to Fromm’s “radical humanist” 
elaboration on Marx’s claims that the discussion now turns.   
C. The Humanist Critique 
Among its many intellectual contributions, Erich Fromm’s body of work provides a rich 
social-psychological elaboration of Marx’s critique of capitalist society.  Drawing 
significantly from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Fromm interprets Marx as 
a “radical humanist” and develops a social-psychological elaboration of Marx’s theories 
of alienation, bourgeois ideology, private property, and freedom (Durkin 2014; see also 
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Fromm 1965, 1990).  Like Marx, Fromm contends that the conscious experience of 
individuals is greatly influenced by the material conditions of the society in which they 
live and the practical relations they have with others in the society.  As both a social and 
psychological faculty, individual (and collective) agency exists in a dynamic relationship 
with “circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1978e: 
595), while ideas, “have their roots in the real life of society” (cited in Durkin 2014: 41).  
Under conditions of capitalist production—in which social relations are expressed in 
terms of exploitation, technical rationality, and privatization—alienation and illusion 
pervade the individual’s mental and social life.  Power is experienced as control over 
commodities (including the commodified individual); freedom is depicted as absolute 
independence from other people (Macpherson 1962); and morality is rendered 
indistinguishable from social convention (Fromm 1969). 
What Fromm contributes to Marx’s critique of property is a direct examination of the 
connection between private property and alienation as a social-psychological 
phenomenon, and—importantly—a moral prescription that connects the development of 
human autonomy with the transcendence of private property (Marx 1978b: 87; Fromm 
1976: 83–84).  In To Have or To Be, Fromm (1976) elaborates upon his analysis by 
contrasting two “fundamental modes of existence” toward self and the world—“two 
different kinds of character structure… determining the totality of a person’s, thinking, 
feeling, acting” (p. 53).  Fromm terms these two social-psychological “modes” of 
orienting to the world the “having” mode and the “being” mode. 
Fromm (1976) explains that “the nature of the having mode of existence follows from the 
nature of private property. In this mode of existence all that matters is my acquisition of 
property and my unlimited right to keep what I have acquired” (p. 64).  Individuals in the 
“having” mode apperceive the world in terms of things and possessions, and thus regard 
social relations and social norms in static, instrumental ways.  As Fromm (1976) 
explains, humans’ mastery over the material world, insofar as it has led to the ossification 
of subject and object, has a paradoxically oppressive effect on the ‘master.’  Because the 
having orientation derives individuals’ “modes of existence” from their control over 
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external objects, the individual is rendered dependent upon those objects.  Fromm (1976) 
states that, 
In the having mode, there is no alive relationship between me and what I have.  It 
and I have become things, and I have it because I have the force to make it mine.  
But there is also a reverse relationship: it has me, because my sense of identity, i.e., 
of sanity, rests upon my having it (and as many things as possible) (p. 77).  
Fromm’s statement echoes from a critical psychoanalytic standpoint Marx’s analyses of 
alienation and commodity fetishism.32  Both Marx and Fromm contend that a mode of 
social life in which objects come to rule the individuals who create them is an aberration 
from healthy human development—a case of social and psychological pathology in 
modern society.33  
The having mode is concerned primarily with the conversion of dynamic (material and 
immaterial) relationships into commoditized (material and immaterial) objects.  It 
therefore corresponds closely to both the individualistic, possessive orientation to self 
conceptualized by Macpherson (1962) and to the privatized, alienated institution of 
property ownership examined by Marx (1992).  Drawing together his assessment of both 
the predominant individual state of mind and the prevailing social milieu, Fromm lays out 
an unequivocally negative evaluation of the consumerist, “materialistic” ethos 
represented by the having orientation. For Fromm, “greed for money, fame, and power 
has become the dominant themes of life” in Western industrial society (1976: 7), and has 
                                               
32 “To them, their own social action takes the form of the action of the objects, which rule the 
producers instead of being ruled by them” (Marx 1978d: 323). 
33 This concern is elaborated in Fromm’s (1976) psychoanalytic critique of consumerism: 
What matters is Freud’s view that the predominant orientation in possession occurs in the 
period before the achievement of full maturity and is pathological if it remains permanent.  
For Freud, in other words, the person exclusively concerned with having and possession is 
a neurotic, mentally sick person; hence it would follow that the society in which most of 
the members are anal characters is a sick society (pp. 83–84). 
Likewise, the present research project is concerned not only with testing the statistical 
relationships between various theoretical analogues of the “having” mode; it also aims to draw 
inferences about the prospects for human development based on the relationships identified. 
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led to the intellectual deadening of humankind’s capacities for spontaneous, creative, 
productive existence.   
Fromm’s concern is therefore not simply with possessiveness or consumerism per se, but 
with the total industrial and cultural system through which private property gains its 
ideological power—and the consequences of that power for the future of human reason 
and freedom.  The legitimation of private property, the romanticized pursuit of it, and the 
lionization of those who possess it are therefore central to the having mode.   Altogether, 
these constitute both a consequence and a cause of alienation. 
Whereas the having mode prioritizes non-living entities (and indeed objectifies the 
individual’s own sense of self), the “being” mode prioritizes the lived experience and 
practice of existence. In the being mode, one’s material and social environment are 
regarded as mutually constitutive of one’s own life activity.  Accordingly, insofar as one 
does engage in the objectification of labour, this relationship is foremost characterized by 
its productive rather than possessive qualities—that is, by utility rather than 
commodification.  In Fromm’s words, “the mode of being has as its prerequisite 
independence, freedom, and the presence of critical reason.  Its fundamental character is 
that of being active, not in the sense of outward activity, of busyness, but of inner 
creativity, the productive use of our human powers” (p. 88).  The being mode of 
existence, therefore, is not simply an idealistic state.  It requires a “dynamic,” 
“productive,” “active” orientation to one’s own reason and social relations, as well as to 
the concrete material conditions necessary for the free exercise of personal autonomy and 
critical reason (Fromm 1976, 1989, 1998).  Heteronomy, private property, and possessive 
individualism, then, are categorically inconsistent with the being mode of existence, both 
socially and psychologically (Fromm 1976: 65–66, 1998).   
For Fromm, “having” and “being” represent two alternative and contradictory modes of 
personal as well as social life, which bear close connection to the way in which 
individuals and social systems are oriented to resource allocation: either the private or the 
social control of property.  Fromm (1976) states that  
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from these two contradictory strivings in every human being it follows that the 
social structure, its values and norms, decide which of the two becomes dominant.  
Cultures that foster the greed for possession, and thus the having mode of existence 
are rooted in one human potential; cultures that foster being and sharing are rooted 
in the other potential.  We must decide which of these two potentials we want to 
cultivate, realizing, however, that our decision is largely determined by the 
socioeconomic structure of a given society that inclines us toward one or the other 
solution (p. 93). 
Such alternates, Fromm argues, have serious implications for how individuals relate to 
the rules of society.  Individuals who are obsessed with private property will not only be 
inclined to accept without question the “given” rules (even though they may be no more 
likely to conform to those rules).  They will also be disinclined to orient their values 
around the interests of others for fear of “losing” power, possessions, etc. to them.  For 
such individuals, morality is something prescribed heteronomously, and is negotiable 
only for the sake of one’s own utilitarian ends.  
Conversely, the being model calls forth the active, productive powers of the human being 
which can only be fully realized through the liberation of one’s social relations from 
private property relations and with the development of one’s critical reason necessary to 
autonomously exercise one’s moral reason (Fromm 1976: 65–67). Those who regard 
property as subject to cooperative productive use and subjective need will accordingly 
tend to orient their moral consciousness around principles of mutual respect, freedom, the 
intrinsic worth of persons, and so on.  Like all other products of “free conscious activity,” 
moral judgments will be dictated by the individual’s own active reasons and convictions 
rather than through uncritical obedience to power or one’s own instrumental self interest 
(Fromm 1967, 1976). 
D. Summary: Property and Moral Autonomy 
What, then, is the crux of the present examination of Marxian social theory?  It is its 
insight into the predominant cultural and political economic relations of our time—that 
the regime of private property, as a “total ideology,” engenders a distorted apperception 
of human relations and an immature orientation to moral agency (cf. Mannheim 1936).  
In prioritizing above all other values the right “to enjoy and dispose as one will, one’s 
goods and revenues, the fruits of one’s work and industry,” bourgeois society produces in 
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the human being a passive, heteronomous relation to moral reasoning (Art. 16, 
Constitution of 1793, quoted in Marx 1978a: 42).  
Marx regards private property not “merely” as an institution which engenders the 
progressive exploitation of a subordinate class by a dominant class but also as one that 
abstracted the principle of individuality at precisely the historical epoch that such 
individuality could have been realized as a social reality. Rather than cultivating the 
productive powers of each person in their “real individual life” (1978b: 105) as members 
of a genuine community, the right of private property engenders egoistic self-interest, the 
commodity fetishism of material and cultural production, and the continued alienation of 
individuals from one another.  Under circumstances of moral uncertainty, where a 
dilemma of interests is at stake, it curtails the individual’s capacity to assess the situation 
with regard to each party’s interests.  Instead, “it leads every man to see in other men, not 
the realization but rather the limitation of his own liberty” (1978a: 42).  And while such 
egoism may be mistaken for the autonomy of “giving one one’s own law,” it is in fact the 
opposite, since such an individual leaves uninterrogated the societal laws which just so 
conveniently cohere with his own.  
Likewise, the apperception of a dilemma itself is not perceived “merely” through the 
distorting lens of bourgeois morality, but it ceases to be perceived as a moral dilemma at 
all.  In reference to the exercise of “free, conscious activity,” Fromm (1976) notes that 
“Marx’s whole critique of capitalism and his vision of socialism are rooted in the concept 
that self-activity is paralyzed in the capitalist system and that the goal is to restore full 
humanity by restoring activity in all spheres of life” (p. 83–84).  At its most hegemonic, 
the right to private property so obscures considerations of human need that “property” 
itself comes to be understood as a thing rather than a relation.  The language and laws of 
political-economy proceed on “facts” of private property that it has taken for granted, but 
fails to comprehend (Marx 1978b :70).   
And yet these critical theories also convey the possibility for a radically different mode of 
being.  Marx’s communistic vision and Fromm’s humanistic ethics describe social, 
material, and moral relations in which cooperation, material wealth, and freedom are 
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made commensurate as productive human relations.  Furthermore, they relate such a 
system to a “fully developed humanism”—the full maturation of the human species. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT STUDY 
The forgoing discussion demonstrates that Marx’s and Fromm’s humanistic analysis of 
private property extend beyond just the unequal distribution of material resources in 
capitalist societies.  Their criticism lies more specifically in the kinds of social relations 
that prevail in these societies.  Whereas Marx directed his criticism to the political-
economic and historical facts of these relations, Fromm addressed their social-
psychological and moral significance. Fromm suggests that beneath the privatization of 
property lies a more general orientation that encompasses both a person’s relation to 
objects and to other persons.  “Possession,” Fromm contends, “is not the actual 
motivation for the orientation toward having, but rather the necessity to use and 
functionalize every relation in which a person stands” (Funk 1998: 11; emphasis added).  
Here an important distinction can be made between the “Materialist” attitudes which Belk 
examines (possessiveness, non-generosity, and envy), and the attitudinal orientation to 
property relations which is the subject of this dissertation.  The exclusionary material 
relationship is, for Fromm, inextricable from the exclusionary social relationship endemic 
within the private property system.  Hence, the prevailing regime of material and social 
exclusion constitutes an intrinsically sociological and moral problem: sociological 
because it pertains to the institutional and normative determinants of resource allocation 
within a society, and moral because it concerns (or, in the case of private property, 
distorts) problems of competing needs and interests in determining a fair system of 
allocation. 
A. Toward a Critical Social-Psychological Study of Cognitive Moral 
Autonomy and Property Attitudes 
Piaget (1965) had the insight to recognize that the development of moral autonomy rests 
not merely on ontogenetic factors, but on social ones as well.  In observing children’s 
consciousness of rules, Piaget (1965) notes that  
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the very nature of the relations which the child sustains with the adults around him 
prevents this socialization for the moment from reaching that state of equilibrium 
which is propitious to the development of reason.  We mean, of course, the state of 
cooperation, in which the individuals, regarding each other as equals can exercise a 
mutual control and thus attain to objectivity.  In other words, the very nature of the 
relation between the child and the adult places the child apart, so that his thought is 
isolated, and while he believes himself to be sharing the point of view of the world 
at large he is really still shut up in his own point of view. …The child is dominated 
on the one hand by a whole set of rules and examples that are imposed upon him 
from outside.  But unable as he is, on the other hand, to place himself on a level of 
equality with regard to his seniors, he utilizes for his own ends, unaware even of his 
own isolation, all that he has succeeded in grasping of the social realities that 
surround him (p. 36). 
Could this same dynamic between moral heteronomy and social heteronomy, between 
egocentrism and isolation on one hand and domination and inequality on the other, be 
extrapolated beyond the domination of rules and parental authority to the level of social-
structural inequality?  If the power relations in one’s immediate personal interactions 
affect the development of moral reasoning, as Piaget suggests, it is reasonable to suppose 
that so too must the total socializing environment.  
This supposition finds support in the theoretical work of Marx and Fromm discussed 
throughout this chapter.  Echoing Piaget’s insight into the effects of isolation, 
domination, and heteronomy on the development of moral reasoning, Fromm states of the 
modern individual in capitalist society: “our judgments are extremely biased because we 
live in a society that rests on private property, profit and power as the pillars of its 
existence.  To acquire, to own, and to make a profit are the sacred and inalienable rights 
of the individual in the industrial society” (Fromm 1998: 38–39; emphasis added).  What 
Piaget observes in the heteronomous powers of rules and status over the developing child, 
Fromm and Marx examine across all of society.  The prevailing ideological and economic 
power of private property relations exerts a power over the individual that curtails 
cooperation, cognitive autonomy, and moral responsibility.  At the same time that the 
bourgeois epoch (with its emphasis on liberty, individuality, and rationality) makes 
possible the imagination of self-chosen, universalizable moral principles, it limits the 
fulfilment of precisely such a morality (Horkheimer 1993: 22–25).  As Fromm (1976) 
notes, even “the autonomous, genuine person is forced to give up most of his or her 
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autonomous, genuine desires and interests, and his or her own will, and to adopt a will 
and desires and feelings that are not autonomous but superimposed by the social patterns 
of thought and feeling” (p. 66; emphasis added).  The pervasiveness of the having 
orientation, and the marginality of the being orientation in contemporary society is a 
testament to the significance of the cultural values which socialize individuals’ senses of 
self, other, and possessions.   
As was discussed in Chapter 2, possessive individualism entails a distinctly possessive 
value orientation vis-à-vis individuality, social relations, and property ownership, and 
that it is prevalent through much liberal political thought (Macpherson 1962).  Carens 
(1993) summarizes the ethical thrust of possessive individualism thusly:  
this version of individualism is ultimately justified on the grounds that it is 
congruent with human nature, for human beings are portrayed as bundles of 
appetites that are, in principle, unlimited and not subject to rational scrutiny.  A 
social world organized around individuals as owners will, it is said, maximize the 
satisfaction of such desires (p. 2).   
It is clear from this description that the social perspectives which inform the possessive 
individualist orientation—characterized as it is by a view of society as “as series of 
competitive relations between naturally dissociated and independently self-moving 
individuals” (Macpherson 1962: 17)—stand in stark contrast to those from which the 
“creative and cooperative individualism” in the Marxist-humanist tradition (and in 
Macpherson’s democratic theory) is derived (Carens 1993: 1–2).34  It is also clear that 
substantial connections may be drawn between Fromm’s descriptive and evaluative 
conception of the having orientation and Macpherson’s conception of possessive 
individualism.  Numerous commentators have noted parallels in Macpherson’s oeuvre 
and the Frankfurt School thinkers (e.g. Carens 1993; Carter 2005; Lindsay 2012; and in 
particular Hansen 2015), but research for this dissertation has not revealed any empirical 
studies that explore the links between these theories.  Given the centrality that concepts 
                                               
34 Referencing Townsend’s (2000) analysis, Carter (2005) suggests that “concepts of commodity 
fetishism and reification are ‘at the root of Macpherson’s theorization and critique of possessive 
individualism’” (2005: 834; emphasis added). 
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of commodity fetishism and reification had in Macpherson’s theorization and critique of 
possessive individualism (Townsend 2000, quoted in Carter 2005: 834), it may be 
worthwhile to explore empirically how this value orientation relates to issues of property 
ownership and moral reasoning.   
It is reasonable to acknowledge, however, that private possessiveness, cupidity, and 
callous individualism are not the only “value orientations” in town.  Most individuals do 
tend to recognize (and value) some interdependency among human beings, and certain 
forms of charity, cooperation, and public/social ownership are regarded as ethical goods.  
Likewise, although Fromm (1976) finds the being orientation to be uncommon—and 
discouraged—in Western capitalist society, it is nevertheless exhibited by a subset of the 
population, and finds its value orientation in the humanistic ethos described in Chapter 2 
as well (Erikson 1965).  Considering the significance that humanism plays in Marx’s and 
Fromm’s vision for the positive development of autonomy and socialism, a measure of 
individuals’ humanistic values developed by Côté (1984) has been included in the study 
(See Chapter 4).  
Analysis of the variations in the salience of one’s humanistic orientation to life may 
provide explanatory insight into the kinds of attitudes one holds regarding property 
ownership, and their possible relationship to moral reasoning—whether, for instance, the 
internalization of humanistic values disposes one to prefer egalitarian, cooperative modes 
of ownership relations and moral conflict resolution over more individualistic modes.  
Research by Levine et al. (2000: 498–499) has examined the relationship between 
humanism and moral reasoning and found “humanistic” value orientations to be 
positively correlated with “moral maturity” during youth-hood, especially as compared to 
more “morally pragmatic” values (Erikson 1965: 216).  As stated in the previous chapter, 
it is the sociocentric quality of the humanistic orientation which makes it relevant to the 
study of individualistic versus social ownership norms, and heteronomous versus 
autonomous moral reasoning.  
In short, to the extent that the humanist’s or possessive individualist’s values orient the 
formation of their overall sense of self and social reality, it is possible that these values 
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may also influence factors relevant to the current study, such as an individuals’ attitudes 
toward the allocation of resources or the manner in which he or she apperceives and 
judges moral problems.   
III. PROPOSITIONS 
Several propositions concerning the relationships among property ownership attitudes, 
moral reasoning, and value orientations within contemporary Western society can be 
derived from the above discussion.  They are as follows. 
A. Property and Ownership Attitudes 
1. Understood as a spectrum ranging between private and social ownership, property 
ownership attitudes entail a set of beliefs about how resources are and ought to be 
allocated in society. Because preferences for social ownership over private 
ownership run counter to the conventions of contemporary North American society, 
maintaining the stability of this attitude with reasoning in defense of it places greater 
cognitive demands (i.e., demands upon autonomous moral cognition) on an 
individual.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect:(a) that a preference for ownership 
norms that more strongly emphasize the private allocation of resources would be 
associated with a diminished exercise of cognitive moral autonomy, since “pre-
constructed cultural norms” are available for their justification, and(b) that a 
preference for ownership norms that more strongly emphasize the social allocation 
of resources would be associated with the increased exercise of cognitive moral 
autonomy.  
2. A preference for ownership norms that more strongly emphasize the social allocation 
of resources is cognitively inconsistent with holding a possessive orientation to 
objects. 
3. A preference for ownership norms that more strongly emphasize the private 
allocation of resources is cognitively consistent with an orientation of non-generosity 
toward sharing one’s possessions. 
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B. Value Orientations: Possessive Individualism and Humanism 
Because possessive individualism and humanism are philosophically, psychologically, 
and socially incompatible value systems, then it is reasonable to expect that:  
1. A preference for ownership norms that more strongly emphasize the private 
allocation of resources is cognitively consistent with the kinds of individualistic 
values espoused in the possessive individualist orientation. 
2. A preference for ownership norms that more strongly emphasize a socialistic 
allocation of resources is cognitively consistent with the kinds of collectivistic values 
espoused in the humanist tradition. Since a possessive individualistic cognitive 
orientation confines an individual’s ontological and ethical perspective to the logics 
of a commodity-exchange market, then it is reasonable to expect that such a 
perspective is inhibitive of the exercise and development of cognitive moral 
autonomy.  Conversely, since a humanistic orientation to social life orients 
individuals’ social perspectives toward addressing the rights and needs of the persons 
who comprise its population, it is reasonable to expect that such a perspective would 
enhance the development of, and require the use of, cognitive moral autonomy.   
3. Since the humanistic orientation toward social life (a) entails norms and values that 
are inconsistent with the dominant norms and values of North American capitalist 
society, and (b) involves the willingness to constructively critique these norms and 
values, it is reasonable to expect that in the context of apprehending and addressing 
specific moral dilemmas implicating these norms, persons who are strongly 
humanistic would be more likely demonstrating moral autonomy in their responses 
to such dilemmas.  Such conflicts do not apply to the relationship between possessive 
individualism and the norms and values of North American capitalist society, and 
therefore nor do such expectations. 
IV. SUMMARY 
By examining some possible attitudinal correlates of individuals’ moral reasoning, this 
study empirically investigates possible connections between the exercise of 
“autonomous” moral reasoning, on the one hand, and humanism, possessive 
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individualism, and property attitudes, on the other.  In the most general sense, the 
theoretical literature presented in this chapter suggests that an attitudinal orientation in 
support of private, exclusionary forms of ownership is inconsistent with the exercise of 
autonomous moral cognition, whereas a humanistic orientation would be consistent with 
the use of autonomous reasoning.  Further inquiry into the effects of cultural value 
orientations (i.e., humanism and possessive individualism) has also been proposed to 
provide explanatory context for understanding the relationships that may be observed 
between both moral reasoning and property attitudes.  In particular, it has been suggested 
that possessive individualism constitutes a cultural value system consistent with pro-
private property attitudes and heteronomous reasoning, whereas humanism constitutes a 
system of cultural values consistent with holding pro-social property attitudes and 
autonomous reasoning.   
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Chapter 4  
4 METHODS 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between property ownership 
attitudes and autonomous moral reasoning.  As discussed throughout Chapter 3, there are 
compelling (albeit as yet empirically untested) theoretical reasons to hypothesize an 
inverse relationship between positive attitudes toward private property and cognitive 
moral autonomy.  It was also proposed that this relationship might be mediated by such 
“value orientations” as humanism or possessive individualism.  It is possible also that the 
relationship might be spurious.  Therefore, survey data was collected to investigate this 
relationship quantitatively.  This chapter describes the procedures for data collection and 
methods of analysis used in this study. 
I. PROCEDURE AND SAMPLE 
A. Ethics Approval 
Ethics approval for this research was granted by the Research Ethics Board for Non-
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) at the University of Western 
Ontario (NMREB File #106468).  Notices of approval and letter of informed consent 
appear in Appendix A. 
B. Recruitment and Instrumentation 
One hundred thirty-nine (N=139) graduate and undergraduate students from the 
University of Western Ontario and affiliate colleges volunteered to participate in this 
study.  Recruitment was conducted through various means.  Within the university, course 
instructors and department secretaries were contacted requesting permission to issue a 
call for participants either in person by in-class announcement, or digitally by 
disseminating a digital flyer (e.g. over email or online class portal) (see Appendix B).  
Calls for participants were also issued through passive snowball sampling over social 
media platforms (e.g. Facebook and Twitter), word of mouth, and flyers posted around 
the campus.  No economic or material incentive was associated with participation in the 
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study.  Based on the desired research sample of 100–200 participants, the recruitment 
campaign was deemed a success. 
The mixed-methods survey was comprised of Likert-style attitude questions and content 
analysis of written responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas.  Participants completed an 
online survey administered via the Qualtrics data delivery system.  Pilot testing suggested 
that the survey would take approximately 30–40 minutes to complete.   
Responses were measured using various scales, both established (Belk’s [1984, 1985] 
Possessiveness Scale and Non-generosity Scale; and a modified version of Côté’s [1984] 
Humanistic Orientation Scale) and exploratory (a measure of Property Attitudes and of 
Possessive Individualism).  An adapted version of Colby and Kohlberg’s (1987) 
instrument for measuring “moral types” was also used to measure one of the main 
variables in this study. 
1. Age 
Age of respondents was measured using a drop-down menu of options ranging from 18 to 
65 years or older.  Nearly 75% of participants were 30 years of age or younger, and 
nearly half were 24 years of age or younger (Table 4.1). 
2. Gender 
Respondents were asked to specify in a text-box what gender they identified as.  This 
enabled respondents to specify a non-binary gender identity, instead of strictly “Male” or 
“Female.” Of those who completed the question, 26% of participants identified as 
“male,” 72% identified as female, and 2% identified as a gender outside of these two 
categories (Table 4.1).  
However, a surprisingly high number of participants (28% of the total sample) left this 
question blank, providing no indication as to their gender identity. While explanations for 
this outcome can only be speculated about, it is reasonable to assume that some 
respondents may have been accustomed to a more straightforward set of “binary” options 
and were thus confused by the open-ended nature of a text-box entry response to the 
question “What is your gender?”  (See Survey, Appendix C).  In any case, tests 
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conducted during the data analyses found no statistically significant relationships 
between completion/non-completion of the question and any of the study’s other 
variables.  
An additional limitation of the gender variable pertains to the small proportion of 
participants identifying as gender non-binary. Given the limitations of deriving 
representative statistics about this sample (n=2), the decision was made to include the 
gender non-binary participants in the “Women” category in the study’s data analysis.35  
The distribution of ages for each gender category in the sample is presented in Table 4.1. 
3. Educational Attainment 
Respondents were asked to specify their highest level of educational attainment from a 
list of options including “Less than high school diploma,” “High school graduate, or 
equivalent,” College/community college graduate,” “University graduate,” “post-
graduate (e.g. Masters, Doctorate),” and “Other.”  These categories were subsequently re-
organized into the three broad categories of educational attainment described in Table 
4.1: “High school or lower,” “Post-secondary degree or diploma,” and “Post-graduate.”  
 
 
 
                                               
35  The decision to place these participants in the “Women” rather than the “Men” category was 
based on the logic adumbrated in Section III.B below—i.e., that in a male-dominated society, the 
perspectives of those who do not identify as cisgender males are often marginalized and may be 
expressed “in a different voice” (Gilligan 1982, 1988, 2011; Gilligan and Attanucci 1988) or from 
a woman’s/non-male “standpoint” (Smith 1987, 1990).   
Nevertheless, the contradiction of providing a more “inclusive” apparatus for recording gender, 
only to re-instantiate a gender binary in statistical terms, is not lost on this researcher.  This 
limitation in the research should be recognized as an important point for correction in future 
studies.  
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Table 4.1 Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Frequency 
Freq. % 
Age Group (n=136)   
19–24 64 47.1 
25–30 37 27.2 
>30 35 25.7 
Gender (n=102)   
Man 26 25.5 
Woman 74 72.5 
Other/Non-Binary 2 2.0 
Educational Attainment (n=136)   
High School or Lower 54 39.7 
Post-Secondary 34 25.0 
Post Graduate 48 35.3 
Educational Milieu (i.e., Faculty Type) (n=139)   
Humanistic (e.g. Arts/Law/Social Sciences) 87 62.6 
Technological (e.g. STEM & Business) 48 34.5 
Mix (Humanistic & Technological) 4 2.9 
Religion (n=138)   
Abrahamic 46 33.3 
Atheist/No Affiliation 81 58.7 
Non-Western Religiosity 11 8.0 
4. Educational Milieu 
Respondents were asked to specify the faculty they were enrolled in as students at the 
university (or its affiliated colleges).  Following the research by Côté and Levine (1992) 
and Levine et al. (2000), these faculties were grouped into categories that could be 
classified as “technological” (e.g. science, technology, mathematics, engineering, and 
business) and “humanistic” (e.g. arts and humanities, social sciences, music, law, 
theology, etc.).  Since the study’s concern with institutionalized moratoria pertains to the 
significance of humanism, the four respondents who reported enrolment in double majors 
of both a technological and humanistic faculty (see Table 4.1) were categorized as part of 
the humanistic group in subsequent data analyses. 
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5. Religion 
Respondents were asked to specify whether they followed a spiritual or religious belief 
system.  The following list of possible responses were provided: 
“Aboriginal/Indigenous,” “Agnosticism,” “Atheism,” “Buddhism,” “Christianity,” 
“Islam,” “Judaism,” Hinduism,” “Sikhism,” “No spiritual/religious affiliation,” “Not 
sure/prefer not to say,” and “Other.”  For simplicity of analysis, these belief systems were 
organized into the three broad categories “Abrahamic” (comprised of Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism), “Atheist/No Affiliation” (comprised of Agnosticism, Atheism, No 
spiritual/religious affiliation, Not sure/prefer not to say, and Other), and “Non-Western 
Religiosity” (comprised of Indigenous spirituality, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sikhism).  
The sample distribution for these three categories is presented in Table 4.1.   
II. MEASURES 
A. Moral Reasoning Questionnaire 
The survey contained two hypothetical “moral dilemmas” adapted from the instruments 
developed by Colby and Kohlberg (1987), and Schrader et al. (1987) (Appendix C).  In 
these dilemmas, male and female protagonists are faced with moral problems relating to 
the accessibility and allocation of owned objects (i.e., “property”).  Respondents were 
asked to make “moral judgments” about what they thought the protagonist ought to do in 
the face of these dilemmas, and to provide written reasons for this judgment.  Each of the 
participants’ responses to these dilemmas were analyzed with regard to whether the 
choices and reasons for the judgment expressed any of the nine “Piagetian” qualities of 
moral autonomy: choice, hierarchy, intrinsicality, prescriptivity, universality, freedom, 
mutual respect, reversibility, and constructivism (cf. Colby and Kohlberg 1987; Howard 
1984; Piaget 1975). “Choices” were recorded as a binary “yes”/“no” judgment as to 
whether the protagonist should engage in a proposed act (e.g. stealing a drug to save a 
dying wife).  “Reasons” were recorded in a text-box, where the participants were invited 
to explain the reasons that informed their judgment in a series of follow-up probes.  
Although it uses many of the same theoretical concepts as Kohlberg’s (1984) and Colby 
and Kohlberg’s (1987) studies of “moral substage,” the present study’s investigation of 
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“A-type” and “B-type” reasoning differs from those approaches in a few notable ways.  
First, the present study does not assume the existence of either moral “stages” 
constituting “structured wholes,” or of moral “substages” orienting the structure and 
content of an individual’s moral judgment.  Although there are theoretical and 
philosophical reasons for postulating the existence of a developmental stage sequence 
(Kohlberg 1981, 1984), a “highest” stage of moral reasoning (Côté and Levine 2002; 
Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine 1990; and Habermas 1979), and an 
analytically fruitful ideal-typical distinction between moral substages within a given 
moral stage (Kohlberg 1984; Henderson 2012), the present study is only interested in the 
heteronomous and autonomous qualities of an individual’s moral reasoning more 
generally.  It therefore uses Kohlberg’s “moral judgment interview” as a tool for 
conducting qualitative analysis of an individual’s moral reasoning, and not as a method of 
determining the “stage” or “substage” of a subject’s moral development.  
Second, and following from the previous point, the coding and scoring procedures 
described below differ from those used by Colby and Kohlberg (1987).  Whereas the 
scoring method developed by Colby and Kohlberg (1987) assess moral “substage” 
according to whether or not a subject’s responses pass certain “critical criteria” for 
autonomous reasoning (i.e., the expression of moral judgments considered to be “crucial 
indicators of B-type reasoning,” Henderson 2012: 28), the present study examines the 
total proportion of autonomous moral statements by a respondent.    
1. Coding and Scoring Procedures for Moral Reasoning “Types” 
i. Scoring Criteria 
Moral autonomy and heteronomy were scored using an adapted version of Colby and 
Kohlberg’s (1987) instrument for measuring “moral types.”  Each “choice” and each 
distinct, scorable moral “utterance” made by a respondent was scored as reflecting either 
an “autonomous” or “heteronomous” cognitive orientation; that is, moral statements that 
expressed an actively constructive, “sociocentric” cognitive orientation were coded as 
morally “autonomous,” whereas those which espoused a unilateral respect for 
“preconstructed” norms and values were coded as morally “heteronomous.”  A rubric of 
the scoring criteria used in this procedure is shown in Table 4.2.  Statements that met the 
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relevant criteria for “autonomous” reasoning were assigned a “pass” and coded as 
reflecting “B-type,” “autonomous” moral reasoning (cf. Colby and Kohlberg 1987).  
ii. Moral Autonomy Score 
The percentage of “passing” (i.e. autonomous, “B-type”) statements in a participant’s 
written responses served as their “Moral Autonomy Score” (MAS) for each dilemma.  
The percentage of total passing statements across both dilemmas was used to determine 
their overall Moral Autonomy Score.  An individual’s MAS, either for individual 
dilemmas or across both dilemmas therefore ranges from 0–100.  The overall Moral 
Autonomy Score taken across both dilemmas is treated as the main dependent variable in 
the present study.36   
2. Inter-Judge Reliability 
The interpretative nature of Colby and Kohlberg’s (1987) methodology raises certain 
challenges regarding measurement reliability.  To ensure the accuracy and reliability of 
scoring, inter-judge reliability checks were conducted on 20% of the moral reasoning 
survey responses (n=28).  Both I and the Principal Investigator, a researcher with 
extensive experience in the theorization and measurement of Kohlberg’s stage and 
substage research, coded and compared the scores assigned to these responses. 
Following the method used in other moral reasoning research (e.g. Levine 1976; 
Jakubowski 1989; Henderson 2012), inter-judge reliability was assessed by the 
proportion of agreement between coders (described henceforth as “Judges”).   
This was conducted in two steps. First, comparisons were made between of the number of 
“scorable statements” that judges observed in each of the responses.  Table 4.3 presents 
the total number of “scorable statements” in each dilemma by the two judges, and the 
percentage of agreement between judges’ scores.  The total proportion of agreement for 
“scorable statements” between judges was 99.1%.   
                                               
36 The label “Moral Autonomy Score” implies the exercise of cognitive moral autonomy, rather 
than moral autonomy proper.  The study makes no assumptions as to whether evidence of 
autonomous moral reasoning predicts an individual’s likelihood for morally autonomous action.    
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Table 4.2 Definitions of Evaluative Criteria for Autonomous/Heteronomous 
Reasoning 
General 
Criteria Autonomous Heteronomous 
Choice Support and justify the solution that 
is just and fair from the standpoint 
of postconventional stages (based 
on principles of justice, fairness, 
equity). 
Support a solution that is based on 
considerations other than justice 
and fairness and are contrary to 
postconventional judgments. 
Hierarchy Reflect a clear hierarchy of moral 
values and prescriptive duties that 
supersede pragmatic, descriptive, 
consequential, or aesthetic 
considerations. 
Contain no clear hierarchy of 
values OR: pragmatic, descriptive, 
consequential or aesthetic 
considerations supersede moral 
values. 
Intrinsicality Reflect valuing people as ends in 
themselves, based on respect for 
moral personality, moral autonomy 
and human dignity. 
Support treating people as means to 
other (instrumental or pragmatic) 
ends. 
Prescriptivity Uphold obligations and actions 
(moral duty is based on inner 
compulsion, moral necessity, or 
conscience). 
Reject moral duties obligations, or 
actions as necessities and take an 
instrumental or hypothetical view 
of moral duty. 
Universality Based on the consideration that 
these judgments are/should be 
applied to anyone and everyone in 
the same or similar circumstances. 
Reflect uncritically assumed and 
accepted values or are relative to 
instrumental self-interests. 
Freedom Made without reference to external 
parameters.  
Made and justified within 
constraints of external parameters. 
Mutual Respect Reflect importance of cooperation 
among equals. 
Exhibit unilateral respect for 
authority, law, tradition, or power, 
whether people or institutions. 
Reversibility Characterized by ability to engage 
in mutual reciprocal role taking. 
Constrained by considering only 
one perspective on a problem. 
Constructivism Consider rules and laws as humanly 
constructed guidelines (and thus 
flexible and adaptable to situations 
and circumstances). 
Laws and rules as emanating from 
some higher authority (and are 
therefore rigid and inflexible). 
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Table 4.3 Inter-Judge Reliability Test 1: Comparisons of scorable statements and 
percentage agreement for random sample of responses to Dilemma 1 & 2 
 Judge 1 Judge 2 % Agreement 
Dilemma 1 176 176 100.0 
Dilemma 2 146 149 98.0 
Total scorable 
statements 322 325 99.1 
Note: From random sample of 28 respondents (20% of total sample, N=139). 
Second, judges compared the number of “A-type” and “B-type” reasons they scored for 
each respondent in the subsample.  Differences in scoring were discussed on a case-by-
case basis and either agreed upon or left as a disagreement.  Table 4.4 presents a broad 
summary of the total A-type and B-type scores that each judge observed in each of the 
dilemmas.  On both dilemmas, A-type and B-type reasons were scored in similar 
proportions by the judges. 
Table 4.4 Inter-Judge Reliability Test 2: Comparison of scores on A-Type and B-
Type utterances for random sample of responses to Dilemma 1 & 2 
 Judge 1 Judge 2 
Dilemma 1 
A-Type (Heteronomous) 103 99 
B-Type (Autonomous) 73 77 
% of statements scored 
“Autonomous”  41.5% 43.8% 
Dilemma 2 
A-Type (Heteronomous) 68 65 
B-Type (Autonomous) 78 84 
% of statements scored 
“Autonomous”  53.4% 56.4% 
Total 
A-Type (Heteronomous) 171 164 
B-Type (Autonomous) 151 161 
% of statements scored 
“Autonomous”  46.9% 49.2% 
Note: From random sample of 28 respondents (20% of total sample, N=139). 
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Overall, there were 11 disagreements on Dilemma 1, which contained 176 scorable 
statements (94% agreement), and 14 disagreements on Dilemma 2, which contained 146–
149 scorable statements (90–91% agreement).  Since disagreements on one dilemma 
were sometimes balanced out by disagreements on the other dilemma, the number of 
disagreements on an individual’s overall A-type and B-type scores was 16 (95.0–95.1% 
agreement for 322–325 scorable statements).  These discussions served not only as a 
validity check but also as a means of developing greater precision in the qualitative 
evaluation of moral statements.  On the basis of these more refined qualitative 
understandings, dilemma scores for the rest of sample were reviewed and adjusted where 
appropriate, in order to ensure consistency of scoring across the sample.   
3. Distribution of Moral Autonomy Scores 
Figure 4.1 describes the distribution of Moral Autonomy Scores within the sample.  
Overall, the sample contained numerous cases distributed across the full range of possible 
scores, with both mean and media scores slightly above 46.  With the exception of the 
low and high ends of the MAS spectrum, the distribution of scores appears to be fairly 
even across the sample.  It is worth 
noting, however, that while very 
high usage of “heteronomous” 
moral reasoning is still relatively 
common (i.e. MAS scores between 
0–20), the use of predominantly 
“autonomous” reasoning is 
especially rare.  The Pearson 
coefficient (r) for the two 
dilemmas was 0.35 (p≤0.001). 
B. Attitude Scales 
Variables representing individuals’ social attitudes were measured using various 
established and exploratory scales.  As Côté et al. (2016: 83) note, because the reliability 
of short scales (like the ones used in the present study) cannot be accurately assessed 
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solely by conventional methods such as Cronbach’s alpha, additional statistical methods 
should be used.  In the current study, each scale was tested for construct validity using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax Rotation.  This technique is well-
suited to the sample size of the present study, which is not large enough to conduct a 
reliable Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  PCA nevertheless serves to provide exploratory 
insight into the existence of underlying “components” in a given series of items and to 
measure the strength of these components (Blunch 2013; Nie et al. 1975).   
Of the sample population, less than 5% had missing data in their responses to the attitude 
scale items.  For cases in which a participant did not complete just one scale item, the 
missing value was imputed using the mean of the participant’s other responses in that 
scale.  This was done in order to retain these participants’ responses in the analysis.  For 
cases in which more than two items were incomplete, the case was not assigned an 
overall scale score, and was not included in analyses involving that scale.  For ease of 
comparison, and since some scales were measured using a 5-point Likert scale and others 
used a 7-point scale, a respondent’s total score on each attitude scale was averaged to a 
possible score out of 100.   
The following summary describes the efforts taken to test the construct validity of the 
main covariates in the study, as well as the characteristics of these measures within the 
sample.37 
1. Property Ownership Attitudes, Non-generosity and Possessiveness 
Empirical efforts to quantitatively measure attitudes toward property ownership itself are 
scarce in the sociological, psychological, and political science literature, although a few 
exceptions include Göncüolu-Eser, Luloff, and Warland (2004); Jackson-Smith, Kreuter, 
and Krannich (2005).  Because these measures pertain to fairly specific studies of land 
ownership, however, there currently remains an absence of psychometric instruments for 
the analysis of individuals’ attitudes toward public and private institutions of property 
                                               
37 A detailed summary of the scale scores within the sample is provided in Table 4.9, Section 
II.B.3, below. 
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ownership.  An attitude scale for property ownership was therefore constructed to address 
this gap, and Belk’s (1985) “Non-Generosity” and “Possessiveness” scales were also 
used as covariates for measuring additional dimensions of ownership attitudes (see 
Chapter 2, Section II.B.2).  To avoid measurement error, items in each of these scales 
were presented in random order on the questionnaire.   
i. Property Attitude Scales 
Attitudes toward private property were measured using a seven-point Likert scale.  
Respondents were asked about the strength of agreement or disagreement with ten 
statements pertaining to the private or social control of resources.  In addition to an item 
similar to the one used by Göncüolu-Eser, Luloff, and Warland (2004), the items 
addressed aspects of ownership such as taxation, the societal function of ownership laws, 
the rights to deny access to privately owned property, etc.  Positive attitudes toward 
private property were represented by high scores on the scale, while negative attitudes 
toward private property (i.e. positive attitudes toward social property) were represented 
by low scores.   
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax Rotation was used to test the internal 
consistency of these items.  Based on these tests, a five-item Property Ownership 
Attitudes Scale (PAS) was established as the measure of respondents’ attitudes toward 
property attitudes. These scale items, addressing ideas such as one’s right to deny others 
from using an object of property, the stabilizing function of property rights, redistributive 
taxation (reversed), hard work as a justification for ownership, and public control over 
private corporations (reversed), are displayed in Table 4.5 alongside their factor loadings, 
eigenvalues, and Cronbach’s alpha. 
The internal consistency coefficient for these items was 0.71 (Cronbach’s alpha), which 
meets the general “rule of thumb cutoff” of 0.70 (Helve et al. 2017: 202).  The PCA 
found factor loadings greater than 0.40 for these five items, which is regarded as an 
“acceptable” cutoff point for inclusion of items in a component (Côté et al. 2016). 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of PAS scores in the sample.  These scores ranged 
from 10–100, with a median score of 53.3 and standard deviation of 18.2.  Further details 
about the sample distribution for PAS appear in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.5 Property Attitude Scale (PAS) 
Item Wording* Factor Loadings 
If I have worked hard for the things I own, then I deserve them for myself. 0.4770 
Without the right to hold and defend our private property against 
criminals, society would fall into chaos. 0.4318 
I should have the right to deny others from using anything I own. 0.4368 
The public should be afforded greater influence over the decisions of 
private corporations.** 0.4208 
In order to improve the lives of poor people, rich people should be taxed 
more than they currently are.** 0.4670 
Eigenvalues 2.3198 
5-item alpha 0.7085 
Notes: PCA, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser off 
* 7-point scale 
** Reverse scored 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Property Attitude scores (PAS)  
measuring positive attitudes toward private property 
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ii. Non-generosity and Possessiveness 
Together Belk’s (1984, 1985) “Non-Generosity,” “Possessiveness,” and “Envy” scales 
comprise Belk’s measure of “Materialism.”  Because the present study is concerned with 
individuals’ psychological orientation to “ownership”—and more specifically how people 
think of things that are “theirs”—the “Envy” subscale was omitted from the study and 
only the “Non-Generosity” and “Possessiveness” subscales were administered.  These 
scales are comprised of seven and nine items respectively, and were measured using a 
five-point Likert (agree/disagree) scale.   
Belk reports Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of 0.68 and 0.72 for “Non-Generosity” and 
“Possessiveness” respectively (1984: 293).  Using the full battery of items in the Belk 
scale, tests for construct validity in the present study resulted in coefficients of 0.73 and 
0.66, respectively.  Principal Component Analyses on the present data found acceptable 
factor loadings for most items, but certain items from the original scales were dropped to 
improve the overall component scores of these scale.   
The shortened (three item) scales used for analysis in the current study are presented in 
Table 4.6. Following Côté et al. (2016: 83), it is not expected that shortening the Belk 
“Non-generosity” and “Possessiveness” subscales in this manner will affect the 
magnitude of their relationship with other measures.  These shortened “Possessiveness” 
and “Nongenerosity” subscales loaded as two distinct factors when tested using Varimax 
Rotation.  Component scores for both of these shortened scales are above the 0.40 “rule 
of thumb cut-off” (Côté et al. 2016). 
It should be noted that these scales are understood to differ from the Property Attitudes 
Scale (described above) in an important way: as the items in each scale indicate, the 
Property Attitudes Scale is designed to measure individuals’ attitudes toward the social 
relations of property ownership, whereas Belk’s (1984) Possessiveness and Non-
Generosity Scales measure individuals’ attitudes toward the control over material objects 
themselves.  
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Table 4.6 Non-generosity and Possessiveness Scales 
Figures 4.3, and 4.4 illustrate the distribution of scores for both of these scales.  Whereas 
Possessiveness was normally distributed and had a mean score of 55.9 (s.d=21.3), Non-
generosity scores tended to be quite lower, with a range of 0–81.25 and mean score of 31 
(s.d.=18.2) (Table 4.9). 
Item Wording* Component 1 Component 2 
Nongenerosity Scale   
I enjoy sharing what I have** 0.581  
I don’t like to lend things, even to good friends 0.5745  
I enjoy donating things to charities** 0.5633  
Possessiveness Scale   
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even if 
it has little monetary value  0.6083 
I don’t get particularly upset when I lose things**  0.6340 
I worry about people taking my possessions  0.4740 
Eigenvalues 2.6391 1.1210 
3-item alpha 0.6846 0.7072 
Notes: PCA, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser off 
* 5-point scale 
** Reverse scored 
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2. Cultural Value Orientations 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the current study is also interested in exploring the 
cultural value orientations that may provide greater explanatory context for understanding 
possible relationships between property ownership attitudes and moral reasoning.  
Therefore, scales measuring respondents’ humanistic and possessive individualist 
orientations were also included in the survey.   
i. Humanism 
An adapted version of Côté’s (1984) “Humanistic Orientation Scale” (HOS) was used to 
measure humanistic values endorsed by the study’s respondents.  High scores on this 
scale indicate that an individual holds humanistic values toward oneself, others, and/or 
society.  The HOS has been used by Côté (1984), Côté and Levine (1989), and 
Jakubowski (1989), and contains four 5-point Likert Scale items.  During pilot testing of 
the study, concerns were raised as to whether differences between the present 
sociocultural milieu and that of the mid-1980s (when the HOS was first developed) 
would necessitate an “updating” of certain survey items. For instance, one concern raised 
during pilot testing was that an item 
addressing whether “women were 
fighting too hard for what they think 
is equality” might not elicit the 
same values and sensibilities in 
2015–2016 as it may have in the 
past.  Considering the various 
achievements of the women’s 
movement since the 1980s, it is 
possible that the item today may not 
be apperceived by today’s 
respondents in the same way. Furthermore, at the time of this study, discourses about 
feminism and women’s equality are especially inflamed, and there was a concern that 
such cultural antagonism might bias respondents to take more extreme positions on the 
question than they might have during less contentious times. It was therefore decided that 
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some additional exploratory items would be included in the scale.  The objective was to 
substitute similar yet more contemporary subject matter, while retaining as much as 
possible both the tone and substance of the original items.  An additional item was 
included that contained the same phrasing as the original “women’s groups” question, but 
it instead asked respondents about their views on “LGBTQ groups.”   
Table 4.7 Humanistic Orientation Scale (HOS) 
Item Wording* Factor Loadings 
Some people argue that if the human race is to flourish and survive 
peacefully, people from all cultures, races, and religions must cooperate in 
a global agreement about military disarmament.  How do you feel about 
this? 
0.5507 
Some people think that women’s groups are fighting too hard for what they 
think is equality and that they are hurting traditions such as marriage and 
the family.  What do you think — are women’s groups fighting too hard 
for what they think is equality?** 
0.4987 
Some people argue that most modern work environments are too 
impersonal and that in their concern for efficiency and profit, they will be 
harmful to the psychological well-being of those who work in them.  What 
do you think — are today's work environments harmful or beneficial to 
one's psychological well-being?  
0.4362 
Some people argue that the legal system has become too tolerant of people 
who break the law and that this is responsible for such things as higher 
crime rates.  Given such issues as capital punishment and longer prison 
sentences, do you think that the law needs to impose harsher punishments 
on criminals?** 
0.5077 
Eigenvalues 1.8603 
4-item alpha 0.6099 
Notes: PCA, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser off 
* 5-point scale 
** Reverse scored 
Tests for construct validity yielded an internal consistency coefficient of 0.57 for the five-
item scale. This result is consistent with that obtained by Côté and Levine (1989), whose 
HOS scale returned a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.56.  Although conventional 
wisdom suggests that such results are lower than desirable, Côté and Levine (1989) note 
that in fact “coefficients of this magnitude are not uncommon among attitude-type scales 
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that are based on only a few items and that are administered to a heterogeneous group” 
(p. 397).  At any rate, a revised four-item HOS, containing items about military 
disarmament, the women’s movement, workplace alienation, and prison sentencing, was 
used in the present study.  Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.61 and PCA returned 
factor loadings ranging from 0.44 to 0.55 for its items (Table 4.7). 
The distribution of scores on the HOS is illustrated in Figure 4.5, which shows the 
relatively high scores reported for humanistic values within the sample. In fact, 
humanism had the highest scores of the five scales used in the study, with a mean score 
of 65.9 (Table 4.9) and more than three quarters of respondents reporting positive 
humanistic attitudes (i.e., overall HOS scores greater than 50; not shown in tables). 
ii. Possessive Individualism 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept “possessive individualism” was developed by 
political scientist C. B. MacPherson to describe the prevailing orientation to the ‘self’ 
within liberal capitalist society and in many of its founding philosophies.  The concept 
pertains to the notion that an individual is “seen as essentially the proprietor of his own 
person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them” (Macpherson 1962: 3).  This 
concept contrasts with the “humanistic orientation” in that its conception of individuality 
posits one’s personal agency and powers as separable from, rather than interdependent 
with, a community of other social actors.  The examination of this particular conception 
of individualism will hopefully provide particular analytical insight into the relationship 
between “autonomous” thought and “individualistic” values (discussed in Chapter 2).  
Finally, given the study’s interest in Marx’s humanistic conception of alienation and 
property, its liberal conception of “freedom” and autonomy also serves as a foil to the 
conceptions of freedom and autonomy espoused in in Marx’s theories. 
Because no research has sought thus far to operationalize possessive individualism for 
empirical investigation, an exploratory scale was constructed.  Items for the scale were 
developed using the tenets of “possessive individualism” summarized in C. B. 
Macpherson’s Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (see page 46, above).  Efforts 
were made to develop Likert-style statements that reflected the underlying normative and 
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ontological viewpoint of possessive individualism, either by rephrasing or combining 
certain tenets directly, or by providing example issues that invoked such viewpoints (e.g. 
about the “right” of individuals to accept jobs vacated by striking workers). 
In total, four items comprise the Possessive Individualism Orientation Scale (PIOS).  
These include questions concerning fairness of companies saving money by 
manufacturing their products in countries with low working standards, the right of 
individuals to take jobs vacated by striking workers, the government’s right to regulate 
market exchanges among businesses and economic institutions (reverse-scored), and 
individuals’ supposed obligation to “give back” to society when they become successful 
(reverse scored).  High scores on this scale indicate an individual’s positive value 
orientation toward toward ideas associated with possessive individualism. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of these items was 0.66, and a PCA returned factor loadings 
ranging from 0.45 to 0.55 (Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 Possessive Individualism Scale (PIOS) 
Item Wording* Factor Loadings 
Some people argue that the government has become too passive in regulating 
business and economic institutions.  What do you think — should politicians 
do more to regulate the market exchanges that occur within society?** 
0.5109 
Some people believe that successful people have an obligation to “give back” 
to society for the success they have achieved.  What do you think — do 
successful people “owe” something to society or others who are not as 
successful?** 
0.5485 
Some people feel that if a union goes on a labour strike, outside workers 
should not be prevented from taking up the jobs that have been 
vacated.  What do you think — does a person have the right to take on a job 
vacated during a labour strike? 
0.4505 
Some people believe that it is wrong for companies to manufacture their 
products in poorer countries with low working standards, in order to save 
money.  What do you think — are these companies taking unfair advantage 
of their workers?** 
0.4850 
Eigenvalues 2.0114 
4-item alpha 0.6636 
Notes: PCA, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser off 
* 5-point scale 
** Reverse scored 
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The distribution of scores on the 
PIOS is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
These scores tended to be lower 
than those on HOS, with a mean of 
35.3 (Table 4.9), and over three 
quarters of the sample reporting 
overall disagreeable views toward 
the possessive individualist ideas 
presented in the survey (i.e., overall 
PIOS scores less than 50; not 
shown in tables). 
3. Summary 
The preceding discussion has outlined the characteristics of the main covariates examined 
in this study, as well as the efforts taken to test the construct validity of these measures.  
A detailed summary of the scale scores within the sample is provided in Table 4.9, 
below. 
Table 4.9 Description of scale variables 
 PAS1 Possessive-ness 
Non-
generosity HOS
2 PIOS3 
n= 133 132 132 137 135 
Mean 51.2 55.9 31.0 65.9 35.3 
Range 10–100 6.25–100 0–81.25 18.8–100 0–100 
Median 53.3 56.25 31.3 68.75 37.5 
Std Dev. 18.2 21.3 18.2 18.5 20.0 
Note: Scales are based on a possible score from 0–100. 
1Higher PAS score indicates greater preference for private property norms. 
2Higher HOS score indicates greater “humanistic” value orientation. 
3Higher PIOS score indicates greater “possessive individualist” value orientation.   
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III. STUDY HYPOTHESES 
A. Main Research Variables 
Given the theoretical rationale provided in Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the above 
descriptions of variables, the following hypotheses were investigated:  
Hypothesis 1(H1): Positive attitudes toward property (PAS) will be inversely related 
with the exercise of autonomous reasoning (proportion of prescriptive statements 
classified as morally autonomous). 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Measures of humanistic value orientation (HOS) and measures of 
possessive individualist value orientation (PIOS) will be inversely related.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Measures of humanistic value orientation will be inversely related 
with positive attitudes toward private property. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Measures of possessive individualist value orientation will be 
positively related with positive attitudes toward private property. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Measures of humanistic value orientation will be positively related 
with the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Measures of possessive individualist value orientation will be 
inversely related with the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning. 
B. Control Variables for Exploratory Investigation 
In addition to the main research variables, analyses also included the variables of age, 
gender, educational attainment, educational milieu, and religion.  The reason for 
including these variables in the present study is exploratory, since there does not appear 
to be any research that has investigated the possible effects of these variables on the 
relationships hypothesized above.   However, there are reasons that suggests there may be 
something to be gained from exploring their possible effects. 
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In the case of age, while there is no empirical research suggesting an association between 
age and autonomous moral cognition (aside from in very young children, Piaget 1965), it 
is plausible that older—and thus potentially more “mature” participants in a university 
setting might be more accustomed to exercising various critical reasoning faculties 
(which might also include critical reasoning about moral dilemmas).  Additionally, since 
the sample is likely to be over-represented by younger adults (given the sample pool of 
university students), age was included as a demographic control variable.   
In the case of gender, some research on moral stage development has explored the 
possibility that men and women apperceive moral dilemmas differently, reason about 
moral problems differently, and/or express their reasons differently (Clopton and Sorell 
1993; Gilligan 1982, 2011; Levine 1974; Silberman and Snarey 1993).  For instance, it 
has been suggested that such differences may predispose women to make moral 
judgments oriented to ethics of “care” more so than of “justice” (Gilligan 1982, 2011).  
This thesis has received criticism on numerous grounds (e.g. Clopton and Sorell 1993; 
Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer 1983; and Silberman and Snarey 1993), however, and the 
literature remains inconclusive about the effects of gender on moral “stage” and “type” 
reasoning.  In addition, the lack of available research concerning property ownership 
attitudes leaves open questions concerning its relation to gender.  It is for these reasons 
that no specific hypotheses regarding gender have been proposed. 
In the case of educational attainment, because the research was open to undergraduate 
and graduate students, it is possible that differences exist in the attitudes that these groups 
have toward property ownership and/or in the cultivation of critical reasoning abilities.  A 
variable addressing individuals’ educational attainment has been included to explore this 
possibility. 
In the case of “educational milieu,” research by Côté and Levine (1988, 1992) and Levine 
et al. (2000) find that youth enrolled in post-secondary education programs in 
“humanistic” fields (arts, humanities, social sciences, education) differ from those 
enrolled in “technological” fields (science, technology, engineering, mathematics, 
business).  It may be plausible to suggest that enrolment in humanistic fields, as 
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compared to technological fields, may not only predict stronger preference for 
“humanistic” values but may also generate greater predisposition to utilize B-type 
reasoning.  Additionally, to the extent that humanistic fields also tend to promote a more 
critical stance toward capitalism, social inequality, etc. than technological fields, 
education in humanistic fields might also produce more negative attitudes toward private 
property. 
In the case of religion, Bader and Finke’s (2010) contribution to The Handbook of the 
Sociology of Morality provides a useful statement on the continued relevance of religious 
belief to the social phenomenon of morality in general, and it stands to reason that 
religious beliefs might likewise impact outcomes on the heteronomous/autonomous 
moral reasoning more specifically.  Moreover, the subject matter of the two dilemmas 
used in the moral reasoning questionnaire (Appendix C) may stimulate unique responses 
among followers of the Abrahamic religions, which proscribe theft but promote charity 
and sharing.  There does not appear to be any research directly addressing the 
relationship between autonomous/heteronomous moral reasoning and religion that could 
suggest/justify a concrete hypothesis, however.  Participants’ religious beliefs, 
categorized as “Atheist/Non-religious,” “Abrahamic,” and “Non-Western Religion,” have 
therefore been included in the study for exploratory purposes. 
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Chapter 5  
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This research project seeks to investigate theoretical questions about the ways that 
attitudes about property ownership might relate to the way individuals reason about moral 
problems.  For reasons discussed in Chapters 2–4, the study has also sought to explore 
how value orientations associated with certain cultural ethea like humanism and 
possessive individualism might impact this relationship.  Specific hypotheses about the 
direction of these relationships were stated at the end of Chapter 4.  It was also noted that, 
due to the exploratory nature of the research, controls for age, gender, level of education, 
educational milieu, and religion were also examined in order to control for possible 
confounding effects of an individual’s biographical or demographic background on the 
hypothesized relationships. 
The current chapter presents the results of the empirical study.  It first presents the results 
of the study and their implications for the research hypotheses.  This includes the results 
of bivariate and multivariate regression analyses of the study’s main topic of inquiry: the 
relationship between property attitudes and moral reasoning (H1).  It also includes 
analyses of the two value orientations investigated in the study (humanism and possessive 
individualism): both their relationship to one another (H2), their relationship to property 
attitudes (H3, H4), and their relationship to moral reasoning (H5, H6).   
The chapter then presents a series of multivariate models that estimate the relationships 
of cognitive moral autonomy and private property attitudes when all other variables, 
including humanistic values (HOS) and possessive individualism (PIOS), are held 
constant.  These analyses aim to further explore the attitudinal and ideological correlates 
of cognitive moral autonomy. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the study’s results and summarizes their implications, both 
for the research hypotheses and for the theoretical ideas it has sought to investigate.   
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I. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
A. Property Attitudes 
Table 5.1 presents the coefficients from four nested Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression models estimating the use of autonomous moral reasoning in the two moral 
dilemmas described in Chapter 4.  The bivariate regression in Model 1a estimates the 
linear relationship between participants’ scores on the Property Attitude Scale (PAS) and 
the proportion of “autonomous” (B-type) expressions in their responses to the moral 
judgment questionnaire (n=133).  Model 1b estimates the same relationship, but specifies 
its analysis to only those participants whose surveys contained no missing data (n=94).  
Linear equations estimated in both of these models predict an inverse relationship 
between positive attitudes toward private property and the use of “autonomous” moral 
reasoning (β=−0.59; p≤0.001).  The scatterplot and LOESS curve in Figure 5.1 illustrates 
this relationship. 
Figure 5.1 Scatterplot and fitted curve for Private Property Attitudes (PAS) and 
Moral Autonomy Scores (MAS) 
 
Note: One outlier removed from scatterplot 
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Table 5.1 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression models 
predicting Moral Autonomy Score (MAS) 
 Model 1a  (n=133) 
Model 1b† 
(n=94) 
Model 2
(n=95) 
Model 3
(n=94) 
Property Attitude Scale 
(PAS) 
−0.588***
(0.108) 
−0.656***
(0.119) 
−0.671***
(0.137) 
−0.595***
(0.146) 
Age   −0.315
(0.322) 
−0.376
(0.322) 
Gender (Female)   −0.968
(5.670) 
−3.129
(5.767) 
Education  (<High School)     
Post−Secondary   −0.082
(6.914) 
−0.310
(7.168) 
Post-Graduate   2.064
(6.853) 
1.214
(6.930) 
Faculty Type  (Humanistic)   1.510
(5.351) 
2.447
(5.363) 
Religion (Abrahamic)     
Atheist/Non-Affiliated   −4.436
(5.253) 
−3.279
(5.287) 
Non-Western Religion   −6.469
(8.923) 
−3.020
(9.052) 
Possessiveness    0.108
(0.136) 
Non−Generosity    -0.319*
(0.160) 
Constant 77.423***
(5.849) 
82.080***
(0.119) 
94.068***
(14.376) 
96.223***
(15.198) 
Pseudo R2 0.1793 0.2414 0.2005 0.2181 
Note: Scales are based on a possible score of 0–100 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data 
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001 
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The inverse relationship observed in the bivariate analysis remains consistent in the 
nested linear regressions presented in Model 2, where respondents’ gender, educational 
attainment, educational milieu, and religious affiliation are held constant (β=−0.67; 
p≤.0001). 
Given the conceptualization of property developed in Chapter 2, the study has also sought 
to distinguish individuals’ dispositions toward the control of things (i.e. possessiveness 
and non-generosity), on the one hand, from their attitudes toward the social relations and 
institutions of property ownership (PAS), on the other, and to control for the former.38  
Model 3 therefore introduces two adapted versions of Belk’s (1984) “Materialism” sub-
scales (Possessiveness and Non-generosity) to the regression equation.  When 
demographic variables and the Possessiveness and Non-generosity scales were held 
constant, the inverse relationship between PAS and autonomous moral reasoning 
remained statistically significant (β=−0.60; p≤0.001).  Of the two “Materialism” sub-
scales included in this model, only Non-generosity was found to be significantly related 
to moral reasoning (β=−0.32; p≤0.05).  
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that cognitive moral autonomy scores were calculated 
based on the overall proportion of “B-type” (i.e., autonomous) moral reasons articulated 
by a respondent in their judgments of two moral dilemmas (Appendix C).  Separate 
regression equations for Moral Autonomy Scores in each of the two dilemmas were also 
calculated (see Appendix D, Appendix E).  Results for these models indicate similar 
patterns to those described in Table 5.1, finding inverse relationships between PAS and 
the use of cognitive moral autonomy in each dilemma.  The magnitude of the predicted 
“effects” differs somewhat, however, as the coefficient for the bivariate relationship 
between PAS and MAS in Dilemma 2 (β=−0.70; p≤.001) is 1.5 times that in Dilemma 1 
(β=−0.47; p≤.001) (Appendix D, Appendix E).  Likewise, when demographic variables, 
Possessiveness, and Non-Generosity, are held constant (Model 3), the beta for PAS is 
32% greater on Dilemma 2 than Dilemma 1.  
                                               
38 See discussion in Chapter 2, Section II.A, “Relations, not Things.” 
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Despite these differences, the study finds a consistent inverse relationship between 
positive attitudes toward property and the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning, and 
thus finds support for Hypothesis 1 (H1). 
B. Value Orientations: The Humanistic Ethos and Possessive 
Individualist Ethos 
In addition to its main topic of property attitudes and moral reasoning, this study also 
collected exploratory data on certain “value orientations” held by individuals, with the 
aim of examining the interrelation among property attitudes, moral reasoning, and 
cultural values like humanism and possessive individualism.  It is possible that 
exploration of the broader cultural ethos of humanism or possessive individualism might 
provide further sociological context for understanding the relationship observed between 
moral autonomy and property attitudes in the previous section.  An exploration of these 
relationships could also yield theoretically relevant links between the current research 
study and other fields of study such as identity theory and political science.  Therefore, 
the study now turns to a deeper consideration of the relationships among humanism, 
possessive individualism, property attitudes, and moral reasoning. 
1. Relationships Among the Main Scale Variables 
To assess the relationships among property attitudes, humanism, and possessive 
individualism, this study examined both the strength and magnitude of their correlation 
using Pearson’s r and OLS regressions.  Table 5.2 presents the correlation coefficients 
(r) between each of the scale variables measured in the study.  Regression coefficients 
estimating the linear relationships among all three possible pairings of PAS, HOS, and 
PIOS may be observed in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, below.39  
                                               
39 Bivariate regressions were conducted using both the fullest available dataset and data from 
respondents with zero missing data. Multivariate regressions were also conducted to control for 
the possible confounding effects of demographic and/or biographic variables.  Regression 
coefficients for the main dependent variable in each set of nested models remained relatively 
consistent even when controlling for such covariates.   
99 
 
Table 5.2 Pearson correlations among attitude scales 
Scale PAS Possessive-ness 
Non-
generosity HOS 
Property Attitude Scale (PAS) 1.000    
Belk Possessiveness Scale 0.3478*** 1.000   
Belk Non-generosity Scale 0.3949*** 0.5229*** 1.000  
Humanistic Orientation Scale 
(HOS) −0.6570*** −0.2746** −0.3204*** 1.000 
Possessive Individualist 
Orientation Scale (PIOS) 0.7194*** 0.2283** −0.3601*** −0.5745*** 
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001 
2. Humanism and Possessive Individualism 
As expected, the Pearson coefficient for respondents scores on humanism (HOS) and 
possessive individualism (PIOS) indicates a moderate, inverse relationship (r= 0.57; 
p≤0.001).  OLS regressions presented in Table 5.3 yielded a coefficient (β) of 
approximately −0.52 (p≤0.001) (Model 4a).  A similar result was obtained in regressions 
controlling for demographic factors (β=−0.52; p≤0.001) (Model 5).   
Figure 5.2 presents a scatterplot and LOWESS curve of the relationship between HOS 
and PIOS scores.  As these data illustrate, although humanism and possessive 
individualism clearly entail inversely related value orientations, individuals appear 
capable of holding aspects of both value orientations simultaneously—that is, while there 
are theoretical reasons to regard Humanism and Possessive Individualism as antagonistic 
value orientations (see Chapter 3, 4), they do not constitute “absolutes” about which 
individuals hold exclusively to one value orientation or another.  With that said, it is 
worth noting two clusters of respondents that are observable within the scatterplot.  The 
first of these is comprised of participants who scored below 20 on the PIOS but above 60 
on the HOS.  Bearing in mind that the HOS and PIOS items were administered using a 5-
point Likert scale, it would appear that individuals who tend to “strongly disagree” with 
possessive individualist values and ideas also tend to respond positively to humanistic 
values and ideas.  One can observe a second cluster of respondents whose overall scores 
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suggest a neutral or weak disagreement with the values and ideas addressed in both the 
HOS and PIOS (i.e., scores between 30–60).  Given the fact that HOS scores skew to the 
right, this cluster suggests that many individuals who scored neutrally on PIOS also 
tended to score relatively low on HOS.  
These results indicate that measures of humanistic and possessive individualist value 
orientations are inversely correlated, and therefore support Hypothesis 2 (H2). 
Table 5.3 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression models 
predicting Humanistic Orientation (HOS) 
 Model 4a (n=135) 
Model 4b†
(n=94) 
Model 5
(n=95) 
Possessive Individualist 
Orientation Scale (PIOS) 
−0.523*** 
(0.065) 
−0.554*** 
(0.072) 
−0.518***
(0.076) 
Age   −0.204(0.212) 
Gender(Female)   −2.14(3.76) 
Education (<High School)    
Post-Secondary   2.174(4.546) 
Post-Graduate   3.288(4.423) 
Faculty Type (Humanistic)   2.713 (3.466) 
Religion (Abrahamic)    
Atheist/Non-Affiliated   7.459*(3.384) 
Non-Western Religion   11.912*(5.851) 
Constant 84.697*** (2.617) 
86.990*** 
(3.027) 
83.895***
(8.148) 
Pseudo R2 0.3250 0.3852 0.4487 
Note: Scales are based on a possible score of 0–100 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data.
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001. 
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Figure 5.2 Scatterplot and fitted curve for PIOS and HOS scores 
 
3. Property Attitudes and Value Orientation 
As was also expected, positive attitudes toward private property are inversely correlated 
with humanistic values (p≤0.001), but positively correlated with possessive individualism 
(p≤0.001) (Table 5.2).  These correlations, both with coefficients (r) greater than ±0.65, 
were actually stronger than those between property attitudes and other ostensibly 
“ownership oriented” attitudes measured by Belk’s “Materialism” sub-scales 
(Possessiveness and Non-generosity).  While these latter scales were still positively 
related with PAS as expected, their correlations (r) with PAS were relatively weak, with 
neither coefficient surpassing 0.40 (p≤0.001).   
Table 5.4 presents bivariate regressions between property attitudes (PAS) and humanism 
(HOS) and possessive individualism (PIOS), respectively.  A notable characteristic of 
these relationships is the similarity in the magnitude of these relationships predicted in 
bivariate OLS regressions.  The regression coefficients (β) predicting PAS scores are 
−0.65 for HOS (Model 6a) and 0.65 for PIOS (Model 7a).  Both coefficients were 
statistically significant at (p≤0.001), and the direction and statistical significance of these 
relationships remains consistent both when examining only cases with zero missing data 
and when controlling for demographic variables.   
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Table 5.4 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from bivariate OLS 
regression models predicting property attitudes (PAS) 
 PAS and HOS PAS and PIOS 
 Model 6a (n=133) 
Model 6b† 
(n=94) 
Model 7a 
(n=133) 
Model 7b† 
(n=94) 
Humanistic Orientation 
Scale (HOS) 
−0.652*** 
(0.065) 
−0.672*** 
(0.078) 
  
Possessive Individualist 
Orientation Scale (PIOS) 
  0.651*** 
(0.055) 
0.686*** 
(0.059) 
Constant 94.366*** (4.485) 
96.812*** 
(5.3900) 
28.253*** 
(2.228) 
26.973*** 
(2.480) 
Pseudo R2 0.4273 0.4425 0.5139 0.5905 
Note: PAS, HOS, PIOS are based on a possible score of 0–100. 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data. 
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001  
 
The scatterplots and LOESS curves depicted in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 provide visual 
illustration of the relationships that PAS has with HOS and with PIOS.  With the 
exception of the opposite direction of the relationship itself (and the positive and negative 
skew of respondents’ HOS and PIOS scores), one can observe similarities in both the 
magnitude of “effect” that each value orientation has in relation to PAS and the linear 
pattern that these relationships appear to follow.     
The foregoing analyses of the relationship between PAS and HOS indicate that private 
property attitudes are inversely related with humanistic values in the study sample.  That 
is to say, the more emphatically an individual expresses support for humanistic values 
and ideas, the less support they are predicted to have for notions of private property.  
Thus, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3 (H3). 
Conversely, analyses of the relationship between PAS and PIOS indicate a positive 
correlation between private property attitudes and possessive individualist values, and 
therefore provide support for Hypothesis 4 (H4) as well.  It will be noted, however, that 
the strength of the correlation between PAS and PIOS (as well as the similarity in effects 
that each has in relation to moral reasoning and humanism) should inspire some caution 
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as to the possibility of multi-collinearity between these two exploratory scales (see 
Section III.B below for further discussion on this issue). 
Figure 5.3 Scatterplot and fitted curve for Private Property Attitudes (PAS) and 
Humanistic Orientation Scale (HOS) scores 
 
Figure 5.4 Scatterplot and fitted curve for Private Property Attitudes (PAS) and 
Possessive Individualist Orientation Scale (PIOS) scores 
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4. Value Orientations and Moral Reasoning 
Table 5.5 present the results of bivariate regressions predicting the relationship of MAS 
with HOS and with PIOS.  As was expected, Model 8a yielded a positive relationship 
between humanism and cognitive moral autonomy (β=0.67; p≤0.001).  Additionally, 
HOS also explained nearly one quarter of the variation in MAS (R2=0.241).  Both the 
regression coefficient and the R-squared value for this relationship was the highest of all 
attitudinal predictors of MAS examined in the study (although PIOS was a close second 
in both regards). 
Indeed, the results of Model 9a indicate that although the correlation between PIOS and 
MAS was in the opposite direction, it was otherwise comparable to the linear relationship 
between HOS–MAS in terms of both estimated effect-size (β=−0.60; p ≤0.001) and the 
proportion of variance it explained (R2=0.235).40 
Table 5.5 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression models 
predicting Moral Autonomy Score (MAS) 
 MAS and HOS MAS and PIOS 
 Model 8a (n=137) 
Model 8b† 
(n=94) 
Model 9a 
(n=135) 
Model 9b† 
(n=94) 
Humanistic Orientation 
Scale (HOS) 
0.667*** 
(0.100) 
0.661*** 
(0.119) 
  
Possessive Individualist 
Orientation Scale (PIOS) 
  −0.604*** 
(0.093) 
−0.639*** 
(0.102) 
Constant 2.716
(6.858) 
2.850
(8.249) 
68.470*** 
(3.771) 
71.266*** 
(4.279) 
Pseudo R2 0.2413 0.2440 0.2350 0.2922 
Note: HOS and PIOS are based on a possible score of 0–100 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data. 
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001;  
                                               
40 Multivariate regressions controlling for demographic characteristics in each of the above 
relationships yielded no substantive differences in effect size, nor revealed any additional 
predictors of MAS, and are therefore not presented in this dissertation (available on request). 
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These findings provide support for both Hypothesis 5 (H5), that measures of humanism 
(HOS) are positively related with the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning (MAS), 
and Hypothesis 6 (H6), that possessive individualism (PIOS) is inversely related with the 
exercise of autonomous moral reasoning (MAS). 
C. Summary of Findings 
To recap the study’s findings thus far: it will be recalled that Section I.A. of this chapter 
investigated the relationship between private property attitudes and cognitive moral 
autonomy (H1).  OLS regressions indicated a statistically significant relationship between 
PAS and MAS within the sample, even when controlling for demographic variables and 
materialistic attitudes like possessiveness and non-generosity.  The results presented in 
Section I.B. provided evidence supporting each of the study’s hypotheses as well—i.e., 
that humanistic and possessive individualist value orientations are correlated with one 
another (H2), with property attitudes (H3, H4), and with moral reasoning (H5, H6).  
Considering the complexity that these statistical interrelationships represent in social-
theoretical terms, the dissertation will now undertake further exploration—and hopefully 
some clarification—of the observed relationships. Namely, in the interest of “scratching 
the surface” of an understanding of property and moral reasoning, it will investigate 
whether the relationship between property attitudes and moral reasoning remains 
significant when controlling for humanism and possessive individualism, or whether 
these relationships are confounded or mediated in some way. 
II. FURTHER EXPLORATION: PROPERTY ATTITUDES, VALUE 
ORIENTATION, AND MORAL REASONING 
The results described in the previous section suggest that property attitudes and cultural 
value orientations (humanism and possessive individualism) are interrelated in many 
ways—both among one another and with moral reasoning.  Given this dissertation’s main 
theoretical objective of empirically exploring Marxist humanism’s theoretical critiques 
concerning private property and morality, this section seeks to disentangle some of those 
interrelationships and, more specifically, to explore how cultural value orientations like 
humanism and possessive individualism impact the relationship between property 
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attitudes and cognitive moral autonomy.  Do the relationships that PAS, HOS, and PIOS 
each have with MAS remain consistent when the other scales are held constant?  Answers 
to this question may not only impact the strength of support for Hypotheses 1, 5, and 6 of 
this study; they may also provide a clearer picture of the relative salience that each of 
these factors has in predicting cognitive moral autonomy.  
Table 5.6 presents a series of three nested OLS regression models estimating linear 
relationships between cognitive moral autonomy and the key demographic and attitudinal 
variables addressed in this study.  These models were constructed to further explore the 
relationship between property attitudes and moral reasoning by controlling for possibly 
confounding effects of cultural value orientations, possessiveness, and non-generosity.  
Model 10 presents the regression coefficients predicting cognitive moral autonomy when 
PAS, HOS, Possessiveness, Non-generosity, and demographic characteristics are 
accounted for.  Model 11 provides a similar analysis, but controls for PIOS instead of 
HOS.  Lastly, Model 12 holds both HOS and PIOS constant in the same equation (along 
with PAS, demographic characteristics, and the Belk sub-scales). 
In Model 10, when other variables are held constant, PAS is inversely correlated with 
MAS (β= −0.36; p≤0.05), while HOS is positively correlated with MAS (β=0.41; 
p≤0.01).  Thus, property attitudes appear to be correlated with cognitive moral autonomy 
even when humanistic values, possessiveness, non-generosity, and demographic factors 
are accounted for.  However, it is only in Model 10 that PAS is a statistically significant 
predictor of MAS.  The relationship between moral autonomy and PAS is not significant 
when controlling for PIOS and the other covariates in Model 11.  Likewise, it is not 
significant in Model 12 when all variables—demographic, attitudinal, and value 
orientations—are accounted for. 41  
                                               
41 The results presented above are from analyses of the Moral Autonomy Score for both moral 
dilemmas. Regression analyses calculated for each separate dilemma provided less conclusive 
estimates than those estimating overall MAS (possibly due to the lower variation in dilemma 
scores).  While Model 10 did predict a positive relationship between HOS and MAS in Dilemma 
2 (not shown, available on request), the standard errors of most of these models are too high to 
predict any significant relationships. 
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Table 5.6 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression models 
predicting the use of autonomous (B-type) moral reasoning on two hypothetical 
dilemmas 
 Model 10(n=94) 
Model 11
(n=94) 
Model 12
(n=94) 
Property Attitudes
(Private = Higher) 
−0.357*
(0.171) 
−0.258
(0.201) 
−0.132
(0.207) 
Age −0.286(0.315) 
−0.316
(0.314) 
−0.255
(0.310) 
Gender
(Female) 
−2.875
(5.598) 
−4.385
(5.637) 
−3.922
(5.544) 
Education 
(<High School)    
Post-Secondary −0.610(6.958) 
−1.931
(7.010) 
−1.844
(6.887) 
Post-Graduate 1.275(6.726) 
0.787
(6.747) 
0.924
(6.629) 
Faculty Type  
(Humanistic) 
1.935
(5.209) 
2.282
(5.220) 
1.899
(5.132) 
Religion
(Abrahamic)    
Atheist/Non-Affiliated −5.399(5.203) 
−2.522
(5.156) 
−4.405
(5.154) 
Non-Western Religion −7.013(8.932) 
−2.718
(8.810) 
−6.035
(8.816) 
Possessiveness 0.128(0.132) 
0.067
(0.133) 
0.092
(0.131) 
Non-Generosity −0.280(0.156) 
−0.228
(0.160) 
−0.215
(0.157) 
Humanism (HOS) 0.405*(0.164)  
0.330*
(0.166) 
Possessive Individualism (POS)  −0.408*(0.172) 
−0.324
(0.174) 
Constant 53.636*(22.676) 
92.354***
(14.881) 
58.421*
(22.488) 
Pseudo R2 0.2635 0.2594 0.2851 
Note: Scales are based on a possible score of 0–100. 
*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001.  
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Although controlling for PIOS appears to “cancel out” the relationship between PAS and 
moral autonomy in Model 11, whereas controlling for HOS failed to do so in Model 10, it 
would be incorrect to assume that possessive individualism therefore stands as the 
“underlying” predictor of cognitive moral autonomy.  Holding all other variables 
constant, Model 12 predicts a positive relationship between MAS and HOS (β=0.33; 
p≤0.05), but no significant relationship between MAS and either PIOS or PAS.  Thus, 
among the psychometric variables explored in this study, it is humanism that appears to 
be the strongest predictor of autonomous moral reasoning.  
These results stand to both complicate and clarify several things for our understanding of 
the study hypotheses: First, Hypothesis 1 remains partially supported, but some 
qualifications are now clearly required.  Second, the conceptual and statistical similarities 
in the ways PAS and PIOS relate with other variables throughout the study suggests a 
need to reflect critically upon whether these scales in fact measure the same thing.  Third, 
among the three hypotheses concerning scale variables and moral reasoning (H1, H5, H6), 
it is the hypothesis relating humanism to morally autonomous reasoning (H5) which 
receives the strongest support.  Discussion of the study’s overall implications will be 
taken up by way of these three key points. 
III. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. Hypothesis 1 Revisited 
Findings from Models 1–3 yielded inverse correlations between property ownership 
attitudes and autonomous moral reasoning. Both the bivariate and multivariate models 
suggest that, when tasked with adjudicating a moral dilemma, participants with a strong 
preference for private over public property tend to rely more on “preconstructed,” 
heteronomous justifications than participants with more strongly collectivistic attitudes.  
By holding constant such demographic and biographic factors as an individual’s age, 
gender, religion, and educational milieu (i.e., level of education, humanistic/technological 
university program), it is possible to show that this relationship cannot be explained away 
by these background characteristics of the individual.  Furthermore, by controlling for 
attitudinal characteristics like Possessiveness and Non-generosity, it is also possible to 
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show that the inverse relationship between attitudes toward property ownership (qua 
property relations) and moral reasoning exists even when an individual’s attitudes toward 
the control over objects is held constant.  These relationships appear consistent not only 
for predictions of an overall Moral Autonomy Score (MAS), but for Moral Autonomy 
Scores in each of the two dilemmas that were administered.   
The exploratory analyses undertaken in Section I.B. provide some additional support for 
the study’s main hypothesis (H1), that positive private property ownership attitudes are 
inversely related with the use of autonomous moral reasoning. On the one hand, it was 
shown that when demographic characteristics, materialistic attitudes, and humanistic 
values are held constant, an inverse relationship between PAS and MAS is still observed.  
The cultural and social-theoretical significance of this result is worth serious 
consideration, as it suggests that the relationship observed in Model 10 between private 
property attitudes and moral reasoning cannot simply be explained away by an 
oversampling of “humanistic youth”; it suggests, in fact, that even among humanists (or 
non-humanists), individuals’ attitudes toward property norms bear a significant 
relationship with the exercise of morally autonomous reasoning.  
On the other hand, however, the exploratory analysis also found that the relationship 
between property attitudes and moral reasoning disappears when possessive individualist 
values are held constant alongside other variables (i.e., Model 11, Model 12), leaving 
Hypothesis 1 only partially supportable.  Based on these findings, it appears untenable to 
regard the relationship between private property attitudes and moral reasoning as a fact 
independent of certain ideological values and beliefs.  Instead, it is necessary to account 
for the ways that cultural value orientations impact individuals’ apperception and/or 
judgment of moral dilemmas.  Given the results of Model 11 and Model 12, it is 
necessary to reflect upon whether property ownership attitudes might simply entail a 
more generalized notion of property, one that encompasses one’s own self and social 
relations—i.e., possessive individualism. 
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B. Private Property and Possessive Individualism 
Insofar as individuals’ attitudes toward private property norms might actually express a 
broader set of ideas and values regarding what should be “mine,” and what should be 
“ours,” the theoretical framework developed by C. B. Macpherson (1962) provides a 
compelling point of reference—especially for examining the neo-liberal ethos of 
contemporary North American capitalism.42  Moreover, insofar as either property 
attitudes or possessive individualism are inversely correlated with morally autonomous 
thought (as has been shown to be the case in this study wherever PAS and PIOS are not 
held constant in relation to one another), these relationships appear consistent with 
Macpherson’s (1966) observations regarding the undemocratic character of unfettered 
private property rights.  Thus, while the exploratory analyses controlling for both PAS 
and PIOS stand to reduce the support that may be ascribed directly to Hypothesis 1, they 
appear at least somewhat consistent with the broader theoretical principles involved.   
Importantly, they also serve to dispel any simplistic interpretation of the 
interrelationships among property attitudes, value orientation, and moral cognition.  
Instead, they elicit a number of exciting new theoretical and empirical problems 
concerning the cultural and moral complexity of psychological ownership.   
More concretely, the results of the current study suggest that further investigation into 
property attitudes and possessive individualist values, both toward the refinement and 
differentiation of the Property Attitude Scale and Possessive Individualist Orientation 
Scale and toward various social-psychological phenomena that they might be used to 
investigate, would be a worthwhile undertaking. 
C. The Humanistic Ethos 
It is of considerable theoretical interest that humanism remains a significant predictor of 
cognitive moral autonomy even when other factors such as property attitudes, 
                                               
42 It will be recalled that essence of possessive individualism lies in a conception of private 
property that extends even to notions of the self—i.e., the individual as “essentially the proprietor 
of his own person and capacities” (Macpherson 1962: 263; emphasis added). 
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possessiveness, non-generosity, possessive individualism, age, gender, educational 
milieu, and religion are held constant.  Among the three hypotheses concerning scale 
variables and moral reasoning, it was the hypothesis relating HOS to MAS that received 
the strongest support (H5). As noted above, it is also interesting that HOS and PAS 
operated as statistically significant (albeit oppositional) covariate predictors of morally 
autonomous reasoning.   
How might we make sense of these results?  It is worth considering how the social and 
psychological recognition of “the other” lies at the crossroads of both humanistic values 
and moral autonomy. It seems reasonable to suggest that the regard one holds for the 
worth and dignity of one’s fellow human beings is an integral determinant of how one 
apperceives and reasons about dilemmas of conflicting interest among persons.  In the 
course of moral deliberation, for instance, a paradigmatic sensitivity to distinguishing the 
needs and interests of human beings from the exigencies of institutional or doctrinal 
norms (and prioritizing the former over the latter) epitomizes the philosophical and 
psychological conceptions of both humanism and moral autonomy.   
That this connection has been found to exist alongside attitudes to private property in 
predicting the use of morally autonomous reasoning—and that these characteristics 
should exert opposing “forces” upon moral reasoning (Model 10)—reflects in statistical 
terms the central thesis of Marx’s philosophical critique of bourgeois property.  It 
suggest, as Marx postulates, that the ideological effect of private property is that it “leads 
every man to see in other men, not the realization but rather the limitation of his own 
liberty” (1978a: 42), but also—and perhaps more optimistically— that “the positive 
transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life is, therefore, the 
positive transcendence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man…to his 
human, i.e., social  mode of existence” (1978b: 85; emphasis in the original).  While the 
results of the study’s hypothesis tests and the exploratory analyses are not without 
limitations (see Chapter 6), and merely scratch the surface of a comprehensive critical 
social-psychology of property ownership, they nonetheless appear to provide limited 
corroboration for the ethical crux of Marxist-humanist social theory: that in the face of 
the near-hegemonic cultural impetus toward privatism, individualism, and 
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commercialization, it is one’s sense of humanistic solidarity with others that remains the 
decisive factor in whether the expression of one’s cognitive moral faculties is an exercise 
of activity or passivity—of freedom or of alienation. 
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Chapter 6  
6 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The study of property ownership and moral reasoning intersects fields of moral 
development psychology, critical sociology, political theory, law, history, and normative 
ethics.  A study of these two broad phenomena is therefore bound to suffer some degree 
of conceptual underdevelopment from the standpoint of any one particular discipline.  In 
reference to his pioneering efforts to bridge the disciplinary gap between psychology and 
philosophy, Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) remarked, “obviously a developmental 
psychologist must be a fool to enter the den of philosophical wolves…unless he has to”—
and then he proceeded to spend the remainder of his life demonstrating just why such a 
venture was necessary (p. 103).  The current social-psychological study was undertaken 
with the same disposition in mind.  It has sketched a framework for a “critical social-
psychology” of morality, and sought to explore the possibilities for such a framework 
through a study of people’s property attitudes and moral reasoning.  It has done so with 
the aim of contributing to a number of social-scientific research areas by drawing their 
respective theoretical, epistemological, and methodological frameworks into 
conversation.  Namely, it has sought to subject Karl Marx’s theoretical critiques of 
private property to empirical investigation, and it has sought to augment its social-
psychological exploration of the relationship between moral reasoning and property 
ownership by exploring connections to concepts from ego psychology (e.g. Erikson 
1975) and political theory (e.g. Macpherson 1962).  In this chapter, a consideration the 
study’s limitations and contributions, as well as a few points of clarification, will be 
presented.  The chapter concludes with some closing remarks on the study’s main 
findings, sociological implications, and directions for future research.   
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I. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 
CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Research Protocol 
1. Research Sample 
The sampling method used in this research presents some limitations for the 
generalizability of the study’s findings.  The convenience sample drawn for the study 
lacks control over the demographic characteristics of the survey sample.  Due to the lack 
of monetary incentive provided, it is also possible that the survey attracted participants 
who were less “extrinsically motivated” than the general population (although providing 
cash or prize incentives for participation is not without its own set of drawbacks). 
2. Measures of Gender 
The sample contained an unexpected amount of missing data on respondents’ gender.  
The method of collecting data on this variable was outlined in Chapter 3 and techniques 
for addressing missing data were described in Chapter 4.  Given the lack of statistical 
correlation between non-response rate on gender and any other variable in the study, but 
also the open-ended text-box format of the question, it is plausible that some participants 
did not understand what was being asked of them in the question, “What gender do you 
identify as?” or simply overlooked the question.  Future research might better address this 
issue by providing a set list of options (e.g. “male,” “female,” “other/non-binary gender 
identity—please specify,” etc.) to reduce the non-response rate on the question.    
3. Measures of Social Class 
Future research should also include a measure of social class because it is of obvious 
sociological importance.  A shortcoming of the present research is that it does not include 
a measure of class in the questionnaire (although given the sample characteristics—i.e., 
participants attended a relatively affluent post-secondary institution—much variation in 
class would not have been expected).  Given the characteristics of the present study, it is 
not obvious what kinds of class differences might emerge and the variable would have 
been treated as an exploratory measure.   
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Nevertheless, there are some areas of theoretical interest that would justify including this 
variable in future research studies.  While a full examination of the impact of class 
habitus on moral reasoning and property attitudes was beyond the scope of this study, it is 
reasonable to account for the possibility that certain cultural dispositions and/or economic 
freedoms “inherited” from one’s parents might effect what and how an individual thinks 
about things like property, morality, etc.  It is possible, for instance, that the kind of 
cultural and economic circumstances of an individual’s primary socialization may affect 
persons’ ingrained value orientations (e.g. humanism, possessive individualism), 
ownership attitudes, or “moral perceptions of the social world” (Bourdieu 1984: 435; see 
also, Ignatow 2010 and Sayer 2010).  
4. Response Bias 
The study questionnaire contained three main sections: demographic information, moral 
reasoning questionnaires, and attitude scales.  In order to reduce response bias, items in 
each of the attitude scales were presented in randomized order.  However, the moral 
reasoning questionnaire and the surveys were not themselves randomized, meaning that 
participants always completed the latter after the former.  Consequently, it is possible that 
the study’s results may be affected by question order bias.  For instance, it is possible that 
participants might seek to rationalize the moral judgments expressed in the moral 
reasoning questionnaire by giving ideologically similar responses to the attitude scale 
items.  It is also possible that participant exhaustion could lead to less attentive responses 
to questions in the latter parts of the survey.  Future research could mitigate these 
possible forms of bias by ensuring that the order of attitudinal and moral reasoning 
sections in the survey are randomized.   
B. Attitudes Scales 
1. Value Orientation Scales 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage fully with the rich complexity of 
Erikson’s psychoanalytic and developmental theories, or with Macpherson’s analyses of 
liberal democracy and property ownership, much less with all of the fields that their ideas 
have impacted.  The more modest objective for this study has been to draw upon the 
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Eriksonian conception of a humanistic orientation, and the Macphersonian conception of 
possessive individualism, in exploring the study’s main topic.  In this regard, this study 
has sought to extend its analysis beyond “merely” the attitudes or normative-ethical 
judgments of its participants.  As was discussed in Chapter 4, the Humanistic Orientation 
Scale (HOS) was used to measure participants’ humanistic value orientation, whereas a 
Possessive Individualism scale (PIOS) was constructed for purposes of this study to 
explore participants’ possessive individualist value orientation. 
Regarding the former, the results of the present research suggest that it may also be 
possible to derive important insights concerning the relationships among humanism, 
property attitudes and moral cognition.  Further, more direct examination of the 
interaction and potential mediating effect among these variables, as well as their 
implications for ego development, all appear to be a fertile site for future research (cf. 
Côté and Levine 1989; Levine, Jakubowski and Côté 1992; Levine et al. 2000). 
Regarding the latter, the final Possessive Individualist Orientation Scale (PIOS) 
performed acceptably on tests for construct validity (Cronbach’s alpha and Principal 
Component Analysis).  Since not all of the original items appeared to fit the construct, 
however, the scale ended up shorter, and perhaps more theoretically limited in its 
encapsulation of possessive individualism proper, than originally expected.  The scale 
nevertheless appears to be promising, and further development of a psychometric 
instrument for possessive individualism stands to fill a gap in the literature noted by 
Carter (2005) and Storms (2004).  Key objectives for this task include distinguishing 
measures of possessive individualism from measures of property attitudes and capitalistic 
ideologies, and also improving the construct validity of the scale overall.   
2. Property Attitudes  
Like the PIOS, the Property Attitude Scale (PAS) was constructed as an exploratory scale 
for the purposes of this study.  Principal Component Analyses indicate that this scale is 
acceptable for exploratory purposes, but further refinement and elaboration upon scale 
items would be a direction for future research.  Such an undertaking would contribute to 
the field of ownership psychology by more clearly distinguishing between the following: 
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the psychological phenomenon of property ownership as things and the social-
psychological phenomenon of property ownership as relations.   
Additionally, while the scale is intended to measure attitudes toward property relations 
along a spectrum of exclusionary (i.e., private) versus inclusionary (i.e., social) attitudes 
to ownership relations, many of the ideas expressed in the items correspond closely with 
Fromm’s (1976) conception of the “having” orientation.  Bearing in mind some 
theoretical constraints inherent in attempting to quantitatively operationalize Fromm’s 
more “dynamic,” psychoanalytically oriented concepts (Fromm 1990), there could 
nevertheless be much social scientific value to be gained from developing psychometric 
measures for the “Having” and “Being” orientations (1976).  
C. Moral Judgment Questionnaire 
The online survey format of the moral dilemma questionnaire prevented a more 
comprehensive in-person interview process, such as the one developed by Kohlberg. 
Nevertheless, the procedures for interpreting “A-type” and “B-type” moral statements 
provided a broad range of Moral Autonomy Scores overall.  Given the differences in 
participants’ mean scores in the two dilemmas, and the weak–moderate correlation 
between them (r=0.35), future research might strive to investigate whether qualitative 
characteristics of the dilemmas themselves stimulate differences in participants’ 
apperception and adjudication of the moral situation.  As was noted earlier, Levine’s 
(1976) research suggests that particularly among individuals at the “conventional” level 
of moral development, one’s sense of obligation, empathy, and sympathy tend to vary in 
intensity depending on the meaningfulness that one ascribes to specific issues, interests, 
and parties within the dilemma itself.  This could possibly explain the stark differences in 
the use of autonomous/heteronomous reasoning between dilemmas by some participants, 
or (as in the following example) the contradictory moral statements they expressed from 
one dilemma to the next. For instance, Respondent 3nAVP states that it is wrong for 
Terence to steal a life-saving drug for a stranger because “stealing is wrong, and wrong 
actions bring negative results” (Dilemma 1), but that it is permissible for Anna to give her 
employer’s baked goods to homeless people because “compassion and kindness will 
bring her blessings” (Dilemma 2). 
118 
 
Future research could examine how dilemmas themselves might account for the 
particular “types” of moral cognition participants exercise.  Development of the scoring 
methodology used in the present study might therefore include non-property related 
moral dilemmas involving various treatments on the actors and relationships described 
(e.g., men/women, foreigners/native-born; best friends, strangers, business rivals, etc.). 
D. Regarding Questions of Researcher Bias 
Given the philosophically contentious implications of this study’s subject matter (i.e., 
issues of private ownership and moral “autonomy”), it is possible that this research may 
encounter accusations of methodological and/or ideological bias.  First, it is possible that 
these research findings may receive criticism on the grounds that the study commits the 
fallacy of petitio principii, “begging the question” (i.e., that its conclusions have already 
been assumed in its methodological premises).  It may be objected, for instance, that 
property attitudes are simply moral judgments in an alternative form—that by featuring 
moral dilemmas related to an individual’s conformity with or rejection of property norms, 
the study measures the same thing twice, and thus “stacks the deck” toward coding 
“autonomous” (i.e. “B-type”) scores for participants who are already likely to prefer 
“social” forms of ownership over “private” forms.  A second possible objection might be 
that the study contains an implicitly “socialist” bias, not simply in terms of its research 
interest in Marxian theory but more substantively in its (supposed) association of 
“autonomy” with law-breaking activities such as stealing a life-saving drug or 
appropriating a business owner’s commercial property to feed the poor.  Since these 
objections are likely to be based in some misunderstandings of the research protocol 
and/or confusion about the relevance of political ideology to the measures, the following 
points of discussion aim to address such objections and to provide some clarification on 
the study’s theoretical implications.  
Regarding the first point of criticism, it is possible that one may interpret the study as 
essentially measuring the same variable twice.  I should therefore like to clarify what 
makes the Property Attitudes Scale (PAS) and the Moral Autonomy Score (MAS) 
distinctly different social-psychological variables.  The PAS developed for this study is 
concerned specifically with the attitudes that an individual has toward various norms of 
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property ownership, conceived of as a continuum from preferring “social” forms of 
ownership to “private” forms.  In this regard, it concerns the relatively unreflective 
cognitive “contents” of an individual’s perception of the world.  Such concerns differ 
categorically from the exercise of moral cognition, which concerns the active process of 
adjudicating between/among competing interests on the basis of some conception of 
justice/fairness/care/etc. Whether an individual’s moral judgments are the result of an 
“active reconstruction” of the relevant norms of the moral situation, or whether they rely 
passively on the authority of “preconstructed” norms or rules remains a matter 
theoretically distinct from any particular set of attitudes an individual might have.   
This distinction also explains why very different methods were used to operationalize and 
measure the attitudinal and moral reasoning variables.  It will be recalled that property 
attitudes were measured using the PAS, an exploratory scale comprised of several Likert-
style items relating to an individual’s specific attitudes toward social relations of 
ownership, resource accessibility and allocation, and resource redistribution.  In contrast, 
“cognitive moral autonomy” was measured by examining whether a “moral statement” 
met set criteria for “autonomous reasoning” formulated by Kohlberg et al. (1984) and 
Colby and Kohlberg (1987).  Such criteria neither pertain to an individual’s property 
attitudes nor do they prescribe any particular “social” or “private” ownership norm; 
rather, they assess the qualities of participants’ normative expressions for indications of 
autonomous moral reasoning, and are therefore categorically distinct variables.43   
                                               
43 In other words, it is perfectly plausible that an individual could “autonomously” advocate for 
private property, or draw from “heteronomous” norms to advocate for social property—or 
formulate autonomous or heteronomous judgments on moral grounds independent of property 
norms/attitudes altogether, such as the following two examples: 
“If [Terence] goes to jail for stealing, his wife will be cured and he will get out of jail and be with 
her again.  But if he does not steal it, then she will die and he will never get to see her again.” 
(Respondent 2YQFC; statement scored “Autonomous” for hierarchy). 
“…I think the most effective method would be a public slander campaign against the Doctor, 
forcing him to lower the price.” (Respondent XuDsP; statement scored “Heteronomous” for 
prescriptivity). 
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A second line of criticism this study may face concerns the possibility of a “Marxist bias” 
in its measurement of moral statements —one that implicitly associates “autonomy” with 
criticism of private property regimes.  For instance, it might be assumed that participants 
who prefer “social” or socialist forms of ownership will, by virtue of this 
“sociocentricity,” tend to be more inclined to reject the kinds of property laws at stake in 
the dilemmas, and that this may bias “autonomy” scores toward respondents with more 
“socialist” ideologies.  This objection is worth considering especially given the relevance 
of the study to socialist theory.   
It should first be noted that such a “criticism” essentially reconstructs the study’s main 
hypothesis—that individuals with positive attitudes toward social ownership will for 
various theoretical reasons tend to exercise moral autonomy at greater rates than those 
who prefer private ownership.  But this is only a hypothetical postulation—the charge of 
“researcher bias” would be mistaken because this outcome is far from guaranteed.  One 
can, for instance, imagine cases in which an individual with a high regard for private 
property ownership exercises a high degree of moral autonomy.  Indeed, if the principles 
of neo-liberal capitalism are true, it follows that private property constitutes the basis for 
free, autonomous thought!  At any rate, there is no evidence to suggest that individuals 
with socialistic attitudes toward ownership are inherently more morally autonomous.  It is 
equally plausible that the property attitudes of socialists or capitalists, progressives or 
conservatives, could have had an inverse relation to moral autonomy from the one 
observed here (or that that political ideologies operate independently of moral cognition 
entirely).   
It should therefore be borne in mind that while the study was designed to explore whether 
some of the social-psychological tenets of Marx’s theories about bourgeois property and 
bourgeois morality could be supported empirically, the study’s cognitive-operational 
measures may be regarded as politically and ideologically neutral in and of themselves. 
Rather, it is the empirical relationship that they share with property attitudes and value 
orientations that constitutes the politically interesting issue.   
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II. CONCLUSION 
The current project has explored the social-psychological factors associated with property 
attitudes and moral reasoning.  In drawing upon Jean Piaget’s and Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
theories as a framework for grounding “the moral domain” in terms of dilemmas of 
action, it demonstrates the continued vitality of their theories for interdisciplinary 
examination of the contexts and processes in and through which individuals apperceive 
and reason about moral problems. The value of using a Kohlbergian framework lies in 
the possibility of examining how social norms and values (e.g. those concerning property, 
individuality, and human dignity) relate not only to what but to also how people think 
about moral problems—and the extent to which that thinking is in fact “theirs.” 
By attempting to sketch the characteristics of a critical social-psychology of morality 
(Chapter 2), and subjecting the postulations of Marxian theorists to empirical 
investigation (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), this research has sought to re-assert the relevance of 
critical social theory in contemporaneous social scientific discussions of the moral 
(Abend 2010; Hitlin and Vaisey 2013).  Specifically, this dissertation has explored the 
hypothesis that in modern capitalist society, the “freedom” to think and possibly act in 
accordance with one’s self-chosen values—that is, to think and possibly act 
autonomously—is inversely correlated with the strength of an individual’s preferences for 
private over social property norms.  “Social power is today more than ever mediated by 
power over things,” writes Horkheimer (1947: 129–130); “the more intense an 
individual’s concern with power over things, the more will things dominate him, the 
more will he lack any genuine individual traits, and the more will his mind be 
transformed into an automaton of formalized reason.”  Likewise, Marcuse (1964) warns 
that “if the individuals find themselves in the things which shape their life they do so, not 
by giving, but by accepting the law of things—not the law of physics but the law of 
society” (p. 11).  The investigation undertaken in this study provides tentative empirical 
support for such postulations.  Its results suggest that attitudes that place “property over 
people” tend to also be associated not simply with an “acceptance” but with a reliance on 
the authority of society’s “pre-constructed” moral norms, rather than being associated 
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with an autonomous exercise of rationality and reason amongst mutually-respecting 
persons.   
Furthermore, the findings of this research suggest, in accord with the radical humanism 
of Karl Marx and Erich Fromm, that property ownership and moral reasoning are also 
connected by their shared normative implications for the individual’s sense of social 
being.  Insofar as a person’s relation to the world is grounded by an orientation of moral 
and ontological solidarity with others, norms of ownership and rightness tend to be 
understood nominalistically, as the constructions of moral actors capable of 
developmental change.  Insofar as a person’s sense of being is abstracted from moral and 
ontological solidarity with others—that is, insofar as a person fails to develop a “view of 
self” integrated with the moral, the social, and the other—norms of ownership and 
rightness become mystified, dominating the individual as a force external to him or her.  
What these relationships point to is a stark contradiction between the “freedom” that 
property purports to afford the individual, and the wherewithal to exercise freedom as a 
fully conscious human being.  Thus, the exploratory analyses presented in this study 
appear to support the theoretical postulations of the Marxist-humanist tradition, that the 
reification of private property may not just obstruct access to resources but also access to 
the kinds of social-psychological faculties necessary for reasoned, mutually respectful 
deliberations of human interests.  
In conclusion, classical and contemporary critical theory has produced no shortage of 
compelling philosophical critiques of the oppressive, alienating effects of private 
property.  This dissertation has investigated these theories through a mixed-methods 
social-psychological study—and has thus sought to empirically “scratch the surface” of 
ascertaining the relationship between property and moral autonomy.  It therefore 
constitutes both the continuation of a centuries-old tradition of critical inquiry examining 
the morally deleterious effects of resource privatization, and also a very modest next-step 
toward assessing the social and psychological veracity of such analyses.  Clearly, 
however, the results of the study are not sufficient to support the postulation that the 
institution of private property inhibits the development of morality.  To subject such a 
postulation to empirical scrutiny would likely require a stratified, cross-cultural 
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longitudinal research design, a task clearly beyond the scope of the present study.  What 
the results of the present study appear to indicate, however, is the reasonableness of 
pursuing such research, and the broad cross-disciplinary relevance of its subject matter. If 
future research should stand to refute such developmental postulations, then the 
philosophical validity of many theoretical claims within the Western critical tradition 
would possibly have to either be rejected or scaled back; however, if such research 
should come to produce valid, robust findings substantiating such developmental 
postulations, it would stand to verify in empirical terms that private property does not 
simply hinder human morality in the social-structural sense, but that it is associated with 
the restriction of the individual’s very cognitive abilities to actualize the full extent of 
their moral selves.  Whatever the outcome of such future research, the stakes of human 
morality and reason are too high for us not to ask such important questions and 
vigorously pursue the answers to them.   
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Appendix B Sample Recruitment Flyer 
 
 
!
 
 
 
Looking for Study Participants! 
Project Title: Ownership Attitudes and Moral Reasoning 
 
Is stealing always wrong?   
Are we morally obligated to share with others? 
 
 
What sorts of moral guidelines do you use to answer these kinds of 
questions? 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study looking at how people’s 
attitudes toward owning things (e.g., property, possessions, ideas) may relate to 
the various ways people think about moral problems.  It includes a survey about 
people’s opinions on various social issues relating to property ownership, as well 
as a section in which people are asked to share their views on various “moral 
dilemmas.” 
 
If you are a student (graduate or undergraduate) at Western or its affiliates and 
are 18 years of age or older, then you are eligible to participate.  The study is 
entirely ONLINE, so it can be completed at your convenience, and uses a web-
based survey with the following URL link: 
 
https://goo.gl/M6AdA40
 
 
 
For more information, please contact Robert Nonomura (rnonomur@uwo.ca)!
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Appendix C (continued): Moral Dilemmas 
Instructions 
In this next section you will be presented with two (2) fictional scenarios in which characters 
encounter a “moral dilemma”: a case where they are faced with various possible actions and must 
determine what they “ought” to do. 
Here we would like to know your opinion on what the morally “right” thing to do is, and, in 
particular, your reasons for that opinion. 
You will be provided a text box where you will be asked to provide additional details explaining 
your moral beliefs about what the character “ought” to do in this situation.  We do not assume 
that any responses you give should be considered “correct” or “incorrect”; what we are interested 
to know in this study are your reasons for why you yourself believe that this is what ought to be 
done. 
MORAL DILEMMA #1 
Let's imagine that in London, ON, a young woman was near death due to a rare, life-threatening 
illness.  There was one drug that doctors knew might save her that a pharmacologist in London 
had recently discovered.  The pharmacologist was charging $10,000 for the drug, ten times the 
amount of what it cost to produce.   
The sick woman’s husband, “Terence,” had been to everyone he knew to ask if he could borrow 
the money, but he had only been able to come up with half of the money the pharmacologist was 
asking for.  In desperation, Terence went to see the pharmacologist.  He told the pharmacologist 
that his wife was dying and asked the pharmacologist to sell the drug to him for less, or let him 
pay later.  The pharmacologist, however, refused.   
After attempting every legal option, Terence was thinking about stealing the drug.  
1. Should Terence steal the drug? 
Why or why not? 
2. Does Terence have a duty (to his wife) to steal the drug? 
Why or why not? 
3. Suppose the person who was dying is not his wife but a stranger.  Should Terence steal 
the drug for the stranger? 
Why or why not? 
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MORAL DILEMMA #2 
The Eriksons were a working class family.  Mr. Erikson's job did not pay very much and Mrs. 
Erikson had to take care of their six children.  Anna, the oldest child, found an after-school job at 
a bakery to help the family make ends meet.  The owner of the bakery, who was quite well off, 
was very strict and insisted that unsold goods be sold at discounts the next day. One day two very 
hungry homeless people came to the bakery asking for a bit of food because there were no food 
banks or shelters in the town. 
It was obvious to Anna that these people were truly hungry and in need, and she was inclined to 
give them the unsold baked goods at the end of the day.  She was, however, afraid that if the 
owner found out, she would probably be fired, and she doubted that she would be able to find a 
new job to support her family. 
1. Do you think Anna should give the homeless people some of the baked goods? 
Why or why not? 
2. If Anna does give them some food, would this be the same as stealing? 
Please explain your answer. 
3. Would it be fair that the homeless people get baked goods for free, while other customers 
have to pay for them? 
Why or why not? 
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Appendix D Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression 
models predicting Moral Autonomy Score (MAS) for Moral Dilemma 1 
 Model 1-1(n=133) 
Model 1b-1† 
(n=95) 
Model 2-1
(n=94) 
Model 3-1
(n=95) 
Property Attitude Scale 
(PAS) (Private = Higher) 
−0.466*** 
(0.137) 
−0.568***
(0.152) 
−0.612***
(0.171) 
−0.534**
(0.183) 
Age   −0.752
(0.403) 
−0.819*
(0.405) 
Gender (Female)   −8.262
(7.106) 
−10.912
(7.258) 
Education  (<High School)     
Post-Secondary   −1.973
(8.665) 
−2.010
 (9.022) 
Post-Graduate   3.738
(8.589) 
3.039
(8.722) 
Faculty Type  (Humanistic)   −1.595
(6.706) 
−0.466
(6.750) 
Religion (Abrahamic)     
Atheist/Non-Affiliated   −4.124
(6.583) 
−2.817
(6.655) 
Non-Western Religion   −13.327
(11.182) 
−9.135
(11.393) 
Possessiveness    0.147
(0.171) 
Non-Generosity    −0.358
(0.201) 
Constant 65.712***
(7.460) 
72.308***
(8.408) 
106.036***
(18.016) 
107.165***
(19.128) 
Pseudo R2 0.0739 0.1215 0.1209 0.1312 
Note: PAS is based on a possible score of 0–100 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001 
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Appendix E Regression coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression 
models predicting Moral Autonomy Score (MAS) for Moral Dilemma 2 
 Model 1-2(n=133) 
Model 1b-2† 
(n=95) 
Model 2-2
(n=95) 
Model 3-2
(n=94) 
Property Attitude Scale 
(PAS)(Private = Higher) 
−0.704***
(0.136) 
−0.735***
(0.151) 
−0.724***
(0.171) 
−0.678***
(0.184) 
Age   0.163
(0.402) 
0.102
(0.408) 
Gender (Female)   8.517
(7.079) 
6.444
(7.305) 
Education  (<High School)     
Post−Secondary   3.019
(8.632) 
3.827
(9.081) 
Post−Graduate   -0.545
(8.556) 
-0.678
(8.779) 
Faculty Type  (Humanistic)   6.419
(6.680) 
6.962
(6.794) 
Religion (Abrahamic)     
Atheist/Non-Affiliated   −6.537
(6.558) 
−5.921
(6.698) 
Non-Western Religion   7.434
(11.139) 
10.621
(11.467) 
Possessiveness    0.144
 (0.172) 
Non-Generosity    −0.273
(0.202) 
Constant 89.160*** 
(7.392) 
92.391*** 
(8.347) 
79.330***
(17.947) 
79.547***
(19.252) 
Pseudo R2 0.1636 0.1957 0.1854 0.1831 
Note: PAS is based on a possible score of 0–100 
†Regression includes only respondents with no missing data*p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; ***p≤0.001 
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